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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Few would dispute that adult personal relationships characterized by caring and commitment 
ought to be recognized and supported by the state because of their fundamental importance to the 
well-being of individuals and communities. The law has long sought to identify these relationships by 
reference to ties of blood, marriage or adoption. Contemporary norms, however, value adult 
personal relationships by reference to their qualitative attributes rather than their formal legal status. 
This shift in normative assumptions has accompanied profound shifts in Canadians’ living 
arrangements over the course of the last thirty years. We have witnessed a decline in the marriage 
rate, and sharp increases in the rate of non-marital cohabitation, divorce, non-marital and single-
parent child rearing.   
In seeking to recognize and support adult relationships of caring and commitment, the state 
should be guided by the fundamental values of autonomy, privacy, equality and security that are 
central to our constitutional and political traditions. Individuals should be free to choose whether 
(and with whom) to form personal relationships. The state should promote relational autonomy by 
avoiding policies that create pressure to abandon relationships of caring and commitment, or that 
accord preferential status to certain categories of relationships defined without reference to their 
qualitative attributes. The state ought to promote privacy by avoiding intrusion into peoples’ homes 
and by avoiding legal rules that cannot be administered effectively without intrusive examinations 
into peoples’ intimate lives. The state should promote equality by regulating adult personal 
relationships by reference to qualities that are relevant to legitimate state objectives. The values of 
equality and security require the state to seek to prevent exploitation and violence in personal 
relationships. Finally, the value of security requires that the state put in place an identifiable and 
accessible set of legal mechanisms to protect persons’ reasonable expectations formed in adult 
personal relationships. 
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Existing federal legislation seeks to recognize and support adult personal relationships of 
caring and commitment through the pursuit of two legislative objectives. The first is the 
establishment of legal mechanisms for the formation and dissolution of relationships. Currently this 
is accomplished primarily through the law of marriage and divorce. The second objective is to 
respond to the consequences of relationships characterized by emotional and economic 
interdependence. This objective manifests itself at every stage of the evolution of adult personal 
relationships. The state has an interest in supporting the integrity and security of ongoing 
relationships of caring and commitment, and recognizing the value of caregiving provided in those 
relationships. The state has an interest in protecting people from violence and exploitation to which 
they may be particularly vulnerable in personal relationships. The possible existence of shared 
economic interests arising in relationships of caring and commitment is relevant to many state 
objectives in the context of the regulation of economic transactions. The economic and emotional 
interdependence that characterizes adult personal relationships can be disrupted by a number of 
events such as injury, illness, retirement, death or relationship break down. The state has an interest 
in cushioning the impact that the sudden loss of emotional and economic support can have on 
persons in relationships of caring and commitment, and in ensuring an equitable distribution of 
economic entitlements on the break down of a relationship. 
After summarizing existing federal statutes that employ relational terms, and categorizing 
them according to the relational objectives they pursue, this report pursues the question of how to 
reform these statutes to better support relationships of caring and commitment in a manner that 
promotes the values of autonomy, privacy, equality and security. The report pursues this inquiry in 
two stages. The first is to ask whether the relational objectives underlying particular statutory 
schemes are still compelling. If not, the statutes should be repealed or the relational terms removed. 
Second, if a statute is pursuing a legitimate relational objective, the question is how to go about 
defining the relationships to which it ought to apply. 
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The report identifies a number of laws that do not effectively pursue legitimate relational 
objectives. These include the rules on spousal testimonial competence and compellability in the 
Canada Evidence Act, the monthly allowance provisions of the Old Age Security Act, the anal 
intercourse provision of the Criminal Code, and the insurable employment provisions of the 
Employment Insurance Act. In each of these contexts, the current legislative provisions employing 
relational terms do not pursue legitimate relational objectives in a coherent and compelling manner. 
Other statutes employing relational terms require considerable revision to eliminate the dated or 
questionable assumptions on which they rely. The guaranteed income supplement provisions of the 
Old Age Security Act, the duty to provide necessaries of life provision of the Criminal Code, and the  
wrongful death provisions of the Canada Shipping Act are examples of statutes in need of revision 
to bring them into line with contemporary relational norms and expectations. 
Federal statutes have employed a remarkable diversity of relational terms to accomplish their 
objectives. These relational terms have been restricted, for the most part, to capturing relationships 
flowing from ties of blood, marriage or adoption. Until recently, with the exception of pension and tax 
statutes, federal statutes did not recognize persons cohabiting outside marriage. The Modernization 
of Benefits and Obligations Act, passed shortly after the completion of this report, will add a new 
definition - “common law partner” - to the vast majority of federal statutes. Cohabiting couples, 
whether of the same or opposite-sex, will qualify as common law partners if they have lived together 
for at least one year in a conjugal relationship. Conjugality is now the marker that determines which 
unmarried, cohabiting adult couples will be included within federal legislation. 
The report suggests that using conjugality as a central feature of the new relational definition 
has a number of disadvantages. The distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships is 
an elusive one. The conjugality requirement may result in inquiries into matters, such as the 
partners’ sexual lives, that bear no relationship to legitimate state objectives. It may be possible to 
draft a legislative definition that focuses solely and more effectively on the existence of the three 
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qualitative attributes that are normally relevant to legitimate state relational objectives, namely, 
shared residence, emotional intimacy and economic interdependence. 
The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act takes important steps forward in 
implementing the principle of relational equality in federal statutes. It does so, however, by relying on 
the ascribed or imposed status of “common law partner”. The values of equality, autonomy, privacy 
and security could be significantly advanced if the state would broaden opportunities for persons 
living together to choose to formalize their relationships. This could be accomplished in two ways: by 
removing the legal bar to same-sex marriage, and by implementing a domestic partnership regime. 
A careful analysis of the most recent judicial rulings on the equality rights in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms reveals that the opposite-sex definition of marriage is vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. A government committed to meeting its constitutional obligations, and to 
supporting relationships of caring and commitment, ought to remove the opposite-sex component 
from the legal definition of marriage.  
Whether or not the definition of marriage is amended in the future, the federal government 
ought to enact a domestic partnership law that would enable any two adults to register as partners 
for the purposes of federal laws and policies. Federal statutes should then be amended to accord 
registered domestic partners the same package of rights and obligations as spouses. A domestic 
partnership law would promote the equality and autonomy of non-conjugal cohabitants by permitting 
them to subscribe to the full package of spousal/ partnership benefits and obligations from which 
they are currently excluded. Even for unmarried couples living together in conjugal relationships, a 
registered domestic partnership option would present a number of advantages over the current 
legislative scheme: it would enable them to avoid the delays, uncertainties and potentially invasive 
inquiries generated by the administration of the definition of common law partner. 
A domestic partnership regime is the best way to address the needs of non-conjugal 
cohabiting couples who are currently excluded from relational definitions in many federal statutes. 
Whether non-conjugal cohabitants who choose not to register as partners ought to be included in 
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federal laws can only be answered on a statute-by-statute basis. The report argues that there is a 
compelling basis for subjecting non-conjugal cohabitants to the Criminal Code duty to provide each 
other with the necessaries of life. Similarly, non-conjugal cohabitants should be included in the 
Immigration Act’s sponsorship provisions. They should be able to invoke the testimonial privilege 
that is attached  to private communications by the Canada Evidence Act. On the other hand, to 
accord to non-conjugal unregistered cohabitants a right to a division of pension entitlements, or a 
right to claim pension survivor’s benefits, runs the risk of undermining their autonomy and 
reasonable expectations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Two individuals have lived together for fifteen years. They have a joint bank account to pay 
for household expenses. They own their house jointly. They have a close emotional relationship. 
They share meals. They care for each other through illness and other hardships. They attend social 
and community events together. They have come to depend on each other for all of these things, 
and have no intention of changing the interwoven nature of their lives. How should the state treat 
these individuals? Should their relationship be included in rules regulating personal conflicts of 
interest? Should they have a legal obligation to provide for each other’s basic needs? Should the 
state provide financial relief if their household income is suddenly diminished as a result of disability, 
retirement or death? Should their entitlement to income-tested social assistance be calculated by 
reference to their combined household income? If their relationship breaks down, should they be 
able to claim support from one another? If one of them dies, should the other be able to claim 
benefits from the deceased’s employment pension plan or sue the person whose negligence was 
responsible for the death? 
 The answer to these questions has long revolved around whether the two individuals were 
married. If they were married, then they would be included within the broad web of legal regulation 
that imposed benefits and obligations. If they were not married, they remained outside of this web of 
regulation. Their entitlements depended on their status. Over the course of the last twenty-five 
years, Canadian legislatures have increasingly included unmarried opposite-sex couples within laws 
dealing with relational benefits and obligations, if they were cohabiting in a “conjugal” or marriage-
like relationship. If two individuals were of the opposite sex, living in a conjugal relationship (which 
although elusive, in the past seemed to involve amongst other factors, a sexual relationship), then 
they would be entitled to a few federal benefits and obligations, but would have remained excluded 
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from many others. If they were of the same sex, they would have been excluded. And if they were 
not living in a conjugal relationship, they would be excluded.  
With the impending enactment of Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations 
Act,1 most benefits and obligations in federal statutes will be extended to both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples if they are living in a conjugal relationship. So, in the case of the two 
individuals we described above who share so many aspects of their lives, they will be entitled to 
most federal benefits and obligations if they have lived together in a conjugal relationship for at least 
one year. If they are not living in a conjugal relationship, they will remain largely outside of the web 
of federal regulation of adult personal relationships.2  
 Of course, all of this begs the basic normative question of whether the individuals should be 
included. Should the legal regulation of adult personal relationships depend on marital or marital-like 
status? Should individuals in non-conjugal relationships be more extensively included within this 
legal regulation? What is the basis of the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal couples? 
Should inclusion within the web of legal regulation depend on the existence of a sexual relationship? 
As we will explore in considerable detail, it is no longer clear that the legal distinction between 
conjugal and non-conjugal couples revolves around the existence of a sexual relationship. And if 
sexual intimacy is not the defining feature of a conjugal relationship, then what is the basis of the 
distinction? If two individuals live together in a relationship of economic and emotional 
interdependence, should they be included within the web of legal regulation, regardless of their 
“conjugal” status?   
                                                 
1
  Bill C-23, An Act to modernize the Statutes of Canada in relation to benefits and obligations, 2nd Sess., 36th Parl., 2000 
(as passed by the House of Commons April 11, 2000). At the time of writing (May 2000), the Bill is being considered by 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. It is likely that the Bill will soon receive Royal 
Assent. We have prepared this report on the assumption that the amendments proposed by Bill C-23 will soon be a 
part of federal statutes. 
2
  They may fall within federal statutes that employ terms such as “dependant” or “related person” and define those terms 
broadly to include non-conjugal cohabitants. At the moment, federal statutes that embrace non-conjugal cohabitants 
are relatively few in number. They do not include the most significant laws extending benefits and obligations in 
relational terms. 
3 
In this research paper, we explore all of these questions regarding the legal regulation of 
adult personal relationships. In order to answer these questions, we address two fundamentally 
interconnected issues: why should the state regulate these relationships, and which relationships 
should be included within this regulation? In the past, the state has assumed an active role in 
regulating the marital relationship. Over the years, this regulation has expanded to include a range 
of other adult relationships. Many legal entitlements and obligations have been extended to 
“marriage-like” relationships, that is, to unmarried persons living together in conjugal relationships. 
At the same time, some legal entitlements and obligations have been extended to other familial or 
familial-like relationships, including “dependants”, “near relatives” and “related persons”. The 
growing web of legal regulation of adult personal relationships has embraced a wider range of 
relationships in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion. While the expected passage of Bill C-23 (the 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act) will bring a great deal more uniformity to the legal 
treatment of unmarried cohabiting couples in the federal sphere, federal legislation continues to 
approach non-conjugal familial relationships in an inconsistent manner. In some restricted spheres, 
non-conjugal relationships may qualify for benefits and obligations. More often, and in particular 
where direct financial support is at issue, these same relationships are not recognized.   
 There are a number of problems inherent in telling the story of the legal regulation of adult 
personal relationships. First, the very language we have used to tell the story may prove to be part of 
the problem. The terminology of “conjugal” and “non-conjugal”, which in many ways sets the terms 
of the current debate, is increasingly problematic. As we discuss below, the distinction has always 
been elusive and it may be that the legal coherence of the distinction is collapsing.   
 A second and related problem in telling the story of the legal regulation of adult personal 
relationships is that the history of this regulation risks reinforcing marriage as the unstated norm 
against which other types of relationships are described, evaluated and judged. The story suggests 
that the process is one of expanding the concept of marriage or conjugality to include more and 
more relationships; of beginning with marriage as the centre, and of gradually expanding the 
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boundaries of marriage and conjugality to accommodate other types of relationships. It is a story in 
which marriage remains the unstated norm, and in which the legal recognition of other types of 
personal relationships is cast against this norm. It is a story that downplays the extent to which the 
web of legal regulation already recognizes other types of relationships, and the extent to which these 
relationships should also operate as a norm for describing and evaluating the range of adult 
personal relationships that ought to be included within legal regulation.   
 In the first part of this paper, we consider the general question of why the state should 
regulate adult personal relationships, and which relationships should be included within this 
regulation. We examine the values and objectives that have shaped or should shape Canadian laws 
regarding adult personal relationships. We map existing federal legislation onto these objectives, 
and we explore the range of relational definitions - spousal and familial - that are used to advance 
these objectives. In the second part of the paper, we consider whether these objectives are well 
served by existing relational definitions, or whether these objectives would be better served by more 
inclusive or more consistent definitions. We begin by examining various legal models for identifying 
and defining adult relationships, including marriage, ascribed spousal/relational status, and 
registered domestic partnership regimes. We then return to specific federal statutes and objectives, 
and consider which of the models of inclusion is most appropriate in particular legislative contexts. In 
our view, there is no one model that will satisfy all of the objectives of federal legislation. The 
solution lies in finding the particular combination of legal options that best furthers legitimate state 
objectives in particular policy contexts. Overall, however, we believe that federal legislation needs to 
be far more inclusive of the broad range of adult personal relationships to better reflect and respect 
the diverse ways in which Canadians structure their personal relationships. We will argue that the 
enactment of a registered domestic partnership scheme, and the addition of registered domestic 
partners to the web of federal regulation, is the best way for Parliament to address the problems of 
under-inclusion that have not been addressed by Bill C-23. 
  
PART ONE 
 
 
IDENTIFYING VALUES AND OBJECTIVES  
AND MAPPING EXISTING LEGISLATION 
 
 
 
In the past, the State has assumed an active role in supporting the marital relationship. While 
many legal entitlements and obligations have been extended over the years to unmarried cohabiting 
couples, marriage – or a marriage-like relationship - has continued to be used as a proxy for the 
kinds of relationships that the state should support. The general question that this section will 
address is why has the state supported these marital and marital-like relationships?  We examine 
the objectives that have shaped Canadian laws regarding personal relationships in the past, and the 
objectives that shape contemporary Canadian laws regarding personal relationships. We attempt to 
categorize and map existing federal legislation that employs spousal or other relational definitions on 
to the list of objectives we have identified. Finally, we illustrate the range of spousal and 
relationships definitions contained within federal legislation, and highlight the range of adult personal 
relationships that are excluded from these definitions.  
 
 
 
I. Values and Objectives of State Regulation 
 
 
The traditional objective of the state regulation of adult personal relationships has often been 
framed as one of promoting marriage. However, marriage over time has served many different 
objectives. In this section, we begin with a brief history of the legal regulation of marriage, in which 
we highlight these shifting objectives. We then turn to critique this ‘traditional’ objective, by 
examining the demographic changes in the ways in which Canadians live in families, as well as the 
legal and normative shifts that have accompanied these demographic changes. Finally, we examine 
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the underlying values that ought to animate and shape the state regulation of adult personal 
relationships. We conclude that marriage, although important, no longer captures the spectrum of 
adult personal relationships deserving of state regulation.   
 
A. Traditional Objective of Promoting Marriage 
 
1. A brief history of marriage and its shifting objectives  
 
The history of the legal regulation of family relationships in Canada has been, as with other 
Western countries, a history of the centrality of marriage. English Canada inherited from England a 
legal tradition within which the institution of marriage was privileged over other adult relationships, 
and within which a range of status, rights and responsibilities were conferred exclusively on the 
basis of marriage. However, over the centuries, marriage has served many different purposes.   
In Roman law, marriage was considered a largely private matter, in which the law did not 
involve itself to any great extent in the formation or dissolution of marriage. The status of marriage 
did have important legal implications: “the existence or nonexistence of a marriage was indirectly 
significantly for Roman law when it had to deal with problems involving membership of the ‘houses’ 
of which the body politic was composed, with succession on death, or with allocation of responsibility 
for civil wrongs”.3 However, Roman law accepted whatever local custom recognized as marriage. 
“Marriage was to the Romans, as to the other peoples of antiquity, a de facto rather than a de jure 
matter, in the sense that two people were held to be married, not because they had gone through 
any particular ceremony, but because they in fact lived together as man and wife. ”4 The dissolution 
of marriage – a generally accepted practice - was similarly governed by custom. However, Roman 
law did impose some limitations: it did not recognize marriages between free persons and slaves, or 
                                                 
3
  Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law and Family in the United States and Western 
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) at 21.  
4
  Herbert Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967) at 113.  
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at one time, between senators and other upper class men and women of lower class or rank.5 
Marriage, in Roman time, although not a formal legal institution, was very much about citizenship 
and property.  
The modern day legacy of the strict legal regulation of marriage began to take shape with the 
rise of the Christian Church and its claim to exclusive jurisdiction over marriage. “The Church’s claim 
to exclusive jurisdiction over marital causes and the novel idea that marriage was indissoluble were 
both closely connected to the Christian idea that marriage is not only a natural institution and a 
contract between the spouses, but also a sacrament, that is, a channel of divine grace.”6 The 
dominance of the ecclesiastical courts over matrimonial causes was in place in England by the 
middle of the twelfth century. Canon law established the indissolubility of marriage, and along with it, 
a complex web of regulations for more precisely defining marriage.7 As part of the need to 
accommodate and assimilate local custom, up until the Council of Trent, the Church recognized 
both private, informal marriages and public, formal marriages. But, with the Decree Tametsi8 in 
1563, a public ceremony in the presence of a priest became a condition for a valid marriage. During 
this period, the legal regulation of marriage was very much about the Church’s struggle for political 
and social control. While the religious and political objectives were obvious, the discrediting of 
informal marriages was also animated by more secular concerns. The new merchant class, 
increasingly concerned with controlling its wealth, was concerned with the financial implications of 
clandestine marriages. Many wanted the Church to impose parental consent requirements. While 
the Church did not impose this requirement, it did require that the ceremony now be public.  
                                                 
5
  Glendon, supra note 3 at 21. 
6
  Ibid., at 23.  
7
  As Glendon explains, “Out of this need came the whole complex canon law system of marriage impediments and 
prohibitions. The multiplication of these causes of nullity in turn led to the need to investigate in advance of marriage 
whether impediments in fact existed and thus to the origin of the publication of the banns and the Church’s increasing 
insistence on public marriage, as well as to the elaboration of procedures for declaring marriages invalid.” Ibid. at 27 
8
  Council of Trent, 24th session, c.1. 
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In continental Europe, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the jurisdiction over 
marriage was slowly transferred from the Church to the secular authorities, who “simply took over 
much of the ready-made set of rules of the canon law”. 9 While the Reformation rejected the idea of 
marriage as a sacrament, its leaders did not question that marriage should continue to be governed 
by Christian principles.10 The eighteenth century saw the rise of the codification of private law, which 
included extensive regulation of the formation, dissolution and content of marriage, and the 
emergence of compulsory civil marriage ceremonies.  
In England, however, the Church of England maintained ecclesiastical jurisdiction well into 
the nineteenth century. Informal marriages remained valid until the passage of Lord Hardwicke’s Act 
in 1753,11 banning clandestine marriages, and setting out the basic requirements concerning the 
validity of marriage (such as age, registration, witnesses). The English common law was concerned 
with the integrity of the marital relationship. Through private law, it regulated entry into and restricted 
exit from marriage, as well as the economic consequences of marriage. The doctrine of marital unity 
established that “by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection and cover she performs every 
thing”.12 The marital relationship was a highly integrated, economic relationship, in which the wife 
was legally and financially dependent on her husband. Issues of status and filiation were crucially 
important. The status of marriage conveyed not only social and legal status on spouses, but 
conveyed social and legal status on children, controlling property and inheritance. Civil marriage was 
only introduced in 1836 with the Marriage Act13 and judicial divorce introduced in 1857 with the 
                                                 
9
  Ibid. at 31.  
10
 Ibid. 
11
 (U.K.), 26 Geo. II, c. 33. 
12
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
13
 1836 (U.K), 6&7 Will. 4, c. 85. 
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Matrimonial Causes Act.14 The mid-nineteenth century also saw the passage of the Married 
Women’s Property Acts,15 whereby married women obtained independent legal personality.16   
 
2. Marriage in the 20th Century  
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, Western family law systems had come to share, 
generally speaking, a common set of assumptions. Domestic relations law was organized 
around a unitary conception of the family as marriage-centred and patriarchal. Marriage was 
treated as an important support institution and decisive determinant of the social status of 
spouses and children. It was supposed in principle to last until the death of a spouse and was 
terminable during the lives of the spouses, if at all, only for serious cause. Family solidarity 
and the community of life between spouses were emphasized over the individual 
personalities and interest of family members. Within the family, the standard authority 
structure and pattern of role allocation decreed that the husband-father should predominate 
in decision making and should provide for the material needs of the family. The wife mother 
was to fulfil her role primarily by caring for the household and children. Procreation and child-
rearing were assumed to be major purposes of marriage, and sexual relations within 
marriage were supposed to be exclusive, at least for the wife. Marriage, procreation, and 
divorce were supposed to take place within legal categories. Illegitimate children had hardly 
any legal existence at all.   
    Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 
 
The idea of the conjugal family was, in the words of James Snell, “triumphantly popular” at the 
turn of the century in Canada. In terms that echo Glendon’s description quoted above, Snell has 
described nineteenth century attitudes to the conjugal family as follows:  
Conceived as a single, uniform institution, it incorporated virtually all the principles and ideals 
valued by Canadian society. The family was the source of nurture and early training for 
children, of comfort and nourishment for weary men at the end of hard day’s work, and of 
women’s true fulfilment as wives and mothers.17  
 
Marriage was the cornerstone of this conjugal family and “it was seen to be equally at the heart of 
Canadian society”. Church and state joined together in sanctioning this family through the wedding 
ceremony.18 Marriage was the basic social and legal institution for reproduction and child rearing. It 
                                                 
14
 1857 (U.K.), 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. 
15
 See for example, Married Women’s Property Act, 1882 (U.K.), 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75. 
16
 This legal legacy provided the framework for English Canadian law. At the time of Confederation, jurisdiction over 
marriage was divided. The federal government was given jurisdiction over marriage and divorce under section 91(26) 
of the British North America Act (now Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 2, 
No. 5) and the provinces given jurisdiction over the solemnization of marriage under section 92(12). At the time, 
divorce was available either through an act of parliament, or where available, through divorce courts, although the law 
varied from province to province.  
17
 James Snell, In the Shadow of the Law: Divorce In Canada 1900-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).  
18
 Ibid. at 22.  
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was based on an ideology of separate spheres and a sexual division of labour, within which women 
were allocated the role of wives and mothers, “naturally” responsible for domestic labour and child 
care. Men, by contrast, as husbands and fathers, were responsible for supporting their families.  
As Snell observes, this conjugal family “was central to contemporary images of the Canadian 
nation”. And it was intricately tied to the project of building a national identity, and the role of the 
state was unquestionably one of supporting this family. “Over a vast area of authority and 
responsibility the state or its agents acted in various ways to support the idea of the family in its 
tangible expressions. Most directly these state activities were aimed at the maintenance of a 
particular form of the family: a family household dependent largely on men’s wage labour and on 
women’s domestic labour.”19 Policies on women and the family explicitly promoted this family and its 
sexual division of labour. Beginning as early as the 1880s, and continuing into the twentieth century, 
labour laws restricted women’s labour force participation, thereby enforcing women’s dependency 
on the family (though not for immigrant and working class women, who were encouraged into 
domestic employment).20 Mother’s allowances, initiated in 1916 in Manitoba, were designed  to  
assist  married  women  with  dependent  children  who  had  been  widowed or whose 
husbands were unable to provide for their families. It was designed to recognize that women who 
had been “appropriately” dependent on a male breadwinner would then fall into desperate economic 
circumstances upon the death, or disability of the breadwinner.21 Its objective was to encourage 
these women to stay in the home, rather than enter the work force.22 It was in effect seen as a 
“salary” rather than charity, and it excluded unwed or deserted mothers.23 Family law at this time 
began to impose and enforce more private financial obligations, to ensure that male breadwinners 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. at 28. 
20
  See Jane Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family (Toronto: Women’s Press, 
1992). 
21
  Ibid. at 157. 
22
  Snell, supra note 17 at 29.  
23
  Ursel, supra note 20 at 158. 
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did not abandon their dependants. As Ursel observes, “[t]he introduction of each new welfare 
measure was invariably coupled with more detailed laws of familial obligation to ensure that state 
support would only be received when all available family resources had been exhausted. For 
example, we find a coincidence of the enactment of the Old Age Pension Act with the introduction of 
Parents Maintenance Acts and a tightening up of maintenance laws with the introduction of Mothers’ 
Allowance.”24  
 The regulation of marriage was very much about promoting and stabilizing a particular family 
form, based on a male breadwinner and a female dependant responsible for childcare and domestic 
labour. While debates around reform to the law of divorce often articulated the objectives of legal 
regulation in terms of promoting the stability of marriage, and the integrity of the marital relationship, 
the objective of supporting this particular family form as the basic social unit was never far from the 
surface. The emergence of the social wage, as well as a range of state welfare policies, were all 
informed by and served to reinforce this conjugal family and its sexual division of labour.  
In the post-World War II period, the role of the state expanded, with the rise of the Keynesian 
welfare state, and the extension of a range of public benefits. The post-war period witnessed a rise 
in government expenditures on social services (education, health, social security) and income 
security programs (family allowances, old age security, and unemployment insurance). This period 
was also a time when the male breadwinner, nuclear family ideal appeared triumphant. Despite the 
founding principles of universality, many of the social programs of the era reflected this male 
breadwinner model. For example, in Canada, one of the earliest universal programs, the Family 
Allowance Act,25 was designed as a wage subsidy program and recognized women as mothers and 
homemakers. However, the Keynesian welfare state only took root in Canada in the mid 1960s, with 
the passage of several major federal statutes, including the Canada Pension Plan,26 the Canada 
                                                 
24
  Ibid., at 143.  
25
  S.C.1944, c.40. 
26
  S.C. 1964-65, c.51. 
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Assistance Plan,27 and the guaranteed income supplement amendments to the Old Age Security 
Act.28 Many of these programs were informed by assumptions about the male breadwinner model. 
For example, the Canada Pension Plan originally included a gender-specific widow’s pension. It was 
based on the assumption that married women were financially dependent on their breadwinner 
husbands.29 Further, if the widow remarried, she would lose her pension on the assumption that she 
would then be financially dependent on her new husband. Pension plans for federal public 
employees had similar survivor’s benefits for widows, similarly premised on the male breadwinner 
model.30   
In this male breadwinner model, marriage operated as a proxy for relationships of 
dependency. Marriage was assumed to involve a homemaker wife, who was financially dependent 
on her wage-earning husband. As such, marriage was assumed to be a highly economically 
integrated unit, in which wives provided unpaid domestic services and child care, and husbands 
provided financial support.  
 In current debates, particularly around same-sex marriage, much of this history disappears.  
The state interest in marriage is said to relate to reproduction, social stability, and social support.31 
Justice La Forest, in his dissenting opinion in Egan v. Canada, provided a classic statement of the 
“traditional” approach to marriage:  
Suffice it to say that marriage has from time immemorial been firmly grounded in our legal 
tradition, one that is itself a reflection of long standing philosophical and religious traditions.  
But its ultimate raison d’etre transcends all of these and is firmly anchored in the biological 
and social realities that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most 
children are the product of these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and 
nurtured by those who live in that relationship.32   
 
                                                 
27
  S.C.1966, c.45. 
28
  S.C. 1966-67, c.65. 
29
  See discussion below.  
30
  For  example,  the  original  versions  of  the  Public  Service  Superannuation Act   1953,  and  the  Canadian  Forces 
Superannuation Act, discussed below at notes 192-3.  
31
 See Martha Bailey, Marriage and Marriage-Like Relationships (Law Commission of Canada, 1999). 
32
 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at para 21[hereinafter Egan]  
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But, the promotion of marriage has, since “time immemorial” served many state objectives. 
Citizenship, property, religion, and supporting a sexual division of labour have all been important 
objectives in the legal regulation of marriage. Through this century, the objective of state regulation 
of marriage has been to support a particular family form, based on the assumptions of a male 
breadwinner and female dependency. As a result of these assumptions, marriage has been used in 
state regulation as a proxy for relationships of dependency.   
 
 
B. Critique of the Traditional Objectives: Demographic, Legal and 
Normative Changes 
 
 
In this section, we trace the demographic, legal and normative shifts that have together 
undermined the ‘traditional’ state objectives of promoting marriage. 
 
1. Demographic Shifts  
 
The last 30 years have witnessed major demographic shifts in the ways in which Canadians 
live in families, emphasizing the increasing diversity of adult relationships. This shift, referred to as a 
second demographic transition, is part of a trend in many Western countries, characterized by a 
growth in non-marital cohabitation and single parent families, a decline in marriage, a rise in divorce, 
and an increase in non-marital child bearing. While the majority of Canadians still live in families (in 
1996, 84% lived in families), the nature of those family settings has changed. In 1996, 45% of all 
families were married couples with children, 29% were married couples without children, 15% were 
lone-parent families, 6% were common law couples with children, and 6% were common law 
couples without children.33   
 
                                                 
33
 Statistics Canada, 1996 Census: Marital Status, Common-law Unions and Families: (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1997).  
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(a) Non-marital conjugal relationships 
Amongst the most dramatic changes in the second demographic transition is the growth in 
non-marital cohabitation. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of persons living in 
non-marital conjugal relationships, or what are often called common law relationships. Since the 
early 1980s, the number of persons living common law has tripled. There were approximately 
2,000,000 such persons in 1995, as compared to 700,000 in 1981. These couples living common 
law represented less than 1 in 16 couples in 1981, but had grown to nearly 1 in 6 by 1995. In 1995, 
14% of all Canadian couples were living common law, more than twice the proportion they 
represented in 1981 (6.3%). The number is even higher in Quebec where 25% of all couples were 
living common law. The increase in common law couples with children is also striking, growing from 
2.2% in 1981 to 5.5% in 1996.34 
There has been a corresponding increase in the number of first unions that are common law 
unions. Between 1970 and 1974, 17% of all first unions were common law. Between 1980 and 
1984, the percentage of first unions that were common law had grown to 41%, and between 1990 
and 1995, that number had increased again to 57%. The number again is higher in Quebec where 
80% of all first unions are common law.35   
 
(b) Marriage  
Over the past two decades, there has been a decrease in marriage rates. In 1991, there 
were 6.4 marriages per 1000 population, compared with 7.8 in 1981 and 8.9 in 1971. Marriage rates 
increased between 1986 and 1989, probably reflecting the changes to the Divorce Act,36 and the 
ability of divorcing couples who were now able to remarry once their divorces were finalized. Since 
                                                 
34
 See Anne-Marie Ambert, Divorce: Facts, Figures and Consequences (Ottawa: Vanier Institute of the Family) online: 
<http://www.vifamily.ca/cft/divorce.divorce.htm>; Pierre Turcotte and Alain Belanger, The Dynamics of Formation of 
First Common Law Unions in Canada, online: <http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/other9.htm>; Vanier Institute of 
the Family, Profiling Canada’s Families (Ottawa: Vanier Institute of the Family, 1994).  
35
 Anne-Marie Ambert, ibid., citing Pierre Turcotte and Alain Belanger, “Moving in Together: Formation of First Common 
Law Unions,” Canadian Social Trends at 7-10.  
36
 R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). 
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1990, marriage rates have again been decreasing. In 1995, the marriage rate was 5.4 per 1000 
population.37 Between 1995 and 1999, the total number of marriages in Canada has declined 
slightly, from 160,251 to 154,750.38 
 
(c) Divorce  
As Table One indicates, there was a dramatic increase in divorce following the enactment of 
the first federal Divorce Act in 1968,39 liberalizing the grounds of divorce, and another increase 
following the enactment of the new Act in 1985. However, divorce rates appeared to have peaked by 
1987, and there has been a slow but steady decrease in the total number of divorces since that 
time.  
TABLE ONE 
 
DIVORCE RATES IN CANADA40 
 
 
Year 
 
# of divorces 
 
Rate per 100,000 
pop. 
 
Rate per 
100,000 married 
couples 
1961 6,563 36.0 N/A 
1968 11,343 54.8 N/A 
1981 67, 671 271.8 1,174.4 
1985 61,980 253.6 1,103.3 
1987 96,200 362.3 1,585.5 
1993 78,226 N/A N/A 
1995 77,636 262.2 1,221.9 
1997 67,408 N/A N/A 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Statistics Canada, 1996 Census, supra note 33. 
38
 Statistics Canada, Canadian Statistics: Families, households and housing, online: 
<http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Families/famil04.htm>  
39
 S.C. 1967-68, c.24. 
40
 Source: Anne-Marie Ambert, supra note 34 based on Statistics Canada figures. 
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(d) Lone-Parent Families 
 In 1996, lone-parent families constituted 15% of all families, an increase from 11.3% in 1981. 
The vast majority of lone-parent families are headed by women (83% in 1996). The majority of lone 
parent families were divorced or separated.41 Both women and men are less likely to be lone parents 
as a result of the death of a spouse (20.6% and 23.4% respectively in 1991) compared to the 1950s 
and 1960s, when almost two thirds of lone parents were widows or widowers. In 1991, 20% of 
female lone parents were never married, as compared to approximately 8% of male lone parents.42 
 
(e) Non-Marital Childbearing 
In 1981, common law couples with children represented only 1.9% of all Canadian families. 
In 1996, the percentage of common law couples with children had grown to 5.5.%.   
 
(f) Women’s Labour Force Participation 
Since the mid-1960s, there was a been a dramatic increase in women’s labour force 
participation.  Table Two illustrates the increase in married women’s labour force participation.   
 
TABLE TWO 
 
WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION  
 
Year % of married women in labour 
force 
1941 5% 
1961 22% 
1985 55% 
1991 61% 
(source – Statistics Canada, Vanier Institute of the Family) 
 
 
                                                 
41
 In 1991, 32.5% of female lone parents were divorced, and 24.6% were separated. Similarly, 33.6% of male lone 
parents were divorced, and 37.6% were separated.  
42
 Colin Lindsay, Lone-Parent Families in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992).  
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In 1967, 61% of Canadian families had a sole male breadwinner, and only 34% had a dual 
male/female income earners. By 1990, only 15% of Canadian families followed a sole breadwinner 
model, and 62% had dual male/female income earners.43 Further, women’s incomes now contribute 
to an increasingly significant proportion of families’ incomes. In 1992, wives’ earnings represented 
31% of the income of dual income families, up from 29% in 1989, and 26% in 1967.44 Women’s 
participation in the labour market has become essential to the living standard of families.45 The male 
breadwinner model of the so-called traditional family no longer characterizes the vast majority of 
Canadian families.  
 
2. Legal Shifts 
Prior to the passage of Bill C-23, the federal regulation of adult personal relationships in 
many statutory contexts has relied exclusively on marriage as the marker of the relationships 
relevant to the accomplishment of policy objectives. Change arrived first in the context of pension 
survivor’s benefits. As early as 1919, and accelerat50ing in the 1950s, the marital model was 
expanded to include unmarried cohabiting couples in pension laws. In 1955 the Defence Services 
Pension Continuation Act46 created the discretion to deem a cohabitant to be a surviving widow if 
she could establish that she had “been maintained” and “publicly represented by the contributor as 
the spouse of the contributor”47 for seven years. The Canadian Forces Superannuation Act48 of 
                                                 
43
 Vanier Institute of the Family, supra note 34 at 74.  
44
 Statistics Canada, 1995 
45
 The relative importance of wives earnings to total family income is also reflected in the percentage of Canadian 
families whose income would fall below the low income cut-off points but for wives earnings.  In 1992, 4% of Canadian 
families were below this line. If women’s earnings were subtracted, 16% of these families were fall below the line. 
Statistics Canada, Ibid. at 88.   
46
 S.C. 1955, c.28. 
47
 For 7 years, if either the deceased or claimant were married to someone else, or for an unspecified ‘number of years’ if 
neither was married.  
48
 S.C. 1959, c. 21, s.12(4). 
 18 
 
1959 and the Canada Pension Plan49 of 1966 contained similar provisions permitting common law 
spouses to apply for widows’ pensions. The model for the recognition of common law relationships 
was highly restrictive. It was explicitly gender based, as a response to the assumed dependency of 
women within conjugal opposite-sex relationships. In contrast to the rights of a married spouse, it 
was up to the Minister’s discretion whether or not a common law spouse had a claim. The onus was 
placed on the claimant to establish the facts supporting the existence of the common law 
relationship and a lengthy period of cohabitation was required.  
Further expansion in the legal definitions of spouse did not occur until the mid-1970s, when 
the growth in non-marital cohabitation began to be accompanied by a gradual shift in the law’s 
approach, with a growing recognition of marriage-like relationships. With the increase in cohabitation 
outside of marriage, the law began, in an ad hoc manner, to extend rights and responsibilities to 
couples who lived in marital-like relationships. Private family law was slowly expanded in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, through the extension of support obligations and provisions dealing with 
cohabitation agreements,50 and the use of the principles of unjust enrichment to address the 
property rights of cohabiting couples.51 In the context of provincial social assistance, the state has 
always taken an expansive approach to the recognition of spousal relationships in an attempt to 
reduce welfare costs by privatizing support obligations.52 At the federal level, the rights of cohabiting 
couples were extended and strengthened in pension statutes. In 1975, for example, the spousal 
allowance was introduced in the Old Age Security Act, and the definition of spouse included 
“persons of the opposite sex who have lived together for at least one year and have publicly 
                                                 
49
 Canada Pension Plan, S.C. 1964-65, c. 51, s. 56. Remarriage terminated a widow’s right to a pension. Married 
spouses’ claims were also terminated by seven years of cohabitation with a common law spouse.  
50
  Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c.2. 
51
  Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.  
52
 See Shelley A.M. Gavigan, “Legal Forms, Family forms, Gendered Norms: What is a Spouse?”, (1999) 14 Can. J.L. & 
Soc. 127, 143 (arguing that especially for sole support mothers on social assistance, “the definition of ‘spouse’ has 
always been broad in reach and mean in its application”); see also Shelley A.M. Gavigan, “Paradise Lost, Paradox 
Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian and Gay Engagement to Law”, (1993) 31 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 589, 616. 
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represented themselves as man and wife”.53 In the 1970s Parliament made modest improvements to 
the limited recognition of common law spouses in the Canada Pension Plan and employment 
pension statutes.54 However, apart from pension statutes, all federal laws explicitly addressing the 
legal status of spouses, including those enacted in the 1970s and 1980s, continued to be restricted 
to married spouses.55 
In the 1990s, the definition of spouse again began to undergo further expansion, again in an 
ad hoc manner. In 1992, the Pension Benefits Division Act56 was enacted, and included opposite-
sex couples who cohabited in a conjugal relationship for not less than a year.57 In 1993, the 
definition of spouse in the Income Tax Act was similarly expanded beyond husbands and wives to 
include opposite-sex conjugal cohabitants who have lived “with the taxpayer in a conjugal 
relationship” for at least a year.58 Likewise, in 1995 the Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances 
Act59 was amended to entitle opposite-sex conjugal cohabitants to survivor’s benefits.60 
These reforms eroded the law’s role in privileging marital over non-marital relationships. At 
the same time, they continued and indeed consolidated the law’s role in privileging marriage-like or 
conjugal relationships over non-conjugal relationships. The objectives underlying the extension of 
rights and responsibilities to unmarried cohabitants was to recognize that these relationships were, 
in some respects, functionally similar to marital relationships, particularly in relation to economic 
                                                 
53
  R.S. 1970, c.O-6; as amended 1974-75-76, c. 58. This definition also applied for the Guaranteed Income Supplement 
under the Act.  
54
 The Canada Pension Plan and a number of employment superannuation plans were amended to extend survivor’s 
benefits to widowers, to eliminate the requirement that a common law spouse establish that she had been maintained 
by the deceased, and to reduce the required length of cohabitation before a common law spouse’s application for 
surivivor’s benefits could be considered. The details can be found in Appendix A, “Origins and Evolution of Definitions 
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  S.C. 1992, c.46. 
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  Pension Benefits Division Act, S.C. 1992, c.46, s.2(1).  
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  Income Tax Act, S.C. 1994, c.7, Sch. VIII (1993, c.24), subsec. 140(3), applicable as of January 1, 1993.  
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  R.S.C. 1985, c.M-5. 
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dependency. These laws were often based on a recognition and promotion of the same sexual 
division of labour, recognizing the economic dependency of women within opposite-sex 
relationships.   
More recently, the expansion of spousal definitions has been propelled by the constitutional 
norms of equality, which require the removal of discrimination on the basis of marital status. 61 This 
process of expanding the legal recognition of spousal-like relationships also began to be applied to 
same-sex couples, as constitutional norms increasingly required the removal of discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. In 1997, the British Columbia government introduced legislation 
extending legal rights and responsibilities to same-sex relationships. In 1999, the Ontario 
Government introduced Bill 5, which extended to same-sex couples the same legal rights and 
responsibilities as cohabiting opposite-sex couples.62 In 1999, the federal Public Sector Pension 
Investment Board Act, amended the definition of survivor in a range of federal pension laws to 
remove the opposite-sex requirement.63  And earlier this year, the federal government introduced Bill 
C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, which will significantly extend the rights and 
responsibilities of both opposite and same-sex unmarried cohabitants.   
 
3. Normative shifts 
 The demographic and legal shifts have been accompanied by a change in contemporary 
attitudes towards the regulation of adult relationships. There appears to be an emerging consensus 
in Canadian society that it is no longer legitimate to promote or discourage adult relationships solely 
on the basis of their status or formal attributes. Promoting relationships simply on the basis of status 
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  In 1986, Ontario enacted the Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c.64, an omnibus bill that 
amended the definition of spouse in over 30 statutes to include unmarried couples, based on the government’s 
assessment that marital status discrimination was covered under section 15 of the Charter.  
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 Bill 5, An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H., 1st Session, 37th 
Parl., Ontario, 1999 (assented to 25 October 1999, S.O. 1999, c.6). 
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 S.C. 1999, c. 34.  A ‘survivor’ is defined in s.29(1) as including a person ‘cohabiting in a relationship of a conjugal 
nature with the contributor for at least one year immediately before the death of the contributor’.  
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 (marital over non-marital, legitimate over illegitimate, biological over social, heterosexual over 
homosexual) is increasingly seen as violating the basic values of individual autonomy, privacy, 
equality and security.  
 
(a) Public Opinion 
There has been a significant shift in public attitudes towards non-marital unions over the last 
decade, particularly in attitudes towards same-sex couples. A brief review of public opinion polls 
over the last decade demonstrates this change.  
In 1992, a Gallop poll found that 61% of Canadians opposed same-sex marriages.64 In 1994, 
a Gallop poll found that more than 40% of Canadians under the age of 40 now support same-sex 
marriages compared with only 29% of the general population. 65 In 1996, an Angus Reid poll found 
that a slight majority of Canadians were in favour of same-sex marriage, with 49% of Canadians in 
favour of gay marriage and 47% opposed. 66 Fifty-five percent of respondents supported the 
granting of same-sex benefits.   
In 1998, an Angus Reid poll conducted for the Department of Justice found that 74% of 
respondents supported the extension of federal social benefits to gay couples, 69% wanted them to 
receive income benefits and obligations, and 67% said same-sex couples should receive the same 
benefits and obligations as common law couples.67  However, only 59% of respondents supported 
calling gay couples “spouses”. The support for legally calling same-sex couples "spouses" is most 
likely to come from Canadians between the ages of 18 to 34 years. The lowest levels of support 
tended to be among those over 54 years. The poll also found that 71% of respondents believed that 
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  Toronto Star (13 September 1992) 
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  Maclean’s (16 May 1994). 
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  British Columbia Report July 22, 1996.  
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  Canadian Press, “Canadians ready to accept same-sex marriage – poll: Gays should get benefits but not be called 
‘spouse’” Edmonton Journal (10 February 2000). 
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benefits and obligations should not depend on spouse-like relationships but on any relationship of 
economic dependency.68   
An Angus Reid survey carried out between May 25-30, 1999 found that 53% of Canadians 
believed that same-sex couples who wish to marry should be allowed to do so.69 The survey further 
found that 63% of Canadians believed that gays and lesbians should be entitled to spousal benefits. 
 Overall, the public opinion polls demonstrate shifting attitudes towards same-sex couples.  
Within less than a decade, a significant majority of Canadians now believe that same-sex couples 
should be entitled to the same spousal benefits as opposite-sex couples. And a slight majority of 
Canadians now support same-sex marriage. Moreover, the polls generally confirm that attitudes are 
generational, with younger Canadians increasingly supporting equal treatment and the right to marry 
for same-sex couples. While this issue does not appear to be have been tracked in the same way 
over time, the 1998 Angus Reid Poll reveals that Canadians are overwhelmingly in favour of 
extending benefits and obligations on the basis of economic dependency, rather than spousal 
status. Canadian attitudes towards the legal regulation of adult relationships seem to be moving 
away from exclusive support for the traditional family towards a broader approach that includes 
same-sex couples, as well as non-conjugal relationships. Canadians appear to be increasingly 
committed to freedom of intimate association, and to the equal treatment of and respect for the 
choices that individuals make in structuring their personal relationships.  
 
(b) Constitutional Values 
Canadian’s commitment to freedom of intimate association and to the equal treatment and 
respect of the choices that adults make in structuring their personal lives now finds constitutional 
expression. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms70 as well as federal and provincial 
human rights codes, prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status and sexual orientation. 
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 We focus here briefly on two leading decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that deal with 
marital status discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination, respectively.  
In Miron v. Trudel,71 the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 5-4 majority, held that a definition of 
spouse that excluded unmarried cohabiting couples for the purposes of recovering insurance 
benefits following a motor vehicle accident violated section 15 of the Charter. The majority opinions 
of McLachlin J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. held that section 15 prohibited discrimination against 
unmarried couples. In McLachlin J.’s view,  
…discrimination on the basis of marital status touches the essential dignity and worth of the 
individual in the same way as other recognized grounds of discrimination…. Specifically, it 
touches the individual’s freedom to live life with the mate of one’s choice in the fashion of 
one’s choice. This is a matter of defining importance to individuals. It is not a matter which 
should be excluded from Charter consideration…72 
 
Moreover, she said, the exclusion of unmarried cohabiting couples may perpetuate the historic 
disadvantage that they have suffered, ranging “from social ostracism through denial of status and 
benefits”.73 
Justice McLachlin further observed that “of late, legislators and jurists throughout our country 
have recognized that distinguishing between cohabiting couples on the basis of whether they are 
legally married or not fails to accord with current social values or realities.”74 She noted that many 
statutory provisions have extended rights and responsibilities to unmarried couples. Finally, the 
Court considered and rejected the argument that because marriage is “a good and honourable 
state”, it cannot be a ground of discrimination. According to McLachlin J., the issue is “not whether 
marriage is good”; rather, the issue is whether “marriage can be used to deny equal treatment to 
people on grounds which have nothing to do with their true worth or entitlement.” Quoting 
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s comments in Mossop that “It is not anti-family to support protection for non-
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 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. [hereinafter Miron] 
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 Ibid., para 151. 
73
 Ibid., at para 152. 
74
 Ibid., at para 155. 
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traditional families”, she added that “One might equally say it is not anti-marriage to accord equal 
benefit of the law to non-traditional couples”.75  
In the section 1 analysis, the Court concluded that the exclusion of cohabiting couples was 
not rationally connected to the objectives of the legislation of sustaining families when one of their 
members is injured in an automobile accident. According to the Court, marital status was not a 
reasonably relevant marker of individuals who should receive benefits in the event of any injury to a 
family member in such an accident. The majority concluded that this was one of those “exceptional 
cases” in which the appropriate remedy was “reading in”. It incorporated the subsequent 
amendments to the definition of spouse made to the Insurance Act76 into the standard automobile 
insurance policy.   
The Court’s ruling in Miron suggests that laws dealing with spousal relationships that exclude 
unmarried couples are likely to violate section 15 of the Charter. They will be unconstitutional unless 
the government can demonstrate that the limitation of these laws to married spouses is necessary to 
accomplish pressing and substantial objectives. Court rulings since Miron have declared 
unconstitutional laws that exclude common law couples from the right to seek spousal support and a 
division of family property pursuant to provincial family laws.77 Throughout the 1990s, a number of 
law reform commission reports across the country have similarly concluded that the continuing 
exclusion of common law couples’ right to seek a division of property from provincial family laws is 
not justifiable.78  While restricting rights and responsibilities to married couples was at one time the 
unquestioned norm of legal regulation, such restrictions have now come to be viewed as 
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discrimination on the basis of marital status, and a violation of the basic value of the equality of 
intimate relationships.   
 In M. v. H.,79 the Supreme Court of Canada, in an 8-1 majority, held that section 29 of the 
Ontario Family Law Act80 discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by excluding lesbians and 
gay men from the right to seek spousal support from a same-sex partner with whom they have 
cohabited. Applying the framework for equality analysis that a unanimous Court had elaborated in Law 
v. Canada,81 the principal majority judgement of Cory and Iacobucci JJ.82 found that section 29 of the 
Act violates the human dignity of lesbian and gay couples. According to the Court, the exclusion of 
these couples promotes the view that these couples are “less worthy of recognition and protection. It 
implies that they are judged to be incapable of forming intimate relationships of economic 
interdependence as compared to opposite-sex couples.” Moreover, “it perpetuates the disadvantages 
suffered by individuals in same-sex relationships and contributes to the erasure of their existence.”83  
 In the section 1 analysis, the majority held that the exclusion was not rationally related to the 
objectives underlying the spousal support provisions in Part III of the Family Law Act, which they 
characterized as dealing equitably with the economic needs of persons in interdependent relationships 
and the alleviation of claims on the public purse by privatizing the costs of family break down.84 The 
majority concluded that the appropriate remedy was to declare section 29 of the Act to be of no force 
and effect. The declaration was suspended  for six months to enable the Ontario legislature to consider 
ways of bringing this provision, and other laws, into conformity with the equality rights in the Charter.85 
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 Cory J. wrote the s.15 portion of the analysis, and  Iacobucci J.  dealt with the s.1 and remedial issues.  Lamer C.J.  and 
L’Heureux-Dubé, McLachlin and Binnie JJ. concurred with their joint judgment. Major J. and Bastarache J. wrote separate 
concurring judgments. Gonthier J. dissented. 
83
  M v. H, supra note 79 at para. 73. 
84
  Ibid. at para. 93. 
 26 
 
In M. v. H., the Supreme Court recognized the “conjugal nature” of same-sex relationships. 
For the first time, the Court recognized that same-sex relationships are entitled to the same rights 
and responsibilities as other unmarried conjugal relationships. While the Court was careful to restrict 
its conclusions to the legal provision at issue, its analysis had far-reaching implications. The Court 
noted that the legislatures may now wish to turn their attention to the numerous other statutes that 
rely on similar definitions of spouse.86 The immediate implication of the decision was clear – the time 
had come for governments to recognize same-sex couples on the same basis as other unmarried 
conjugal couples.   
 Together, Miron and M. v. H. are powerful statements of the normative commitment to 
freedom of intimate association and to the equal treatment and respect of the choices that adults 
make in structuring their personal lives. The once legitimate government objective of privileging the 
marital relationship over all other relationships in the allocation of rights and responsibilities has 
given way to a recognition of the different ways in which individuals enter into adult personal 
relationships. The constitutional decisions are both limited, however, to individuals living in 
“conjugal” or “marriage-like” relationships. These decisions do not speak to the question of 
extending recognition, rights and responsibilities to non-conjugal couples. While Canadian attitudes 
towards non-conjugal couples appear to also be changing, this normative shift has not yet witnessed 
a similar judicial or constitutional affirmation.   
The House of Commons has recently expressed its normative commitment to equality and 
freedom of intimate association in conjugal relationships by passing Bill C-23. In her comments on 
second reading of the Bill, Minister of Justice Anne McLellan stated that Bill C-23 is intended to bring 
federal statutes into line with the core Canadian values of “fairness, tolerance, respect and equality”. 
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She added that the Bill is designed to respect the principle of equal treatment of persons living in 
“recognized stable relationships”,87 that is, “committed common law relationships”.88 
 
4. Conclusion 
  
The demographic shifts in Canadian family structures are increasingly reflected in legal and 
normative shifts about the legal regulation of adult relationships. The second demographic 
transition, with its significant increase in unmarried cohabitation, has brought with it changed 
attitudes towards the once privileged marital relationship. While marriage remains an important 
social and normative institution for many Canadians, increasingly its status as the exclusive legal 
model for adult personal relationships is being abandoned. Other conjugal relationships – unmarried 
opposite-sex relationships and same-sex relationships - are increasingly seen as deserving of equal 
respect and recognition.  There appears to be an emerging consensus that the values of equality 
and autonomy, which we explore in greater detail in the section that follows, require that the legal 
regulation of adult relationships reflect the changes in how individuals enter into their intimate 
personal relationships.  
The legal regulation of non-conjugal relationships, however, is still relatively uncharted 
territory. On the one hand, as we will discuss in greater detail below, a broad range of non-conjugal 
relationships are already recognized in law. There appears to be considerable public support for the 
idea that benefits and obligations should depend on the existence of relationships of economic 
dependency, whether or not the relationships are conjugal or marriage-like.89 The recent debates 
around Bill C-23 seem to have brought this issue squarely onto the public agenda. The Minister of 
Justice, in introducing the Bill for first reading, acknowledged that “there is some interest in 
extending benefits and obligations to individuals in other relationships of economic and emotional 
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interdependence”. On the other hand, appropriate state approaches to the regulation of non-
conjugal relationships remain a relatively unexplored issue, and there is less evidence available that 
traces the demographic, legal and normative changes relevant to their situation.   
In the section that follows, we explore the values and objectives that ought to animate state 
regulation of adult personal relationships. We believe that many of these values and objectives have 
resonance for both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships alike. Just as marital status is no longer 
considered an appropriate marker for the distribution of benefits and obligations, we believe that 
there is reason to seriously interrogate the extent to which conjugality remains the appropriate 
marker.   
 
 
C. Identifying Legitimate Values and Policy Objectives  
 
 
1. Values  
 
We have identified five norms or values that ought to guide state regulation of adult personal 
relationships. The first is that relationships characterized by caring and commitment ought to be 
recognized and supported by the state because of their fundamental importance to the well-being of 
individuals and communities. The value of supporting and recognizing relationships of caring and 
commitment provides the underpinning of all legitimate state policies regarding adult personal 
relationships. It is, in that sense, the primary value at play in this context. The other four values 
come into play once it is accepted that the state ought to support and recognize relationships of 
caring and commitment. Those four values are autonomy, privacy, equality and security. The state 
ought to respect individuals’ ability to choose whether or not to form personal relationships. 
Likewise, absent violence or exploitation, choices of intimate companions and decisions regarding 
the termination of personal relationships ought not to be interfered with by state policy. The state 
ought to avoid examinations into the details of people’s intimate lives. Protecting a zone of personal 
privacy free from state intrusion is essential to creating a sense of security and trust in which 
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relationships of caring and commitment can flourish. In regulating adult personal relationships, the 
state must respect legal prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status and sexual 
orientation. And, finally, the state should seek to advance the security of persons in adult personal 
relationships by protecting their reasonable expectations. 
We believe there is little controversy about the relevance of these values. Indeed, the value 
of supporting relationships of caring and commitment is so self-evident that it is frequently taken for 
granted in the literature. It is a value that unites commentators across disciplinary and political 
divides. Much of the contemporary debate about family policy in liberal democratic societies is 
concerned with how best to accomplish the support of relationships of caring and commitment while 
at the same time respecting basic individual rights to autonomy, privacy, equality and security. While 
debates about appropriate family policies frequently generate passionate disagreements, the 
disputes are not about the relevance of the five values we have identified. They are, rather, about 
the implications of these values for the design of particular state policies in the face of dramatic 
social and economic changes. Before turning to that topic, we will outline the dimensions of each of 
the five values. 
 
(a) Caring and Commitment  
There is a growing consensus that the value of adult personal relationships should be 
measured by their qualitative attributes, that is, by the roles they perform, the needs they meet, and 
the satisfactions they provide. Giddens has observed that intimacy has been restructured in 
contemporary liberal democracies, such that adults now form and maintain personal relationships 
“for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another”.90 In a context of 
diverse and fluid domestic arrangements, the value of personal relationships must be located in 
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actual practices and functions rather than formal legal attributes. As Silva and Smart have stated, 
“what a family is appears intrinsically related to what it does”.91  
What do adult personal relationships do that makes them worthy of state support and 
recognition? The answer lies in the provision of care in committed relationships. We all have needs 
to be known and to know another, to be loved and to love another, to be cared for and to care for 
another. Caring for another entails a bundle of roles, such as attending to emotional and sexual 
needs, sharing resources to provide food, shelter and clothing, and providing personal services and 
guidance to dependants such as children or disabled, elderly or infirm adults. For these needs to be 
met, patience and devotion over an extended period of time is required. As Nussbaum has argued, 
people “have interpersonal needs that are a deep part of who they are, and these needs are 
frequently best satisfied in relationships involving commitments that bind the parties over time”.92 
Relationships of caring and commitment are a public as well as a private good. Living 
together in economically and emotionally supportive relationships “enhances people’s mental health, 
makes them more resilient in times of crises, allows them to pool their resources and thus makes 
them more productive”.93 If the state is attendant to the value and consequences of interdependent 
relationships, people will be more willing to make enduring commitments that promote the public 
good.94  
 
(b) Autonomy  
The freedom to choose whether and with whom to form intimate relationships is a 
fundamental interest in free and democratic societies. Karst has persuasively argued that “it is the 
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choice to form and maintain an intimate association that permits full realization of the associational 
values we cherish most”, namely companionship, caring, commitment, intimacy and self-
realization.95 American constitutional doctrine has long recognized that “freedom of personal choice 
in matters of family life” is a fundamental liberty interest.96 Choice and personal autonomy are 
fundamental values in Canadian constitutional doctrine as well. As Iacobucci J. stated in R. v. 
Salituro,  
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed in 
the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own 
philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express 
themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue. 
These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will 
respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid 
subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.97 
 
The value of associational autonomy requires that the state not directly interfere with adults’ 
freedom to choose their intimate relationships. The state should also refrain from indirect 
interference with associational autonomy by, for example, creating financial pressure to abandon 
personal relationships of caring and commitment, or by according privileged status to certain kinds 
of relationships defined without reference to their qualitative attributes. The value of autonomy does 
not mean that the state should never intervene in personal relationships. Rather, the state has an 
obligation to ensure that autonomy is exercised in a manner that does not compromise the equal  
right to autonomy of others. For example, the state must take steps to protect adults who are 
vulnerable to economic exploitation or physical/emotional abuse in personal relationships. 
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(c) Privacy  
Privacy is also recognized as a fundamental value in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. 
It is, in the words of the Supreme Court, “at the heart of liberty in a modern state.”98 Privacy includes 
the right to be free from unwarranted state intrusion or interference in intimate spaces,99 and the 
right to control the dissemination of confidential information.100 
Relationships of caring and commitment are built on intimacy, candour and trust.101 In our 
intimate relationships we reveal thoughts and actions that we are not willing to reveal to others. 
Without the confidence that our intimate thoughts and acts will not be discovered by others, 
personal relationships cannot flourish. In Charles Fried’s words, 
To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard ourselves as the objects of love, 
trust, and affection is at the heart of our notion of ourselves as persons among persons, and 
privacy is the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for 
combustion.102 
 
 At its most basic level, privacy requires that the state avoid physical intrusions into the 
“bedrooms of the nation". It also requires that the state avoid, wherever possible, the establishment 
of legal rules that cannot be administered effectively without intrusive examinations into, or 
disclosure of, the intimate details of adult personal relationships. Sexual behaviour, in particular, 
should not be subject to state investigations in the absence of a compelling objective. Sexuality is an 
especially intimate and sensitive aspect of many personal relationships. Moreover, absent violence 
or exploitation, the presence or absence of a sexual relationship, or the nature of adults’ sexual acts, 
are matters that normally bear no relationship to legitimate state objectives. At the same time, 
privacy rights are not absolute, and must give way, with appropriate safeguards, to compelling 
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objectives such as the state interest in prosecuting and preventing crime, including the commission 
of crimes involving domestic violence and abuse. 
 
(d) Equality 
The guarantee of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires that the state 
accord equal concern and respect to adult personal relationships regardless of personal 
characteristics such as the sexual orientation or marital status of the participants. Relationships can 
be treated differently according to their actual qualitative characteristics. However, the Supreme 
Court has held that neither marital status nor sexual orientation can be used as a proxy for 
identifying relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence.103 Thus, state 
laws and policies cannot in their purposes or effects impose disadvantages on persons living in 
relationships of caring and commitment outside of marriage. Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits 
and Obligations Act, will implement the principle of relational equality in most federal statutes by 
eliminating the differences in the legal status of married spouses and persons living in conjugal 
relationships outside of marriage. However, Bill C-23 does not seek to achieve an equitable 
distribution  of  burdens  and  benefits  between  conjugal  and  non-conjugal  relationships. Rather,  
conjugality will replace marriage as the proxy employed in federal statutes to identify relationships 
characterized by caring and commitment. This approach is inconsistent with the value of equality if 
conjugality does not in fact accurately identify the qualitative attributes of adult personal relationships 
that are relevant to particular state policies. 
The value of equality also requires the state to be attentive to the potential for exploitation 
within personal relationships. This value is reflected in the profound changes that have occurred in 
the law of family property in recent decades, and in the increasing attention legislators have paid to 
the prevention of domestic violence. Finally, the value of equality requires an equitable distribution of 
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burdens and benefits within particular categories of relationships. This means that laws must employ 
definitions that are capable of consistent interpretation and enforcement. 
 
(e) Security 
Relationships of caring and commitment meet important human needs. They can create a 
sense of ordered, stable well-being in people’s lives. At the same time, the combination of emotional 
and economic interdependence in personal relationships can give rise to distinct forms of 
vulnerability. Intimacy, privacy and interdependence are features that in combination afford unique 
opportunities for violence and exploitation to which the state must respond. Moreover, the state 
ought to recognize and respond to the fact that people structure their lives around a set of 
reasonable expectations formed in adult personal relationships. It is common for people to rely on 
an expectation that they will continue to benefit in the future from the economic and emotional 
support provided by their personal relationships. Persons in committed relationships reasonably 
expect the state to provide them with some protection in meeting their needs if they suffer a sudden 
deprivation of emotional and economic support. The state should promote the security of persons in 
intimate relationships by providing them with an identifiable and accessible set of legal protections to 
respond to these reasonable expectations.  
The value of security does not mean that the state should respond to all expectations formed 
in personal relationships. It should, however, respond to 'reasonable' expectations determined by an 
objective standard: what would a reasonable person have expected in all of the circumstances? 
Such mixed objective/subjective evaluations are common in Canadian law. For example, in Pettkus 
v. Becker, Dickson J. (as he then was) held that a common law partner’s reasonable expectations 
entitled her to a share of family property: 
….where one person in a relationship tantamount to spousal prejudices herself in the 
reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in property and the other person in the 
relationship freely accepts benefits conferred by the first person in circumstances where he 
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knows or ought to have known of that reasonable expectation, it would be unjust to allow the 
recipient of the benefit to retain it.104 
 
The reasonableness of individual expectations is a factor of shifting social norms: individual 
expectations are normally considered reasonable when they converge with social norms, and not 
reasonable when they diverge. If societal expectations have not crystallized, or cannot be 
ascertained, an objective/subjective inquiry can still be useful in identifying reasonable expectations 
that ought to be protected by the state. 
 
 
 
II. Mapping Existing Federal Legislation  
 
 
In this section, we categorize and map on to a list of legitimate policy objectives existing 
federal legislation that employs spousal and relational criteria. In this mapping, we will also provide 
examples of the variety of spousal and relational definitions.  This section will not consist of a 
detailed examination of all federal legislation.  We will attempt to at least identify all relevant federal 
statutory provisions and allocate them to the appropriate objective. From the group of statutory 
provisions allocated to each objective, we will choose at least one for a detailed examination that will 
explore its origins and rationale.  
The employment of relational criteria in federal legislation is ubiquitous. There are literally 
hundreds of statutory provisions that regulate adult personal relationships by employing terms such 
as spouse, family, dependant, cohabitant and, if Bill C-23 is enacted, common law partner. At first 
glance, this vast array of legislative activity does not appear to adhere to any organizing principles. 
On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the state is seeking to accomplish two 
basic objectives in regulating adult personal relationships. The first is to enable people to form and 
                                                 
104
  [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. See also Arndt v. Smith, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 539 (mixed objective/subjective test for determining 
whether plaintiff would have undergone medical procedure if fully informed); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (mixed objective/subjective test for determining whether differential treatment 
violates the human dignity of the claimant and thus constitutes discrimination).  
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to dissolve a legally recognized relationship. Currently this is accomplished primarily through the law 
of marriage and divorce. The second and very broad objective is to take into account the multitude 
of consequences that accompany relationships characterized by emotional and economic 
interdependence. This general objective manifests itself in a number of particular ways at every 
stage of the evolution of adult personal relationships. Each of these objectives, illustrated in Table 
Three, will be described below.   
 
TABLE THREE 
 
STATE OBJECTIVES BY STATUTE 
 
Objectives Examples of Federal Statutory Provisions 
1.  Regulating the formation and dissolution of 
adult, personal relationships 
 
Marriage (Prohibited Degrees)Act   
Divorce Act, s.8 (grounds for divorce)  
Criminal Code, ss.290, 293 (bigamy & polygamy) 
2.  Responding to the Consequences of 
Emotional and Economic Interdependence 
in Adult Personal Relationships 
 
2(a) Supporting the Integrity and Security of 
interdependent relationships 
Immigration Act, Employment Insurance Act s.29, 
Evidence Act. s.4(3), Criminal Code, s.23(2) 
2(b)  Recognizing the potential existence of 
shared economic interests in family 
relationships (conflict of interest) 
 
Bank Act, Business Development Bank of Canada Act, 
Canada Cooperatives Act, Cooperative Credit 
Associations Act, Canada Corporations Act, Insurance 
Companies Act, Unemployment Insurance Act   
2(c) Tailoring financial benefits or penalties to 
recognize the consequences of economic 
dependence or interdependence 
Canada Pension Plan , Old Age Security Act, Pension 
Benefits Standards Act, Public Service Superannuation 
Act (and other superannuation Acts)  
2(d) Recognizing the Economic Costs and Value 
of Caregiving Relationships 
Income Tax Act 
2(e)  Compensation for the loss of, or harm to, 
emotional and economically interdependent 
relationships  
Canada Shipping Act, s.645 , Carriage by Air Act, Canada 
Labour Code, s.210(1),   Judges’ Act. s.40(1)  
 
2(f) Preventing violence or abuse during and 
upon the break down of personal 
relationships 
Criminal Code 
2(g) Restructuring financial relationships on the 
break down of adult personal Relationships 
Divorce Act, s.15.1, 15.2, s.16  
Canada Pension Plan  
Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance 
Act, Garnishment Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, 
several superannuation Acts  
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Since at the time of writing (May 2000) there are no apparent obstacles to the imminent 
enactment of Bill C-23, we will describe federal statutory provisions in this section as if they have 
already been amended by the Bill. 
 
A. Regulating the formation and dissolution of adult, personal 
relationships 
 
An important objective of federal legislation has been the regulation of the formation and 
dissolution of adult personal relationships. To be more specific, federal legislation has regulated to a 
limited extent the entry into and, to a much greater extent, exit from marriage. As long as the 
institution of marriage itself is an important legal category, it is important that there be clear rules 
about the formation and dissolution of this institution.   
 
1. Entry into Marriage 
 
The Constitution Act, 1867, s.91(26) gives the federal government power to make laws in 
relation to “marriage and divorce”.105 Section 92(12) gives provincial legislatures the power to make 
laws in relation to “the solemnization of marriage in the province”. As a result of this division of 
power, the federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over the essential validity of marriage and 
the recognition of foreign marriages, while the provinces have jurisdiction over the formal validity of 
marriage.106 The essential validity of marriage deals with the capacity of individuals to enter into a 
marriage. At common law, the parties must be of the opposite sex, have the ability to consummate 
the marriage, have reached a minimum age, not be related too closely by consanguinity or affinity, 
not be parties to a prior existing marriage, and have the capacity to consent. Until this year, 
Parliament did not see any need to enact legislation incorporating these common law rules. Section 
                                                 
105
 Constitution Act, 1867, UK, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.  
106
 See Bushnell, “Family Law and the Constitution”, (1978) 1 Can. J. Fam. L. 202; Katz, “The Scope of the Federal 
Legislative Authority in Relation to Marriage”, (1975) 7 Ott. L. Rev. 384. 
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1.1 of Bill C-23 will become the first definition of marriage to appear in a federal statute. It will define 
marriage “as the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others”. 
The federal government has rarely exercised its jurisdictional authority over marriage. There 
is no comprehensive federal legislation governing the essential validity of marriage, nor the foreign 
recognition of marriage. In 1990, the federal government enacted the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) 
Act107 that reformed the rules of consanguinity and affinity. This law replaced the Marriage Act108 
which had included a more extensive list of prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity. All other 
aspects of the essential validity of marriage continue to be governed by common law, and in 
Quebec, by the Civil Code.109    
The bigamy and polygamy prohibitions in the Criminal Code110 are also part of the legal 
regulation of marriage, and can be seen to form part of the set of rules governing the formation of 
marriage. While the common law rules of marriage provide that a marriage is void if there is a prior 
existing marriage, the Criminal Code makes entrance into a bigamous or polygamous marriage a 
criminal offence. Section 290 provides that any one who commits bigamy – defined as going through 
a form of marriage while married to another person – commits an offence. Section 293 provides that 
every one who practices or enters into any form of polygamy, or any kind of conjugal union with 
more than one person at the same time, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding five years.  
 
2. Exit from Marriage  
 
In striking contrast, the federal government has fully exercised its constitutional jurisdiction 
over  divorce.  The  Divorce  Act, 1968  was  the  first  nation-wide,  uniform  law of divorce. The Act 
                                                 
107
  S.C. 1990, c.46. 
108
  R.S.C. 1970, c.A-14. 
109
  Civil Code of Quebec Art. 1260 C.C.Q. 
110
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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recognized marital offence grounds111 and non-marital offence grounds for divorce.112 The 1968 Act 
was replaced by the Divorce Act 1985, which now provides for divorce on the basis of permanent 
marital break down. The Divorce Act 1985 sets out the jurisdiction over divorce113, the grounds and 
bars to divorce114, as well as the procedural requirements and legal effects of divorce (effective 
dates, appeals, filing of affidavits). It also includes provisions for spousal and child support, which 
are discussed in further detail in the next section on restructuring financial relationships, as well as 
provisions for the resolution of child custody and access.115 The regulations issued pursuant to the 
Divorce Act 1985 provide the establishment and operation of the Central Registry of Divorce 
Proceedings in Canada. 116 
As long as the institution of marriage itself is a relevant legal category, it is a legitimate 
government objective to establish clear rules about the formation and dissolution of this institution. 
To the extent that legal rights and responsibilities are created on formation and/or dissolution of 
marriage, there needs to be rules regulating the status of marriage and divorce. These rules protect 
the interests and choices of the parties themselves, by providing a clear demarcation of the 
termination of the status of the relationship. It also protects the interests of third parties, whose 
economic interests might be affected by the existence or non-existence of a marital relationship.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111
  Section 3 set out the matrimonial  offence  grounds  for  divorce, including  adultery,  sexual  offences,  bigamy,  and 
cruelty.  
112
  Section 4 introduced the idea of permanent marriage break down as the basis for divorce, including imprisonment, 
living separate and apart for 3 years, desertion for 5 years, and addiction to alcohol. 
113
  Section 3 sets out the jurisdiction of courts, and the rules for resolving potential jurisdictional conflicts in divorce 
proceedings.  
114
  According to section 8, there are three grounds for establishing this permanent marital break down – living separate 
and apart for one year, adultery and cruelty.  
115
  The provisions dealing with child custody and access, which regulate parent-child relationships, are beyond the 
scope of this paper, which is focusing on the regulation of adult relationships.  
116
  Divorce Act, 1985, Regulations, SOR/86-600. 
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B. Responding to the Consequences of Emotional and Economic 
Interdependence in Adult Personal Relationships  
 
 
The second general objective of state regulation is to take into account the consequences 
that accompany relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence. This 
objective manifests itself in a number of particular ways at every stage of the evolution of adult  
personal relationships. The state has an interest in supporting the integrity and security of ongoing 
relationships of caring and commitment, and recognizing the value of care-giving provided in those 
relationships. The state has an interest in protecting people from violence and exploitation to which 
they may be particularly vulnerable in personal relationships. The possible existence of shared 
economic interests arising in relationships of caring and commitment is relevant to many state 
objectives in the context of the regulation of economic transactions. The economic and emotional 
interdependence that characterizes adult personal relationships can be disrupted by a number of 
events such as injury, illness, retirement or death. The state has an interest in cushioning the impact 
that the sudden loss of emotional and economic support can have on persons in relationships of 
caring and commitment. In the discussion that follows, we will canvass the range of federal statutes 
that seek to accomplish each of these objectives. 
  
1. Supporting the Integrity and Security of Interdependent Relationships 
 An important objective of federal legislation is the preservation of the stability and integrity of 
on-going interdependent relationships. Federal legislation includes a broad range of provisions 
that attempt to remove obstacles to the continuation of adult personal relationships.117 For example, 
the Employment Insurance Act118 includes a statutory provision that is designed to protect and 
                                                 
117
  E.g, s.5(1.1) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 (providing that a non-citizen who resides abroad with a 
Canadian spouse or common law partner who is working for the government abroad will have that time abroad 
counted as a day of residence in Canada for the purposes of the Act); s.16.20(2), s.24.10(4), s.26.20 and s.35(1) of 
the Young Offenders Act R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 (taking into account an offender’s proximity to family in making orders in 
relation to imprisonment, secure custody, conditional supervision or temporary release); s.264(2) of the Criminal 
Code (criminal harassment includes threatening behaviour to any member of a person’s family); s.423(1) of the 
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promote the integrity of ongoing interdependent relationships. Section 29 sets out the kinds of 
factors to be taken into account in determining whether there was “just cause” for voluntarily leaving 
or taking leave from employment, for the purposes of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. 
The factors in section 29(c) include an “obligation to accompany a spouse, common law partner or 
dependent child to another residence” and an “obligation to care for a child or a member of the 
immediate family.”119 As a result of section 29(c), an individual will not be deprived of the benefits to 
which they would otherwise be entitled by virtue of leaving a job in order to accompany their spouse 
or dependent child, or to care for a child or immediate family member. The provision removes a 
significant financial disincentive to the maintenance of ongoing relationships of interdependency or 
dependency. 
We have chosen to examine in greater detail two examples of laws with the objective of 
preserving and promoting the integrity of ongoing relationships: immigration law that allows for family 
reunification, and evidence laws that place restrictions on spousal testimony in criminal trials.  
 
(a) Immigration  
The Immigration Act, 1976120 has a number of provisions that recognize and promote the 
integrity of ongoing interdependent relationships. The Act states that a foremost objective of the Act 
is to “facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents with their close 
                                                                                                                                                             
Criminal Code (criminal intimidation includes violence or threats of violence to one’s spouse, common law partner or 
children, or intimidation of a relative); s.810 of the Criminal Code (information can be sworn if a person fears for the 
safety of his or her spouse, common law partner or child); s.210(1) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 
(entitles employees to bereavement leave upon the death of immediate family members); s.2 of the Witness 
Protection Program Act, S.C. 1996, c. 15 (entitles persons to protection if they are vulnerable to threats because of 
their relationship with a witness); s.28 Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (criteria for selecting 
penitentiary include accessibility to an inmate’s home community and family); s.71(1) of the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act (inmates entitled to have reasonable contact, including visits and correspondence, with 
family and friends); s.17(1) and s.116(1) of the Correctional and Conditional Release Act (family leave entitlements). 
118
 S.C. 1996, c. 23. 
119
 Ibid., s.29 as amended by Bill C-23, s.108. 
120
 S.C. 1976-77, c. 52. 
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relatives abroad”.121 The Act allows for the immigration of “accompanying dependants”.122 An 
individual who is granted an immigration visa may bring to Canada their “accompanying 
dependants”, defined as a spouse, and any unmarried son or daughter under 19 years of age. Any 
individual granted admission as a refugee may similarly bring their dependants. The objective of 
these provisions is to protect the integrity of close family relationships, by allowing an individual who 
is eligible to immigrate to Canada to bring his or her spouse and/or children.   
Bill C-23 does not contain any amendments to the Immigration Act. The definition of spouse 
within the categories of accompanying dependants and family class therefore remains unchanged to 
date. Spouse is currently defined in the Immigration Regulations, 1978 as “the party of the opposite 
sex to whom that person is joined in marriage”123 The family class also allows a person to sponsor 
their fiancé.124 Unmarried couples do not qualify as accompanying dependants, nor do they qualify 
as members of the family class, unless they are engaged to be married. 125 While most opposite-sex 
                                                 
121
  Immigration Act, Part I, s. 3(c). See Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1997 II. 854 “Family Reunification 
is one of the key objectives of the Immigration Act whereby Canadian citizens and permanent residents may sponsor 
applications for permanent residence in Canada made by relatives who are members of the family class.”  
122
  Immigration Regulations, 1978, as amended SOR/98-544, Section 2, defines “accompanying dependant” as “a 
dependant of that person to whom a visa is issued at the time a visa is issued to that person for the purpose of 
enabling the dependant person to accompany or follow that person to Canada, and if the dependant is the spouse of 
that person, who is at least 16 years of age at the time the visa is issued.”  
123
  SOR/85-225. Section 4(3) provides that the family class does not include a spouse who entered into the marriage 
primarily for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class and not with the intention of 
residing permanently with the other spouse. (SOR/93-44, s. 4(F)) 
124
  Fiancée – para 6(1)(d) of the Regulations provides that a visa officer can issue a visa to a member of the family class 
in the case of fiancée if  
(a) the sponsor and the fiancée intend to reside together permanently after being married, and did not become 
engaged primarily for the purpose of the finance gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class, 
(b) there are no legal impediments to the proposed marriage of the sponsor and the fiancée under the laws of the 
province in which they intend to reside, and 
(c) the sponsor and the fiancée have agreed to marry within 90 days after the admission of the fiancée. (SOR/97-145, 
s. 3)  
125
  In 1997, the definition of spouse was amended for the purposes of sponsorship. The definition was changed to 
include a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting with the sponsor in a conjugal relationship at the time the 
sponsor gives an undertaking, having cohabited with the sponsor for a continuous period of at least one year. 
SOR/97-145 However, this expanded definition only applies for the purpose of the provisions relating to the co-
signing of an undertaking. The See Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1997 II. 854 stated that the 
amendments are intended to bring the definition of spouse in line with the government’s obligations under the 
Charter: “for the purposes of co-signing provisions only, a spouse includes a common-law spouse who is defined as a 
person of the opposite sex who has cohabited with the sponsor in a conjugal relationship for at least one year. This 
provision has been included to conform to the equality provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” 
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couples would be able to opt to marry in order to qualify,126 same-sex couples have no similar 
option.  
While the Immigration Act was not included in Bill C-23, the Minister of Citizenship has since 
introduced Bill C-31, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.127 Although the Bill is primarily 
designed to toughen the immigration and refugee system,128 the Minister has promised supporting 
regulations in the coming months that will expand the “family class”. According to the Backgrounder 
Paper, this will include “modernizing the definition of family class to ensure consistency in 
accordance with government legislation under consideration – family class will include spouses, 
common-law and same-sex partners.”129  
The Immigration Act also allows Canadian citizens and permanent residents to sponsor 
family members for immigration to Canada. A Canadian citizen or permanent resident can sponsor a 
member of his or her “family class” for immigration to Canada. The objective of these family class 
sponsorship provisions is similar to the accompanying dependant provisions, namely, to recognize 
and protect the integrity of family relationships, by facilitating the reunion of family members. The Act 
has a broad definition of family class that allows an individual to sponsor a broad range of relatives 
under the family reunification program. “Family Class” is currently defined in section 1(5) of the 
Regulations (SOR/93-4) as including:  
                                                                                                                                                             
However, the Statement also recognizes the privitizing objectives that underlie the amendment: “…new measures to 
strengthen sponsorship will help protect immigrants from being abandoned by their sponsors as well as protect 
municipal, provincial and federal governments from being financially responsible for supporting family class 
immigrants who cannot support themselves”. This amendment had the effect of broadening the category of persons 
who can assume responsibility for the support of immigrants within the family class, but does not expand the category 
of the family class itself. As such, it is as much about reducing welfare dependency through the privatization of 
support obligations as it is about maintaining the integrity of family relationships.  
126
  Some opposite sex couples may have difficulty, due to a prior existing marriage, particularly if they are immigrating 
from a country with highly restrictive divorce laws.  
127
  Bill C-31, 2nd Session, 36th Parliament, 48-49 Elizabeth II, 1999-2000.  
128
  Through for example front-end security screening of all claimants, clarified grounds for detention, fewer appeals to 
delay the removal of “criminals”, and the suspension of refugee claims for those charged with crimes until the courts 
have rendered a decision.  
129
  Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Opening the Front Door Wider” Backgrounder #2, News Release 2000-09. The 
amendments to the family class promised by the Minister of Citizenship will also broaden the definition of dependant 
child by increasing the age from 19 to 22. 
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(a) the sponsor’s spouse; 
(b) the sponsor’s dependent son or dependent daughter;130 
(c) the sponsor’s father or mother; 
(d) the sponsor’s grandmother or grandfather; 
(e) the sponsor’s brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or granddaughter, who is an 
orphan and is under 19 years of age and unmarried; 
(f) the sponsor’s fiancée; 
(g) any child under 19 years of age whom the sponsor intends to adopt and who is 
(i) an orphan 
(ii) an abandoned child whose parents cannot be identified 
(iii) a child born outside of marriage who has been placed with a child welfare authority 
for adoption 
(iv) a child whose parents are separated and who has been placed with a child welfare 
authority for adoption  
(v) a child one of whose parents is deceased and who has been placed with a child 
welfare authority for adoption, or 
(h) one relation regardless of age or relationship to sponsor where sponsor does not 
have a spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, 
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece who is a Canadian citizen, permanent resident 
or whose application for landing the sponsor may otherwise sponsor.   
 
The rules for family class sponsorship thus recognize a broad range of relatives for potential 
sponsorship. 
Finally, the Immigration Act also makes provision for a class of applicants known as 
“assisted relatives”. “Assisted relatives” is part of the independent class of immigration applications 
(which also includes skilled workers). Independent immigrations are assessed against a series of 
selection criteria131. In addition, assisted relatives are awarded five bonus points.132 Assisted 
relatives also need a guarantee of financial assistance from their Canadian relatives if they require 
                                                 
130
 Prior to 1988, the family class consisted of parents and their dependent children up to 21 years of age and unmarried. 
In July 1988, family class was expanded to include all unmarried children, regardless of their age. In 1993, the 
regulations were amended to reduce the family class to encompass only those unmarried children who were 19 years 
of age or under, and those children over 19 years who were dependent, either as a result of being students or of 
having some kind of physical or mental disability.  The amendments to ‘family class’ promised by the Minister will 
again revise the age from 19 to 22 years.  
131
 Points are allocated according to a range of factors including Education, Specific Vocational Preparation, experience, 
occupation demand, arranged employment or designated occupation, demographic factor, age, knowledge of English 
and French languages and personal suitability.  
132
 Prior to 1993 assisted relatives were awarded more bonus points (15 for brothers, sisters and married children; ten 
bonus points for more distant relations. The bonus points made it relatively easy for assisted relatives to achieve the 
total 70 point pass mark. Thus large numbers of applicants could qualify as assisted relatives because of the bonus 
points they received. An amendment to the Regulations, SOR/93-44, January 1993 reduced the bonus points 
awarded to assisted relatives.  
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help in settling. Assisted relative is defined as “a relative other than a member of the family class, 
who is an immigrant and is an uncle or aunt, a brother or sister, a son or daughter, a nephew or 
niece or a grandson or granddaughter of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least 
19 years of age and who resides in Canada”.133 
The Immigration Act thus recognizes a broad range of familial relationships. While the Act 
provides differing degrees of protection to these different relationships, the objectives of all three 
categories (accompanying dependant, family class and assisted relative) are similar. The Act seeks 
to recognize and protect the integrity of family relationships, by facilitating the reunion of family 
members.   
 
   (b) Canada Evidence Act - Spousal Competence, Compellability and Privilege 
Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act134 has been justified on the grounds that it is designed 
to protect and promote the integrity of ongoing interdependent relationships. To understand the 
effects of section 4, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of the common law rules it 
preserves with some alterations. 
At common law, the accused person and his or her spouse are incompetent to testify. There 
are exceptions to the rule that enable spouses to testify for the prosecution if the charge involves an 
injury or threat of injury to the spouse or a child,135 or in any case in which the spouses are 
irreconcilably separated.136 Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act has added a number of other 
exceptions to the common law rule of incompetence. Section 4(1) makes an accused person and 
his or her spouse competent to testify for the defence. Sections 4(2) and 4(4) make spouses 
competent and compellable to testify for the prosecution when the accused is charged with specified 
                                                 
133
 SOR/93-44 1993.  
134
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
135
 J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman and A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 
1999) at 699, 701. 
136
 R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3. S.C.R. 654. 
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offences, including sexual offences against children or youth, vagrancy, prostitution-related 
offences, sexual assault, polygamy, and various crimes of violence involving victims under the age 
of 14 years. These sections preserve the common law rule that spouses are not competent to testify 
for the prosecution with the exception of the listed offences, in which case they are both competent 
and compellable. In other words the statutory scheme seeks to accomplish “in a rough fashion” a 
balance between “the competing interests of the need for the court to receive relevant information 
about a crime and the need to foster marital harmony and to protect a confidential relationship.”137 
Even if a spouse is testifying because he or she is competent pursuant to the common law 
exceptions or the statutory exceptions in s.4(2) or s.4(4), s.4(3) sets out a privilege that permits a 
witness spouse to refuse to answer questions about communications with his or her spouse during 
the marriage. 
 
2. Recognizing the Potential Existence of Shared Economic Interests in 
Relationships of Caring and Commitment. 
 
 A wide range of federal statutes recognize that the economic and emotional 
interdependence that accompanies many adult personal relationships may give rise to shared 
interests or conflicts of interest at odds with the accomplishment of federal legislative objectives. For 
example, the premise of a trial by jury is that the Crown and the accused are entitled to have the 
evidence assessed dispassionately by impartial representatives of the community. Actual impartiality 
and the appearance of impartiality are both necessary to the maintenance of public confidence in 
the criminal justice system. If a member of the jury has a personal relationship with a participant in 
the trial, his or her ability to assess the evidence fairly and impartially may be called into question. 
For this reason, section 632(b) of the Criminal Code gives the judge presiding over a jury trial the 
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 Sopinka et al, supra note 135, at 703-4. 
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discretion to excuse any juror from service if the juror has a “relationship with the judge, prosecutor, 
accused, counsel for the accused or a prospective witness”.138  
Federal statutes that regulate financial institutions reflect a similar concern with ensuring that 
transactions with related parties do not give rise to preferential treatment or the appearance of 
preferential treatment. Parliament has prohibited banks from entering transactions with related 
parties unless standards and procedures designed to minimize the risk of partiality are followed. The 
Bank Act provides that “a bank shall not, directly or indirectly, enter into any transaction with a 
related party of the bank.”139 A related party includes minor children, spouses and common law 
partners of directors, senior officers or significant shareholders.140 The prohibition on entering 
transactions with related parties is subject to a number of exceptions that are extensively regulated 
by the Act.141 Similar provisions can be found in the Business Development Bank of Canada Act,142 
the Canada Cooperatives Act,143 the Cooperative Credit Associations Act,144 the Insurance 
Companies Act,145 and the Trust and Loan Companies Act.146  
 A presumption that certain personal relationships give rise to shared economic interests 
animates a number of federal statutes that regulate corporate takeovers, corporate returns and 
                                                 
138
 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 632.  
139
 S.C. 1991, c. 46, s.489(1). 
140
 Ibid. s.486(1) as amended by Bill C-23, s.7. 
141
 Ibid. sections 489-506. 
142
 S.C. 1995, c.28. Section 31 defines interested persons as including spouses, common law partners (Bill C-23, s.26), 
children, siblings or parents of a director. Section 32 prohibits the bank from granting a loan to a director. Section 33 
provides that close relatives of directors who apply for loans must disclose that they are interested persons, and a 
loan to an interested person can be made only after approval of the board at a meeting where the director related to 
the applicant is absent. 
143
 S.C. 1998, c.1. Section 2(1) defines an associate as including a spouse, common law partner (Bill C-23, s.28), child, 
and any person related by blood or marriage with whom a person resides. Section 160 restricts the ability of a 
cooperative to enter transactions with associates. 
144
 S.C. 1991, c.48. In Part XII (self-dealing), the definition of related parties in s.410(1) includes minor children, spouses 
and common law partners (Bill C-23, s.86). Section 413(1) restricts transactions that associations can enter into with 
a related party. 
145
 S.C. 1991, c.47. In Part XI (self-dealing), the definition of related parties in s.518(1) includes minor children, spouses 
and common law partners (Bill C-23, s.158). Section 521 restricts transactions that companies can enter into with 
related parties. 
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insider trading. For example, the Bank Act defines a takeover bid as a bid by an offeror and his or 
her associates to take control of over ten per cent of the shares of a bank. If this threshold is met, 
certain regulatory provisions are triggered. Section 283(1) defines associates as including children, 
spouses, and common law partners of an offeror, as well as persons related to the offeror by blood 
or marriage who share a residence with the offeror.147 Similar provisions can be found in the Canada 
Business Corporations Act,148 the Trust and Loan Companies Act,149 and the Insurance Companies 
Act.150 In the Corporations Returns Act, the information that must be included in corporate returns 
depends on the situation of affiliated corporations, which includes corporations controlled by a 
related group.151 Section 2(1) defines a related group as persons related by blood, marriage, 
common law partnership or adoption.152 The Canada Corporations Act prohibition on insider trading 
applies to insiders and associates of insiders.153 The definition of associates includes children, 
spouses, and common law partners of an insider, as well as persons related to the insider by blood 
or marriage who share a residence with the insider.154 
 The presumption of shared interests in personal relationships is the rationale underlying 
federal laws that prohibit nepotism in hiring,155 restrict persons’ ability to vote on or act in relation to 
matters concerning a relative’s economic interests,156 put family members’ claims on a bankrupt 
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person’s estate in a subordinate position,157 and call into question the validity of commercial 
transactions between related persons.158 
 A particularly important example of a provision that calls into question the validity of 
transactions between related persons is s.5(2)(i) of the Employment Insurance Act.159 We have 
selected this provision for detailed examination because it employs relational definitions to limit 
entitlement to important social benefits for many unemployed persons.  
In order to qualify for unemployment benefits pursuant to the Employment Insurance Act, 
claimants whose employment has been terminated must have worked for the required number of 
hours in insurable employment. Section 5(2)(i) provides that employment is uninsurable if the 
employer and employee were not dealing with each other at arm’s length. The objective of this 
provision is to prevent people from fraudulently claiming unemployment benefits by manufacturing 
fictitious or artificial employment relationships. 
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 According to section 3(2), the question of whether persons are not dealing with each other at 
arm’s length is to be determined by reference to s.251 of the Income Tax Act: 
251. (1) For the purposes of this Act; (a) related persons shall be deemed not to deal with 
each other at arm’s length; and (b) it is a question of fact whether persons not 
related to each other were at a particular time dealing with each other at arm’s 
length. 
 
Until 1993, the Income Tax Act defined related persons as persons related by blood relationship, 
marriage or adoption. Parliament added common law opposite-sex couples to the definition in 1993, 
and Bill C-23 will add same-sex couples in 2000.160 
 Without more, the combined effect of s.251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act and s.5(2)(i) of the 
Employment Insurance Act would be to deprive all employees who work for a related person of their 
entitlement to unemployment benefits upon termination of their employment. This was, in fact, the 
situation prior to 1990. Recognizing the harshness of an irrebutable presumption that employment 
between relatives is not “real employment”, Parliament amended the Act in 1990.161 The 
amendment, now s.3(2)(c)(ii) of the Employment Insurance Act, gives the Minister a discretionary 
power to treat employment by a relative as insurable employment if the Minister “is satisfied that, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, including the remuneration paid, the 
terms and conditions, the duration and the nature and importance of the work performed, it is 
reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a substantially similar contract of 
employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s length.” The effect of the amendment 
is that employment by a relative is not automatically assumed to be fictitious and therefore excluded 
from the definition of insurable employment. Employment by a related person will be considered 
insurable if, after a careful examination of the circumstances, the Minister concludes the 
arrangement constituted a “real” contract of employment.  
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 The 1990 amendment recognizes that an employee’s work for a family member may be 
perfectly legitimate, and, upon termination, the employee may have an equally valid and pressing 
need for unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, we believe that the use of relational terms in the 
insurable employment provisions of the Act ought to be abandoned entirely. The use of relational 
terms is not necessary to the policy objective of preventing fraud. Moreover, the use of relational 
terms to determine entitlement has a negative impact on relational privacy and may discourage the 
formation of relationships of caring and commitment. We will pursue these arguments further in 
Section C below. 
 
3. Tailoring financial benefits or penalties to recognize the consequences 
of economic dependence or interdependence 
 
 A wide range of federal statutes seek to tailor benefits or penalties in a manner that takes 
into account the emotional and economic interdependence that accompanies family relationships. 
For example, the amount of support that is available to farmers pursuant to the Agricultural 
Marketing Programs Act162 will be reduced if related farmers have received support. Farmers are 
related if they are living together (“cohabiting”, whether or not in a conjugal relationship) or if they are 
related by blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption.163 Similarly, a number of offence 
provisions in federal statutes provide that the calculation of the financial penalty to be imposed after 
a person has benefited from an improper transaction (such as bribery), take into account benefits 
received by family members.164 
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 Relational concerns may sometimes cut in the other direction, leading to a reduction in the 
size of a penalty or a narrower definition of offences if they would otherwise interfere with an 
offender’s ability to meet the needs of family members. For example, a court is not to make an order 
imposing a “victim fine surcharge” on a convicted offender if it would result in “undue hardship to the 
offender or the dependants of the offender”.165 Similarly, it is not an offence to brew beer or grow 
tobacco without a licence so long as the beer or tobacco is for personal or family consumption.166 
Similarly, exemptions to firearms offences are provided for persons hunting or trapping for the 
purposes of family sustenance.167 These exemptions reflect a view that meeting the needs of 
interdependent family units is more important than, or not in conflict with, the public safety goals of 
the offences. 
 Pension laws are a significant area in which federal legislation employs relational criteria in 
an attempt to recognize the consequences of economic dependence or interdependence that may 
exist in adult personal relationships. We will outline the features of the complex array of federal 
statutes in this area. These statutes can be divided into four categories according to the purposes 
they serve. First is the Canada Pension Plan, a compulsory social insurance scheme that provides 
benefits to employee contributors and their families. Second is a large group of federal statutes 
establishing employment pension plans for particular sectors of the federal public service, such as 
the Public Service Superannuation Act. We will consider, as part of this second group, the statutes 
that provide disability benefits (the Pension Act), employment pensions (the Canadian Forces 
Superannuation Act) and old age supplementary pensions (the War Veterans Allowance Act) to 
members of the armed forces and their families. The third category is pension standards legislation, 
the Pension Benefits Standards Act, which establishes minimum requirements for employment 
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pensions provided by private sector employers whose activities are federally regulated. Legislation 
in these first three categories create pension entitlements for employees and their families. The 
focus of our analysis will be on the rules determining entitlements to survivors’ benefits, since this is 
the most important area in which the employment pension statutes use relational criteria. The fourth 
category is the universal old age pension scheme established by the Old Age Security Act. We will 
examine in some detail the use of relational criteria in this Act to determine eligibility for a monthly 
allowance in the years leading up to pension entitlement at age 65, and to determine eligibility for 
the guaranteed income supplement for low income pensioners. 
 
 (a) The Canada Pension Plan 
The Canada Pension Plan establishes a national scheme of old age pensions and supplementary 
benefits related to employment. It is a contributory scheme financed by employers and payroll 
deductions from employees. The Plan provides retirement benefits to contributors over the age of 60 
and disability benefits to contributors under the age of sixty. Relational criteria, however, are taken 
into account in two circumstances: divorce, which we discuss below168 and death of the employee 
contributor. In the latter case, spouses or common law partners are entitled to claim a pension as 
"survivors". Factors such as age, responsibility for dependent children, and disability determine a 
claimant’s entitlement to, and the amount of, the survivor’s pension.169 
 The CPP survivor’s pension has evolved considerably from its original form in a manner that 
mirrors changing social attitudes to conjugal relationships. When the Plan first came into force in 
1966, the survivor’s pension was called a "widow’s pension".170 The scheme of the legislation makes 
clear that the widow’s pension was premised on an assumption that married women were 
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homemakers who were financially dependent on their breadwinner husbands. The widow’s pension 
was gender-specific. It was not available to widowers. If a widow remarried, her new husband was 
presumed to be meeting her needs for financial support. Her widow’s pension would automatically 
terminate.171 The original CPP gave limited recognition to the needs of women living in common law 
relationships with male contributors. The Minister did have discretion to award a widow’s pension to 
a surviving common law spouse. She had to establish that she had "been maintained" and "publicly 
represented by the contributor as [his] spouse" for seven years (if either the deceased or the 
claimant were married to someone else) or for an unspecified number of years (if neither was 
married).172 
 Enacted prior to the liberalization of divorce law, the original CPP expressed a clear 
preference for the claims of separated wives over those of women cohabiting in conjugal 
relationships with the widows’ husbands. A wife's claim to the widow's pension could be displaced 
by a common law spouse only after seven years of cohabitation in a relationship of dependency, and 
then only if the ministry considered it appropriate. The legislation put in place an all or nothing 
entitlement that could operate harshly on wives and common law spouses. The original CPP did not 
make provision for apportioning the widow's pension between a deceased contributor's wife and his 
common law spouse. This problem continues to exist in the current CPP and can give rise to 
significant injustice. 
 In the early 1970s, the ascendance of formal notions of liberal equality demanded gender 
neutrality in federal statutes. In 1974, the CPP widow's pension became a survivor's pension 
available to the wife or husband of a deceased contributor.173 The discretion to award the survivor's 
pension to a common law spouse remained. The period of cohabitation required before a common 
law spouse's claim could be considered was reduced to three years (if either of the cohabitants was 
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married) or one year (if neither was married), and the exclusion of common law spouses who were 
not dependent on the deceased contributor was dropped.174 
 After 1974, the objective of the CPP survivors’ pensions was no longer as clear as it had 
been in 1966. The aim of the 1966 widow’s pension was to address the consequences of the 
presumed dependency of wives on their husbands. After 1974, this dependency rationale could no 
longer provide the sole explanation of the survivor’s pension provisions. Few widowers were 
dependent on their wives’ income the way wives were on their husbands’ income. And common law 
spouses could claim a survivor’s pension whether or not they were dependent on the deceased’s 
income. Beginning in 1974, CPP survivors’ pensions are best understood as serving two objectives: 
compensating dependent spouses for the sudden loss of their spouses’ income and compensating 
interdependent spouses for their contribution to the employment earnings of their spouses. The first 
objective responds to spousal need. The second objective responds to earned spousal entitlement. 
Just as family law has embraced a compensatory understanding of the role of spousal support 
orders,175 the legal structure of CPP survivors’ pensions since 1974 reflects an understanding that a 
spouse’s employment earnings have been made possible by the support and work of the other 
spouse. Individual employment earnings have been earned, in this sense, by both spouses. We will 
refer to these dual objectives underlying CPP survivors’ pensions as the dependence and 
compensatory objectives. 
 In 1986, the position of common law spouses was significantly strengthened. They became 
automatically entitled to CPP survivor’s pensions if they had cohabited with the deceased for at least 
one year, even if the deceased also left a surviving wife or husband.176 With the passage of Bill C-
23, same-sex couples will be in the same position as opposite-sex common law couples. A survivor 
will be defined as the common law partner of the contributor at the time of the contributor’s death, or, 
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if there is no common law partner, the person who was married to the contributor at the time of 
death.177 The CPP still does not contain a provision allowing for the apportionment of a survivor’s 
pension where a contributor leaves both a separated spouse and a common law partner. Rather, 
the common law partner receives the entire survivor’s pension, even if the common law partnership 
was brief and the marriage long. The absence of a just apportionment scheme raises the stakes too 
high in the inevitable unseemly contests that can arise between two surviving spouses.178 Moreover, 
the complete denial of a survivor’s pension to a separated wife or husband when the other spouse 
has formed a new common law partnership is plainly inconsistent with the compensatory objective of 
survivors’ pensions. In our view, the absence of apportionment provisions from the CPP violates the 
Charter's prohibition on marital status discrimination.179 
 
(b) Pension Plans for Federal Public Employees 
Pension plans for federal public employees are established by a number of federal statutes, 
including the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act,180 the Defence Services Pension Continuation 
Act,181 the Governor General’s Act,182 the Judges Act,183 the Lieutenant Governors Superannuation 
Act,184 the Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act,185 the Public Service Superannuation 
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Act,186 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Continuation Act,187 and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Superannuation Act.188 Entitlement to a pension, as is the case with the CPP, is 
determined on an individual basis calculated by reference to an employee’s contributions and length 
of service. In addition to these employment pension plans, the Pension Act189 establishes pensions 
to compensate members of the armed forces who have been disabled or have died as a result of 
military service, and the War Veterans Allowance Act190 provides for supplementary old age 
pensions for war veterans. All of the above statutes provide for survivors’ benefits to be paid on the 
death of the federal employee or veteran. After Bill C-23, benefits will be payable to a surviving 
spouse or common law partner of the deceased contributor or veteran. 
 The eligibility criteria for the receipt of benefits by adult survivors, and the objectives of adult 
survivor benefits, have evolved in a manner comparable to the changes in the CPP described 
above. Up until the 1970s, adult survivor benefits were widows’ pensions, terminable upon the 
widow’s remarriage. Typically a common law wife had no right to a widow’s pension, but she might 
be granted a widow’s pension if she had cohabited with the deceased for a lengthy period of time, 
had been maintained by him and held out to the public as his wife. These were the essential 
features of the scheme adopted, for example, in the original versions of the Pension Act (1919),191 
the Public Service Superannuation Act (1953)192 and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act 
(1959).193 It is evident that widows’ right to receive benefits pursuant to their husbands’ employment 
pension plans was premised on a "family wage" dependency model. The objective was to respond 
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to the sudden loss of income by a homemaker wife who had been entirely dependent on her 
husband’s income and, upon his death, had little earning power of her own. 
 Over the course of the last thirty years, survivors’ benefits in federal employment and 
veterans’ statutes have been continually reformed as the material and ideological premises of the 
dependency model have eroded. Women’s participation in paid employment has increased steadily 
and dramatically since the 1950s. Women’s labour participation rates remained flat at roughly 20% 
for the first half of the twentieth century. The climb that began in the 1950s passed 40% in the 1970s 
and reached 60% in the 1990s.194 Married women’s labour participation rates have followed the 
overall trend. This is true even for mothers of young children. For example, even when there were 
three or more children under the age of six in the family, roughly half of married women held paid 
employment in 1990, up from roughly one fifth in 1970.195 Another force of change has been the 
enactment of legal guarantees of equal treatment on the basis of sex, marital status and sexual 
orientation. Since the 1970s, spousal interdependency has steadily replaced women’s dependency 
as the dominant assumption underlying legal understandings of marital relations. 
 In the 1970s, widows’ pensions became survivors’ pensions that could be claimed by 
common law spouses after a shorter period of cohabitation regardless of whether they had been 
dependent upon the deceased. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rights of common law spouses were 
placed on the same footing as surviving wives and husbands, and the required period of 
cohabitation was reduced to one year. With the passage of the Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act196 in 1999 and the expected passage of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act 
in 2000, same-sex partners of deceased contributors or veterans can now claim survivors’ benefits. 
A survivor who remarries or forms a new common law partnership no longer has to surrender his or 
her survivor's benefits. If the deceased lived with a common law partner at the time of his or her 
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death, and also had a surviving spouse, then the survivor’s benefits are divided between the two in 
proportion to the number of years they cohabited with the deceased. 
 These changes in federal pension laws have not followed a consistent timetable or pattern. 
Some statutes abandoned the elements of the marital dependency model belatedly if at all. Clearly, 
legislators have found their way to recognizing non-marital relationships more readily in some 
contexts than others. For example, that soldiers might have common law wives was acknowledged 
in 1919; that a Prime Minister, judge, Lieutenant Governor or Governor General might have a 
common law partner was a prospect that Parliament could not face 80 years later.197 One of the 
positive aspects of Bill C-23 is that it will introduce greater uniformity into the previously haphazard 
treatment of survivor’s benefits in federal pension statutes for employees and veterans. The 
exception is the War Veterans Allowance Act, a statute that has been peculiarly resistant to 
modernizing trends over the years. Even after Bill C-23, a veteran’s survivor who remarries or forms 
a new common law partnership loses his or her entitlement to survivor benefits. The Minister retains 
discretion to deny a survivor’s benefit to a separated spouse. Parliament should remove these 
anachronisms and bring the War Veterans Allowance Act into line with the contemporary approach. 
 The current model of employment pension survivors’ benefits, like the CPP survivors’ 
pensions, is premised on a combination of dependency and compensatory rationales. The 
dependency rationale has been eroded, but it is not obsolete. Some spouses or partners, 
particularly women who worked in the home during long-term relationships with breadwinner men, 
still require economic support to cushion the economic blow they suffer on the sudden loss of their 
only source of income. The dependency rationale, however, can no longer be the sole objective 
underlying the current regime of survivors’ benefits. Survivors can claim benefits regardless of need, 
even if they cohabited with the deceased for little more than a year, and even if they have since 
formed a new conjugal relationship. Even economically self-sufficient spouses or partners facilitated 
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the employment earnings of their mates by living with them in relationships of caring and 
commitment. The surviving spouse or partner contributed indirectly to the deceased’s earned 
employment entitlements, a role for which he or she deserves compensation. Hence the justice of 
dividing the benefit among multiple claimants in proportion to the number of years they lived with the 
deceased. 
 In our view, the dependency and compensatory objectives are both valid and justify the 
continued use of relational criteria in legislation governing survivors’ benefits in employment pension 
plans. What remains to be considered is whether these objectives could be better accomplished if 
persons other than spouses and common law partners were entitled to claim survivors’ benefits. We 
will pursue this issue below. 
 
(c) Pension Standards Legislation 
The federal legislation regulating employment pension plans at private sector workplaces 
within federal jurisdiction is the Pension Benefits Standards Act.198 The Act sets out minimum 
standards that pension plans are required to meet. One of these requirements is the provision of 
survivor benefits to spouses or common law partners.199 After Bill C-23, a survivor's benefit must be 
made available to the common law partner at the time of the employee's death, or if there was no 
common law partner the employee's spouse. For an employee without a spouse or common law 
partner, there is no obligation to provide a survivor's benefit. The benefit cannot be terminated upon 
remarriage or the formation of a new common law partnership.200 In contrast to the pension statutes 
governing its own employees, the Act does not require private employment pensions to provide for 
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division of the survivor benefits between a surviving spouse and common law partner. Instead, the 
legislation provides that the common law partner’s claim displaces the claim of a spouse.201 
 
(d) Old Age Pensions 
The Old Age Security Act,202 first introduced by the federal government in 1951, provides a 
pension entitlement to all residents of Canada over the age of 65. It was initially a universal 
entitlement calculated without regard to the needs or resources of a particular recipient. Since 1989, 
the old age pension is indirectly subject to an income test: the Income Tax Act recovers all or part of 
the pension from persons with high incomes. Despite the individual nature of the old age pension 
entitlement, there are several supplemental aspects of the legislation that rely on relational criteria. 
Both are attempts to provide additional financial support to the elderly or near-elderly poor since the 
basic old age pension entitlement is not adequate to meet subsistence needs. 
 The first is the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), introduced in 1966.203 The amount of 
the monthly GIS an eligible pensioner receives is determined by his or her relational status. The Act 
sets out two basic rates as the maximum entitlements that form the starting point for GIS 
calculations.204 We will label these the "single rate" and the "conjugal rate".205 The single rate is 
significantly higher206 than the conjugal rate,207 on the assumption that the combined living expenses 
of cohabiting pensioners are less than double that of single pensioners because of economies of 
scale. After Bill C-23, the single rate will apply to pensioners who are single, widowed, divorced, 
separated, living with others in non-conjugal relationships, or living with a spouse or common law 
partner who is not a pensioner. The conjugal rate will apply when two pensioners live together and 
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are spouses or common law partners. The basic rates are then reduced by a formula that takes into 
account the income of the applicant pensioner if he or she does not live with a spouse or partner, 
and that takes into account the combined income of the applicant pensioner and his or her spouse 
or partner if the applicant is living in a marital or conjugal relationship. The assumption underlying 
the GIS formula is that spouses and partners pool their resources. Hence, it is the aggregate income 
of an applicant and his or her spouse/partner that determines whether an applicant is entitled to a 
supplement and, if so, at what amount. 
 The 1966 version of the GIS did not recognize common law spouses. It treated all 
pensioners living with others outside of marriage as individual applicants. They could claim the 
higher basic rate for singles, and they did not have to pool incomes for the purposes of determining 
the amount of their monthly entitlement. Since 1998, a pensioner living in a conjugal relationship 
with a person of the opposite sex is subject to the calculations previously restricted to married 
pensioners,208 and Bill C-23 will accomplish the same result for same-sex conjugal partners.209 The 
Act used to treat cohabiting pensioners more favourably if they were not married. Now it will treat 
cohabiting pensioners more favourably if they cohabit in non-conjugal relationships. 
 The second part of the Act that employs relational criteria is the spousal allowance, first 
enacted in 1975, to be renamed the "monthly allowance" by Bill C-23.210 The spousal allowance is 
available to spouses who are over the age of 60 and under the age of 65, and who are living with an 
older spouse or partner who is a pensioner. Entitlement to, and the amount of, the allowance is 
based on an income test similar to that employed in the GIS provisions. 
 The 1975 legislation was the first federal statute to give common law spouses the same 
rights as husbands and wives. It did not, however, give rights to anyone other than spouses. Low 
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income persons over the age of 60 but not yet 65 could not claim an allowance if they were not living 
with a pensioner spouse. The excluded group included persons who were single, divorced, 
separated or widowed. 
 Parliament expanded the entitlement of widows incrementally over the years. Initially, a 
widow was cut off the spousal allowance if her pensioner spouse died. In 1978, legislation provided 
that widows could continue to receive spousal allowances for six months after they became 
widowed.211 As of 1979, spousal allowance recipients who became widowed would not be cut off 
their OAS/GIS entitlement at all.212 And in 1985, all widows over the age of 60 could claim a spousal 
allowance even if they became widowed before the age of 60.213 In contrast, Parliament has done 
nothing for the near elderly poor who are single, divorced or living with others in non-conjugal 
relationships, and next to nothing for separated spouses.214 
 Members of the near elderly poor cannot claim a monthly allowance if they have cohabited 
with a pensioner in a non-conjugal relationship, or if they are single, divorced, or separated from 
their spouses or partners. The monthly allowance thus represents a significant departure from the 
philosophy of universal, individual entitlement that inspired the original Old Age Security Act. By 
distributing benefits according to marital/conjugal status, it also represents a significant departure 
from the goal of directing old age pensions to seniors with the greatest needs (defined by income 
tests) that animates the current OAS/GIS scheme. 
 The objective of the monthly allowance is to compensate for the hardship that results from 
the loss of income in dependency relationships upon the breadwinner’s retirement. The same 
rationale that led to the adoption of survivor’s benefits triggered by the death of a breadwinner, is 
reproduced here upon retirement. Both events produce sudden shifts in the financial resources. The 
                                                 
211
 Ibid., s.195. 
212
 S.C. 1979, c.4, s.4. 
213
 R.S.C. 1985, c.34 (1st Supp.), s.4. 
214
 Spousal allowance recipients who become separated before they reach 65 can continue to receive the allowance for 
three months as of July 1, 1999. S.C. 1998, c.21, s.114(1), (2). 
 64 
 
rationale for extending benefits exclusively to spouses, partners and widows is that many elderly 
couples live in relationships that followed "traditional" social patterns regarding the division of labour 
and age of the partners; many couples consist of an older male wage-earner and a younger female 
homemaker. For such couples, if the older, formerly wage-earning, spouse retires at age 65, the 
couple may have great difficulty getting by solely on his combined entitlement under the old age 
pension and GIS. In other words, the spousal allowance was initially designed to respond to the 
needs of the homemaker who may have devoted much of her life to caring for children and for her 
spouse, and is entirely dependent on her spouse’s income.215 Widows, too, are presumed to have 
slim employment prospects in their sixties, because a substantial majority did not participate in the 
paid labour force during their marriages. A good example of the expression of this objective is the 
speech of the Hon. Jake Epp, then the Minister of National Health and Welfare, in the House of 
Commons in 1985 when entitlement to the spousal allowance was fully extended to widows and 
widowers: 
We cannot and will not allow a very vulnerable segment of Canada’s near elderly population 
to continue to suffer because of circumstances completely beyond their control…. Low 
income widowed persons aged 60 to 64 do not have many of the options available to most of 
us. For instance, the vast majority of the persons who will benefit from this Bill are women 
who have been financial dependants for most, if not all, of their lives. They did not question 
this financial dependence because society deemed it appropriate. Societal norms dictated 
that the husband would enter the labour force and earn the money while the wife stayed in 
the home and performed the unpaid role of mother, housekeeper, companion, nurse, 
guidance counsellor and community worker, the list is endless…. the Bill before us today 
recognizes this contribution… the contribution these people have made to our society goes 
beyond financial measure.216 
 
 The spousal allowance provisions have been the subject of several Charter challenges. In 
Egan v. Canada,217 the Supreme Court of Canada found that the exclusion of a gay couple from 
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entitlement to a spousal allowance amounted to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
violation of section 15 of the Charter. However, a 5-4 majority of the Court upheld the exclusion on 
the grounds that Parliament should be left to decide whether it has the resources available to extend 
the benefits to same-sex couples.218 If Bill C-23 is passed, Parliament will have responded to the 
Egan ruling by granting common law partners, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, the right to 
receive a monthly allowance if they meet the other eligibility criteria in the legislation. In Collins v. 
Canada,219 the Federal Court Trial Division found that the spousal allowance provisions 
discriminated on the basis of marital status by denying entitlement to spouses who are single, 
separated or divorced. However, Rothstein J. found that Parliament is in a better position than the 
courts to make social policy choices that have significant fiscal consequences.220 As a result, he 
concluded that the limitation on equality rights was justifiable pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. 
The effect of his judgment is to place on Parliament the constitutional responsibility of determining 
whether persons between the ages of 60 and 64 who are single, separated, divorced, or living with 
others in non-conjugal relationships should be eligible for an old age monthly allowance. We will 
return to this issue below. 
 
4. Recognizing the Economic Costs and Value of Caregiving 
Relationships 
 
 Because the provision of unpaid domestic services, emotional support and personal care to 
children and adults is a socially useful role that entails significant financial sacrifice, it is an important 
government objective to provide economic support to homemakers or unpaid domestic caregivers. 
As Margrit Eichler has written, "it is in the state’s interest to support caregiving for inevitable 
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dependants by any means available."221 The Income Tax Act has taken modest steps in this 
direction through the dependants’ credit and the caregiver credit provisions. As we saw in the 
previous section, survivors’ pensions and the spousal allowance in the Old Age Security Act were 
designed to respond to the needs of women who were dependent on the employment income of 
their husbands, frequently because they devoted their lives to raising children and caring for other 
family members. 
 No federal statute, however, provides direct income support to homemakers and domestic 
caregivers for the unpaid work they perform. The Income Tax Act credits are of no direct assistance 
to a person without tax liability sufficient to absorb the credit. The caregivers’ credit is more likely to 
flow to the benefit of a co-resident who can claim the credit for care provided by another family 
member. One of the goals of survivors’ benefits and spousal allowances is to compensate women 
for the sacrifices they make in performing unpaid domestic labour. However, entitlement to these 
benefits depends on spousal status, a crude proxy for the identification of these needs. Moreover, 
entitlement to survivors’ pensions or spousal allowances is tied to events in the breadwinners’ lives 
(retirement or death), rather than a determination of homemakers’ or caregivers’ own needs. 
 It has long been recognized that this gap is a serious injustice that needs to be addressed 
through the development of new federal social policies. For example, the 1985 Parliamentary 
Committee on Equality Rights commented that: 
The lack of pension coverage for homemakers, above the basic OAS/GIS level, represents a 
serious flaw in our pension system. Although society values and depends on the contribution 
of homemakers, work in the home is not recognized as being of the same value as paid work 
performed inside or outside the home… We all agree that some mechanism must be found 
to recognize the vital contribution of homemakers to their families and to society and to 
ensure that all older Canadians have adequate retirement incomes.222 
 
 The implementation of a homemaker’s pension would accomplish more directly and 
accurately the objectives that survivors’ benefits and the old age monthly allowance have sought to 
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accomplish. In the absence of homemakers’ pensions, survivors’ benefits and old age spousal 
allowances will continue to play a role in advancing the objective of compensating spouses and 
partners for the valuable contributions they make in the form of unpaid domestic care and services. 
These are awkward vehicles, however, for delivering on this important policy objective. They link 
benefits to the existence of a spousal or partnership relationship with an employee contributor (in the 
case of survivor's benefits) or pensioner (in the case of the spousal allowance). They do not link 
benefits specifically to the provision of unpaid domestic care and services. 
 We have argued that the central value that ought to guide state regulation of adult personal 
relationships is the promotion of relationships characterized by caring and commitment. There is no 
doubt that the failure to provide any direct form of income support to unpaid domestic caregivers 
seriously compromises this value. 
 
5. Compensation for the loss of, or harm to, emotional and economically 
interdependent relationships 
 
Death or personal injury can have serious consequences for adults in personal relationships 
with the deceased or injured person. Reasonable expectations of continued financial and emotional 
support are obviously terminated in the case of death and may be seriously disrupted by personal 
injury. It is a legitimate state objective to seek to respond to or alleviate these distinct relational 
harms. It is necessary to do so by employing relational terms in the drafting of the legal rules.  
 
(a) Bereavement Leave 
Employment standards laws seek to ensure that employers respect employees’ needs for 
time to grieve, attend funerals, gather with family and friends, commence administration of estates 
and deal with other financial matters, and rearrange their lives following the death of a loved one. 
Legislation does so by stipulating minimum bereavement leave entitlements that employers must 
provide to employees. The relevant provision in the federal context is s.210(3) of the Canada Labour 
Code, which provides that 
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Every employee is entitled to and shall be granted, in the event of the death of a member of 
his immediate family, bereavement leave on any of his normal working days that occur during 
the three days immediately following the day of the death. 
 
The regulations define “immediate family” as including spouses, common law spouses (which 
presumably will be changed to “common law partners” following the passage of Bill C-23),223 parents 
(including in-laws), children, siblings, and “any relative of the employee who resides permanently in 
the employee’s household or with whom the employee permanently resides.”224 
 
(b) Relocation of Family  
Another federal law that recognizes and seeks to alleviate a distinct financial consequence of 
death is s.40(1) of the Judges Act which provides that if a judge dies while in office, his or her 
children and surviving spouse or common law partner are in some circumstances entitled to a 
“removal allowance” if they have to move to another part of the country following the death. The 
provision recognizes that family members may have to move their residence when a judge is 
appointed, and, for a variety of personal or economic reasons, may have to move again upon the 
judge’s death.225 
 
(c) Wrongful death or injury 
Where the death or injury of a person is caused by the wrongful actions of another, 
Canadian statutes give family members a right to bring a civil action to recover damages for the 
economic and emotional injuries they have suffered consequent upon the tortiously caused death or 
injury. While the establishment of statutory tort actions is a matter that normally falls within provincial 
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jurisdiction, the federal government has the power to establish civil actions as an incidental aspect 
of its jurisdiction over certain activities such as aeronautics, navigation and shipping.  
Thus, for example, the Carriage by Air Act226 imposes liability on airlines to each member of 
a passenger’s family who suffered damage because of a passenger’s death.227 Family members are 
defined to include wives, husbands, common law partners, parents, grandparents, siblings, children 
and grandchildren.  
Similarly, Part XIV of the Canada Shipping Act228 enables “dependants” to bring a wrongful 
death action when a member of the family is killed through the negligence of another in a boating 
accident that occurs at sea or on inland waters anywhere in the country. For the purposes of 
highlighting the reform issues with respect to statutes that seek to respond to the economic and 
emotional relational consequences of death or injury, it will be illuminating to conduct a more 
detailed examination of the origins and evolution of this statutory cause of action. 
The common law took a very harsh approach to family members’ loss of the expectation of 
continued emotional or economic support upon the death of a loved one: no cause of action was 
recognized. The severity of the common law rule was overcome in England in 1846 with the 
enactment of Lord Campbell’s Act.229 The Act recognized the legitimate interests of “dependants” in 
the lives of their close family members. It enabled family members to bring a claim for their 
pecuniary losses consequent upon the negligently caused death of a family provider. The Act set out 
a list of family members who were entitled to bring a claim: wives, husbands, parents, grandparents, 
children and grandchildren. The common law bar to wrongful death actions remained in place for 
claims brought by persons in relationships with the deceased that did not fall within the statutory list. 
If a claimant had the requisite relationship with the deceased, the Act permitted recovery of his or 
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her derivative “pecuniary” losses. It was not possible to claim damages for grief, bereavement, loss 
of consortium, or for the deceased’s suffering prior to death.230 Rather, the claim is for the loss of a 
reasonable expectation of a future pecuniary benefit. The claim will include the portion of the 
deceased’s disposable income and the value of the domestic services that would have flowed to the 
benefit of the claimant in the future. 
Wrongful death statutes inspired by Lord Campbell’s Act have been passed in all common 
law provinces and similar rights of action are recognized in the Quebec Civil Code. However, in the 
context of Canadian maritime law, a wrongful death action was not added to the Canada Shipping 
Act until 1948.231 The scope of the action is closely modelled on Lord Campbell’s Act. The list of 
potential claimants is identical to the 1846 statute, with the exception that the definitions of children 
and parents includes persons in adoptive or social (in loco parentis) parent-child relationships. 
Unlike some of its provincial counterparts, the maritime law wrongful death action has not been 
modernized since 1948 to reflect contemporary conceptions of relational losses. Section 61 of the 
Ontario Family Law Act,232 for example, puts in place a relational claim that is not limited to wrongful 
death actions. It also permits claimants to bring actions in cases of negligently caused personal 
injury to a family member, broadens the class of claimants to include common law spouses and 
same-sex partners,233 and expressly permits recovery of damages for loss of “guidance, care and 
companionship that the claimant might reasonably have expected to receive from the person if the 
injury or death had not occurred.”234 In contrast, the federal maritime wrongful death action is still 
limited to claims resulting from death, common law partners and siblings are not included in the list 
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of claimants, and compensation for the loss of future emotional support is not explicitly recognized. 
In all of these ways, the Canada Shipping Act continues to reflect a limited nineteenth century 
conception of relational harm. 
While Parliament has not taken any steps to modernize the scope of the maritime wrongful 
death claim since 1948, the Supreme Court of Canada took significant steps forward in its 1998 
ruling in Ordon Estate v. Grail.235 The Court recognized that  
...contemporary conceptions of loss include the idea that it is truly a harm for a dependant to 
lose the guidance, care and companionship of a spouse, parent, child, etc... It is unfair to 
deny compensation to the plaintiff dependants in these actions based solely upon an 
anachronistic and historically contingent understanding of the harm they may have 
suffered.236 
 
The Court therefore reformed Canadian maritime tort law to permit claims for relational losses 
arising out of negligently caused personal injury to a family member, and to permit claims for loss of 
guidance, care and companionship upon the negligently caused death or personal injury of a family 
member.237 The Court was not willing, however, to expand the class of claimants entitled to bring a 
claim to include common law partners238 and siblings: 
...although it may be desirable for Parliament to expand the list of eligible dependants under 
s. 645 of the Canada Shipping Act, it would be inappropriate for the courts to undertake this 
task unilaterally by reforming non-statutory maritime law in order to supplement the statutory 
provision. Through the Canada Shipping Act, Parliament has spoken as to the class of 
eligible plaintiffs in the case of a fatal accident. For this Court to reform the law to expand the 
class would be to effect a legislative and not a judicial change in the law.239 
 
Parliament has not yet acted to expand the list of eligible claimants. Bill C-23 contains no 
amendment to the Canada Shipping Act. However, it is clear that this omission is not the result of a 
judgement that the status quo is acceptable. Rather, the federal government “has undertaken to 
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complete a top-to-bottom modernization” of the Act240 and the forthcoming amendments will no 
doubt address the issue of eligible claimants in the maritime wrongful death action. We will return to 
this issue in Part II (B), below. 
 
6. Preventing violence or abuse in adult personal relationships 
 
Intimate relationships give rise to unique risks and vulnerabilities. These risks and 
vulnerabilities may be compounded by isolation from others and emotional or economic 
dependence. Just as caring and committed relationships are worthy of state support and 
recognition, the state ought to be vigilant to discourage and condemn relationships that are violent 
or abusive. These concerns have led the state away from regulating relationships by reference to 
their formal status and towards regulation premised on actual relational qualities. The repeal of the 
marital rape exemption in 1983 is a clear example of this fundamental shift in norms guiding state 
regulation of adult personal relationships.241 
A number of provisions of the Criminal Code aim to prevent and punish physical violence or 
harassment in adult personal relationships. Criminal prohibitions on assault and sexual assault apply 
with equal force to persons who are married or in other adult relationships. To be valid, consent to 
sexual activity cannot be obtained “by abusing a position of trust, power or authority.” (s.273.1(2)(c)) 
The “rape shield” provision of the Criminal Code aims to prevent the use of evidence of 
complainants’ past sexual relationship with an accused or anyone else from being used to suggest 
that they abandoned their right to physical security. (s.276(2)) The criminal harassment provision of 
the Code, s.264, was enacted in large part to discourage “stalking” and other behaviour threatening 
the physical and psychological security of persons seeking to avoid or end intimate personal 
relationships. The incest prohibition in s.155 of the Code reflects the view that sexual intercourse 
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with a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or sibling is likely to be either abusive or psychologically 
damaging. The offences of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching and sexual exploitation 
in sections 151-153 and section 153.1 of the Code seek to protect persons who are vulnerable to 
sexual abuse as a result of youth or disability. These provisions of the Code reflect particular 
concern regarding the potential abuse by adults of relationships of authority or dependence. One 
provision that stands out as anomalous is the prohibition on anal intercourse in section 159 of the 
Code. This provision makes it an offence to engage in anal intercourse unless the act takes place in 
private between two persons who are married to each other or both over the age of 18.  
A concern with addressing the consequences of violence or abuse in adult personal 
relationships is evident in the sentencing provisions of the Code. Evidence that an offender abused 
his spouse or child, or abused a position of trust or authority in relation to a victim, is an aggravating 
factor in sentencing (s.718.2(a)(ii) and (iii)). Moreover, an offender who has caused or threatened 
harm to a member of his household can be required to make restitution to them for any costs they 
have incurred as a result of moving out of the offender’s household for temporary housing, food, 
child care and transportation (s.738(1)(c)). 
In addition to its concern with preventing and punishing physical violence, the Criminal Code 
targets serious forms of abusive neglect that threaten the lives or health of persons in dependency 
relationships. Section 215(1) imposes legal duties on parents and guardians to provide the 
necessaries of life to children, on spouses and partners to provide the necessaries of life to each 
other, and on caregivers or custodians to provide the necessaries of life to persons under their 
charge who are wholly dependent on them ‘by reason of detention, age, illness, mental disorder or 
other cause.’ Necessaries of life is understood by the courts to include food, clothing, shelter and 
medical treatment. By virtue of section 215(2), it is an offence to fail to provide necessaries to a 
child, spouse or common law partner who is ‘in destitute or necessitous circumstances’. It is also an 
offence to fail to provide necessaries and thereby endanger the life or health of a child, spouse, 
common law partner, or wholly dependent person under one's charge. 
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In Canada’s original 1892 Criminal Code, it was an offence for husbands to not provide 
necessaries to their wives.242 The offence reflected the view that marriage imposed a permanent 
obligation on husbands to support their wives, even in the case of separation.243 In 1974, the marital 
offence was amended to impose a spousal duty to provide necessaries on wives as well as 
husbands.244 In 2000, Bill C-23 will extend the duty to provide necessaries to common law partners 
of the opposite or same-sex.245 The spousal offence thus originated in a patriarchal model of the 
family and has since been changed to accommodate the demands of gender neutrality and non-
discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation. These expansions in the offence 
have occurred without any alteration of the substantive definition of the crime. We will take up the 
argument below that s.215 is in need of further reform to eliminate its reliance on outdated 
assumptions regarding dependency relationships. 
As the above review illustrates, the state’s legitimate concern with preventing violence or 
abuse related to adult personal relationships most often manifests itself in federal legislation in the 
form of criminal offences directed at punishing violence or abuse. Criminal prohibitions operate 
retroactively to punish behaviour that has already occurred and provide some deterrence of 
prospective acts of violence. The federal government, however, could do much more to protect 
persons from the risks of violence in their personal relationships. The Witness Protection Program 
Act246 provides a useful model for a more pro-active approach to the prevention of violence. The Act 
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enables the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. to provide new identities and police protection to persons 
admitted to the program. At the moment, the program is limited to witnesses who have assisted in 
the prosecution of criminal offences and to persons who, because of their "relationship" or 
"association" with a witness, require protection.247 These limitations reflect the restricted purpose of 
the program: “to promote law enforcement by facilitating the protection of persons who are involved 
directly or indirectly in providing assistance in law enforcement matters.”248 The Act reflects the view 
that "witnesses are the ultimate public servants"249 and need to be protected from violence or threats 
of violence to which they are exposed by their participation in the criminal process as Crown 
witnesses. At the moment, protection can be afforded to persons at risk of relational violence only if 
they have testified against their ex-spouses or ex-partners (or are associated with someone who 
has). 
The goals of the Witness Protection Program are laudable. Yet the restriction of the program 
to witnesses and their associates raises the concern that the government is willing to act to prevent 
violence in personal relationships only when it furthers its interest in punishing criminal acts that 
have already occurred. The state ought to be concerned with protecting all persons from risks of 
violence. Canadians who are not witnesses ought to be entitled to seek pro-active protection from 
serious ongoing abuse, intimidation or threats they face from ex-spouses, ex-partners, or other 
persistent stalkers. The federal government should give serious consideration to expanding the 
Witness Protection Program Act, as proposed in a 1999 private member’s bill,250 or by expanding its 
new identities program, which has provided limited assistance to victims of domestic abuse.251 
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7. Restructuring financial relationships on the break down of adult 
personal relationships 
 
 Another important objective of federal legislation has been to assist in the restructuring of 
financial relationships on marriage break down.  Federal legislation has imposed spousal and child 
support obligations on divorce, provided for the division of benefits under the Canada Pension Plan, 
as well as established a range of mechanisms for the enforcement of support orders. These 
provisions are intended to recognize the consequences of financial interdependency on marriage 
break down, by imposing and enforcing support obligations between family members.  
 
(a) Family Support Obligations - Divorce Act, 1985 
 The Divorce Act, 1985 imposes both spousal support and child support obligations on 
marital break down. Section 15.1 deals with child support obligations. Following the 1997 
amendments, these child support obligations are governed by the child support guidelines. The 
objectives of the guidelines are: (a) to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures 
that they benefit from the financial means of their parents (b) to reduce conflict and tension between 
parents or spouses by making the calculation of child support more objective; (c) to improve the 
efficiency of the legal process by giving courts and parents and spouses guidance in setting the 
levels of child support and encouraging settlement, and (d) to ensure consistent treatment of 
parents or spouses and their children who are in similar circumstances. 252 While child support is a 
right of the child, and is thereby more specifically part of the regulation of the parent/child 
relationship, the child support guidelines are nevertheless an important dimension of the 
restructuring of adult relationships upon marriage break down. The guidelines are intended to give 
guidance to this restructuring, and thereby allow parents to reach agreements with less conflict or 
litigation.   
                                                 
252
 SOR/97-175 as am. by SOR/97-563.  
77 
 Section 15.2 of the Divorce Act 1985 deals with spousal support. Section 15.2(1) authorizes 
courts to make spousal support orders on divorce. The objectives of spousal support orders are set 
out in section 15.2(6), as (a) recognizing any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses 
arising from the marriage or its break down; (b) apportioning between the spouses any financial 
consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for 
the support of any child of the marriage; (c) relieving any economic hardship of the spouses arising 
from the break down of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promoting the economic self-
sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.  
The family support obligations of the Divorce Act fit within the general objectives of family 
law, setting out the private rights and responsibilities of individual family members, providing that 
family members have obligations to support one another, and those obligations do not cease upon 
break down of the family. The support provisions of the Divorce Act recognize that marriage is an 
economic partnership that may confer economic advantages and disadvantages on the spouses, 
advantages and disadvantages that need to be addressed when that relationship breaks down.  
 
  (b) Enforcement of Family Support Obligations 
The Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act253 provides generally for 
garnishment and attachment of federal salaries. It further provides for the diversion of pension 
benefits from federal sources to satisfy financial support orders, including any support order made 
under the Divorce Act, or any provincial law relating to family support obligations. The person named 
as recipient of a financial support order can apply for a diversion of a pension benefit payable to the 
recipient. The Act allows for up to 50 percent of the benefit to be diverted, or if the support order is in 
arrears, more than 50 percent of the benefit may be diverted.  
There are a number of federal superannuation statutes which include provisions for the 
garnishment of pensions or annuities to satisfy support orders. The Canadian Forces 
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Superannuation Act,254 the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act,255 the Lieutenant 
Governors Superannuation Act,256 the Public Service Superannuation Act,257 and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act 258 all include provisions that allow a pension, annuity 
or amounts otherwise payable under the Acts to be diverted to satisfy financial support orders, in 
accordance with Part II of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act. 259 The Judges 
Act and the Governor General’s Act have virtually identical provisions.260 
The Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act261 provides for (1) the 
release of information regarding location of a person in breach of a family provision (including a 
support, custody or access order);262 (2) the garnishment of federal moneys to satisfy support orders 
and support provisions; and (3) the denial of federal licenses, including a passport.263  
(c) Division of Pensions on Relationship Break down 
 Division of property on relationship break down falls within provincial jurisdiction. However, 
federal legislation provides for the division of federal pensions, otherwise in accordance with 
provincial rules.  
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The Canada Pension Plan Act allows for a division of unadjustable pension earnings 
between spouses and common law partners on relationship break down. On divorce or separation, 
section 55 of the Act allows each of the former spouses or common law partners to make an 
application for the equal division of pension entitlements that each spouse/partner accumulated 
during the relationship. Prior to Bill C-23, under section 55, “spouse” was defined as a married 
spouse. 264 Spouses or former spouses had to have cohabited for at least 36 consecutive months. 
Former spouses could apply for a division for unadjustable pensions earnings accrued in the months 
in which the former spouses cohabited during the marriage. Bill C-23 will amend the definition of 
spouse in section 2(1) of the Canada Pension Plan Act, adding “common law partner”, defined as a 
“person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having 
so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year.” Section 55.1 will also 
be amended to allow for the division of unadjusted pension earnings in the case of common law 
partners. Section 55.1(3) now provides “that persons subject to a division of unadjusted pensionable 
earnings must have cohabited for a continuous period of at least one year in order for the division to 
take place”.265 
As Carol Rogerson notes “this provision reflects the same economic model of the spousal 
relationship as do schemes which provide for division of matrimonial property after marriage break 
down – i.e., the view of marriage as an economic partnership in which spouses contribute equally to 
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the accumulation of wealth during the course of the relationship, entitling them to equal shares of 
the wealth upon break down.”266 
  The Pension Benefits Division Act also provides for the division of pensions earnings of the 
members of federal pension plans for public employees. Prior to the Bill C-23, a member, spouse or 
former spouse may apply to divide the member’s pension benefits.267 Section 2 of the Act defined 
spouse as “a person of the opposite sex who (a) is married to the member, (b) is cohabiting with the 
member in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited with the member for a period of not less 
than a year, or (c) is a party to avoid marriage with the member.” Bill C-23 will amend the definition, 
replacing opposite-sex common law spouses with “common law partner.” Any application may be 
made (1) where a court, in a proceeding involving divorce, annulment or separation, orders the 
pension benefits to be divided between the member and the spouse/former spouse, or common law 
partner or (2) where the spouses or common law partners have lived separately and apart for one 
year, and a court orders that the pension benefits be divided, or the member and spouse/former 
spouse or common law partner made a written agreement providing for the division of pension 
benefits. 268 A division of pension benefits is made by transferring 50% of the value of the pension 
benefits that accrued during the period subject to division to the spouse or former spouse.269 The 
Pension Benefits Standards Act270 governs private pension plans in federally-regulated workplaces. 
Section 25 provides for the assignment of pension benefits to a spouse, former spouse or common 
law partner.271  
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These various federal statutes providing for the division of pension benefits are all based on 
the same principle as the provincial family laws dealing with division of property, namely, that 
marriage is a kind of economic partnership, that gives rise to an entitlement to equal sharing on 
marital break down. As Rogerson notes “these provisions governing pension division can essentially 
be seen as an adjunct to private law rights with respect to division of matrimonial property between 
spouses upon marriage break down”.272 
 
8. Conclusion 
  
In this section, we have provided, for descriptive purposes, an overview of federal laws that 
employ relational terms. We have sought to categorize those laws according to the legitimate federal 
objectives that they seek to accomplish. It is important to emphasize that to conclude that these are 
legitimate objectives in the regulation of adult relationships is not to suggest that the objectives are 
well served by existing spousal or relational definitions. Nor is it to conclude that all of the statutes 
included in our review ought to be seen as having legitimate relational objectives. In the sections 
that follow, we further interrogate both of these issues.  
 
 
 
 
III. Legitimacy of Relational Objectives in Particular Policy 
Contexts 
 
In this section, we pursue a critical evaluation of some of the laws reviewed above to 
determine whether their pursuit of relational objectives continues to be compelling. While we have 
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concluded in the previous section that these laws are pursuing objectives that, in the abstract, are 
legitimate relational objectives, it may be that the continued pursuit of these objectives in a particular 
legislative context is no longer legitimate. In other words, there are instances where the use of 
relational criteria is an entirely inappropriate way of imposing penalties or distributing state benefits, 
rights and/or responsibilities. This could be the case for a number of reasons. First, the relational 
objective may lack any factual or empirical foundation. We argue that this is the case with the anal 
intercourse offence in the Criminal Code. Second, the asserted relational objective may not 
correspond to the actual objectives of a legislative scheme. The actual design or operation of a 
legislative scheme may call into question the legitimacy of an asserted relational objective. This is 
the case, we argue below, with respect to the insurable employment provisions of the Employment 
Insurance Act and the monthly allowance provisions of the Old Age Security Act. Third, even if the 
law is contributing to the accomplishment of relational objectives, there may be other more 
compelling state objectives that override the pursuit of the relational objectives in the particular 
policy context. We argue that this is the case with the evidentiary rules that make a husband or wife 
incompetent and non-compellable as witnesses for the Crown in a criminal trial of his or her accused 
spouse.  
 
 
A. The Anal Intercourse Offence in Section 159 of the Criminal Code 
 
The anal intercourse provision of the Criminal Code uses adult relational terms in a manner 
that stands out as anomalous in the current normative structure of sexual offences. Unlike other 
particular kinds of sexual acts, section 159 makes the act of engaging in anal intercourse an offence 
regardless of whether violence, exploitation or a commercial exchange was involved. An exception 
to the prohibition was added in 1969 to remove from the scope of the offence acts of anal 
intercourse engaged in, in private, by husband and wife, or any two persons over the age of twenty- 
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one.273 In 1987, the age of consent to anal intercourse was reduced to eighteen274 (still four years 
higher than the age of consent that operates with respect to other kinds of consensual, non-
commercial sexual activity). The continuing presence of distinct treatment of acts of anal intercourse 
in the sexual offence provisions of the Criminal Code can be justified only if acts of anal intercourse 
involve distinct harms or risks of harm to the participants. The marital exemption, in turn, must be 
explained by the proposition that protecting marital privacy and autonomy is of greater concern than 
the alleged harms of anal intercourse.  
Since its enactment in 1969, Parliament has not amended the marital exemption to extend it 
to acts committed by partners to other kinds of committed relationships. Bill C-23 will not amend 
section 159.275 As a result, unmarried persons under the age of 18 can be charged with committing 
the offence, even if the charge relates to private, non-exploitative sexual acts with a common law 
partner. However, the Ontario and Quebec Courts of Appeal have declared the anal intercourse 
provision to be of no force and effect on the grounds that it discriminates on the basis of age and 
sexual orientation, and that it fails to further any compelling state objective.276 The provision remains 
in force in the other provinces. Rather than expand the marital exemption in section 159(2) of the 
Code, Parliament ought to repeal s.159 entirely. The distinct criminal prohibition on anal intercourse 
does not contribute to the accomplishment of any legitimate policy objectives. 
B. Defining Insurable Employment in the Employment Insurance Act 
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 The Employment Insurance Act excludes non-arm’s length employment from the definition of 
insurable employment. Without sufficient insurable employment, an employee who has lost his or 
her job does not qualify for unemployment benefits. These provisions pursue a legitimate federal 
objective: the denial of benefits to persons who have in essence committed fraud by manufacturing 
fictitious employment relationships for the purpose of claiming benefits. The question is whether 
relational terms ought to be used to protect the scheme from being abused by collusive employers 
and employees. 
The legislation currently uses relational definitions to accomplish this objective. If persons 
are unrelated, “it is a question of fact whether [they] were at a particular time dealing with each other 
at arm’s length.” If persons are related by blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption, 
they are deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length.277 Until 1990, the presumption of non-
arm’s length dealing between related persons was irrebuttable: family employment was not insurable 
under the Act. Relational status was unjustly used as a proxy for fictitious employment. Meanwhile, 
whether employment by non-family members was real and therefore insurable was a question of fact 
to be determined in each case. 
Now, even if persons are related, and therefore initially deemed to not deal with each other 
at arm’s length, s.5(3)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act allows the Minister to deem the reverse: 
…if the employer is, within the meaning of [the Income Tax Act], related to the employee, 
they are deemed to deal with each other at arm’s length if the Minister of National Revenue is 
satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, including the 
remuneration paid, the terms and conditions, the duration and the nature and importance of 
the work performed, it is reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a 
substantially similar contract of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s 
length. 
 
 
The 1990 amendment thus abandons the view that family employment is always 
manufactured with an eye to taking advantage of unemployment benefits. Whether family 
employment qualifies as insurable employment depends on an examination of the relevant facts 
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(“having regard to all the circumstances of the employment”). In other words, after the 1990 
amendment, the tests for determining whether employment between related persons or between 
unrelated persons is insurable are the same: in both cases, it is the factual elements of the 
employment relationship itself that determines whether it is fictitious or real. This is as it should be. 
According to the legislation as currently structured, however, decision-makers must follow an 
unnecessarily confusing and circuitous path. The use of the notion of an “arm’s length” relationship 
as a proxy for fraudulent arrangements is confusing. Commercial relationships between persons 
with common interests – such as friends, associates or family members – are not necessarily tainted 
by collusive fraud. Similarly, persons without any prior association may both have something to gain 
from concocting a fictitious employment relationship. A more direct way of pursuing the objective of 
this provision would be to replace the exclusion of non-arm’s length employment currently effected 
by sections 5(2)(i) and 5(3), and to replace those sections with a provision excluding employment if, 
having regard to all the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the contract of employment 
was manufactured to take advantage of unemployment benefits. 
The removal of the arm’s length and relational definitions from section 5 of the Act would 
have advantages beyond the production of a more transparent and less confusing legislative 
regime. At the moment, since persons related by blood, marriage, partnership or adoption are 
deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length (at least initially), the existence of such a 
relationship becomes a subject of inquiry and contestation in the administration of the scheme.  
For many years, the administration of the provision excluding non-arm’s length employment 
from insurable employment has given rise to a steady stream of appeals to the Tax Court by 
claimants denied unemployment benefits.278 A significant number of these cases involved 
examinations into the private relational aspects of claimants’ lives to determine, for example, 
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whether opposite-sex cohabitants were in a conjugal relationship.279 In some of the reported cases 
claimants have denied the existence of a conjugal relationship with their employers, while the 
Minister has sought to establish such a relationship to help justify the decision to deny benefits. This 
is an undignified spectacle that ought to be avoided if at all possible.  
The Minister and the courts appear to have imposed a heightened degree of suspicion and 
scrutiny on family employment relationships. In our view, this focus on the personal aspect of a 
family employment relationship entails an unnecessary invasion of privacy. It also distracts attention 
from what the real issue ought to be regardless of whether a personal relationship existed: was the 
employment relationship manufactured for fraudulent purposes or not? 
Moreover, as a general principle, the government should not make an individual’s entitlement 
to basic financial benefits dependent upon the non-existence of a personal relationship per se. 
Persons should not be put in the position of having to choose between the formation of personal 
relationships and receiving benefits to meet their basic financial needs. The Employment Insurance 
Act as currently structured and administered places an incentive on persons in family relationships 
to avoid working for each other. This negative consequence can be avoided and privacy respected 
without compromising the policy objectives of the statute. In our view, the relational and arm’s length 
concepts in section 5 of the Act should be replaced by a provision excluding employment if, having 
regard to all the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the contract of employment was 
manufactured to take advantage of unemployment benefits. 
 
C. The Monthly Allowance in the Old Age Security Act 
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87 
  
As described above, the stated purpose of the monthly allowance provisions has been to 
respond to the distinct needs and contributions made by women who have performed unwaged 
labour in the home. However, the legislative scheme has never been limited to claims by 
homemaker women. Rather, it is a gender-neutral scheme that relies on a combination of factors - 
age, spousal/partner or widowed status, and combined income - to determine entitlement. Adult 
relationships qualify for entitlement regardless of the presence or absence of children, and 
regardless of whether the relationship involved economic dependency. Indeed, common law 
partners qualify for the benefit even if they have lived together for only one year.  
Given these features, it is obvious that the legislative design is poorly tailored to the stated 
relational objective. The goal of the scheme as drafted is, rather, to respond to the economic needs 
of the elderly or near elderly poor, male or female, so long as they are widowed or living in a spousal 
or partnership relationship. Because the financial needs the legislation addresses are not distinct to 
spouses, partners or widows, the Act is a serious affront to the dignity of single, separated or 
divorced persons whose economic needs may be equivalent or more pressing. Indeed, statistics 
show that it is elderly women living alone who, not surprisingly, have the highest rate of poverty in 
Canada. As the Federal Court concluded in the Collins case,280 the monthly allowance provisions of 
the Old Age Security Act discriminate on the basis of marital status in violation of section 15 of the 
Charter.  
The same conclusion was reached by the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights in 
1985. They recommended that “the Spousal Allowances under the Old Age Security Act be replaced 
with an equivalent benefit that is available without reference to marital status.”281 The government 
acknowledged in its response that “there are other near-elderly persons in need who still do not 
have the financial protection offered by the Spouses Allowance [sic].” However, the government 
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refused to change the law, citing fiscal limitations: “as was recognized by the all-party Task Force on 
Pension Reform in 1983, restraint prevents the Government from going further at this time.”282 Thus, 
fiscal constraints have been cited by both the courts283 and the government for maintaining 
discrimination contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for more than twenty years.  
 Yet, with all due respect, the fiscal argument fails to provide a compelling justification for the 
maintenance of discriminatory benefit programmes. Parliament has a constitutional obligation, when 
faced with limited resources, to avoid limiting the distribution of resources to claimants identified by a 
prohibited ground of discrimination. Parliament has a range of choices available to it that are 
consistent with its constitutional obligations, including making a lower level of benefit available to a 
larger group of people. Thus, equality norms dictate that the denial of monthly allowances to single, 
divorced or separated claimants be repealed.  
One option would be to remove any relational preconditions to entitlement in the Old Age 
Security Act. Entitlement to a monthly allowance could be determined solely by reference to need. 
For example, it could remove the relational requirements and make a reduced benefit available to all 
persons over the age of sixty whose income falls below a certain level. Entitlement to a monthly 
allowance would then be determined solely by reference to income. Such a scheme would be an 
improvement on the current legislation in two ways. First, income is a far better proxy than relational 
status for identifying financial need. Second, an income test avoids state inquiries into private 
matters that can accompany a relational test of entitlement. Moreover, because individuals are 
already required to disclose their annual income to the federal government for income tax purposes, 
an income test can be applied without additional invasions of privacy and with relatively modest 
administrative cost. 
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A second option would be to replace the monthly allowance available to spouses and 
common law partners with a monthly allowance targeted more directly to homemakers and 
caregivers who sacrificed employment earnings in order to provide caregiving and domestic services 
to other members of their households. While the design and administration of any such scheme 
would pose practical challenges, in theory it is preferable to the current use of spousal or partnership 
status to accomplish these goals. 
 
D. Spousal Competence and Compellability in Criminal Trials 
 
Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act is in need of reform. The government is currently 
considering a package of amendments to the Act, and, in deference to those deliberations, Bill C-23 
does not propose any amendments to the Canada Evidence Act.  
The first law reform issue is whether the policies underlying these special evidentiary rules 
regarding spousal competence and compellability are still valid and still outweigh the competing 
policy that favours the admission of all relevant and probative evidence that can aid in the fact-
finding process. If not, then legislation ought to be passed amending section 4 and completely 
abolishing the common law rules restricting the competence or compellability of husbands and 
wives. If there are valid policies underlying the evidentiary rules, then there are strong arguments for 
expanding the application of the special spousal evidentiary rules so that they apply to other adult 
personal relationships whose integrity or harmony is worth preserving. The question would then 
become how to define the adult personal relationships that ought to be included. The general 
approach taken to other statutes by Parliament in Bill C-23 suggests that, at the very least, “common 
law partners” should be incompetent or non-compellable witnesses in the same circumstances as 
married spouses (and that they should be able to claim a privilege for their private communications). 
There may even be other non-conjugal adult personal relationships -- for example, relationships 
between siblings or non-conjugal cohabitants -- whose emotional strength and integrity is worth 
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preserving to the same degree as marital relationships. If so, they too should be incompetent and 
non-compellable witnesses (and their communications privileged) in the same circumstances as 
spouses or common law partners. We will return to these definitional issues below. 
A number of policies have been offered over the years for the spousal evidentiary rules. 
Wigmore traces marital testamentary privileges back to the end of the 1500s and early 1600s. He 
notes that a variety of explanations for the rule were given in texts beginning in the seventeenth 
century, including the marital unity of husbands and wives and the assumption that their interests 
are identical.284 Neither of these early rationales for the rule is consistent with contemporary attitudes 
to the marital relationship.285 The two surviving rationales, according to recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada,286 are, first, that the rules are necessary to foster the integrity and 
harmony of marital relationships, and second, that they reflect “the natural repugnance in every fair-
minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other’s condemnation, and to 
compelling the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life 
partner.”287 The “natural repugnance” rationale, however, is not self-explanatory. What is the basis 
of the “natural repugnance”? In our view, it has its source in either the unity or common interests of 
spouses, or the protection of their relational integrity, intimacy and privacy. Since the unity and 
common interests rationales are based on now discredited conceptions of marital relations, we are 
left with the marital harmony rationale. However, even this rationale fails to provide a compelling 
justification of the current rules which have come under sustained attack from courts and 
commentators. 
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Consider first the rule that makes a spouse an incompetent witness for the prosecution in 
cases that do not fall within the common law exceptions or do not involve offences listed in sections 
4(2) or 4(4) of the Canada Evidence Act. The spousal incompetence rule has the effect of 
preventing a spouse from testifying even if he or she would prefer to do so. In other words, the 
legislation substitutes a paternalistic preference for preserving marital harmony even if it conflicts 
with a spouse’s own view on whether his or her relational interests are best served by testifying or 
not. In our view, there are two fundamental objections to this position. One is that if a spouse 
chooses to testify against his or her husband, there may be little marital harmony left to protect. And, 
second, even if the integrity of the relationship is an ongoing concern, the witness spouse is in the 
best position to determine whether it is worth taking the relational risks that testifying entails. As 
Iacobucci J. stated in R. v. Salituro,288 
The grounds which have been used in support of the rule are inconsistent with respect for the 
freedom of all individuals, which has become a central tenet of the legal and moral fabric of 
this country particularly since the adoption of the Charter. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, Dickson J. (as he then was) defined freedom in this way (at p. 336): 
"Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights 
of the human person." The common law rule making a spouse an incompetent witness 
involves a conflict between the right of the individual to choose freely whether or not to testify 
and the interests of society in preserving the marriage bond. 
 
To give paramountcy to the marriage bond over the right of individual choice in cases of 
irreconcilable separation may have been appropriate in Lord Coke’s time, when a woman’s 
legal personality was incorporated in that of her husband on marriage, but it is inappropriate 
in the age of the Charter. As Wilson J. put it in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 
166, the Charter requires that individual choices not be restricted unnecessarily. 
 
   The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed in 
the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own 
philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express 
themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue. 
These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will 
respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid 
subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life. 
 
  Through its family and divorce laws, our society has recognized that spouses have the right 
to seek dissolution of the marriage where relations between them have irrevocably broken 
down. The recognition that a marriage may be dissolved is reflected in the long history of 
divorce legislation...289 
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Justice Iacobucci’s reasoning in Salituro led him to conclude that the common law rules of spousal 
incompetence should not apply in situations where the spouses are irreconcilably separated. This 
issue was easily resolved “because there is no marital harmony to be preserved.”290 He left open the 
“difficult question” of whether the spousal incompetence rule should be abrogated more broadly.291 
In our view, the reasoning in Salituro provides a compelling basis for making spouses competent 
witnesses for the prosecution in all circumstances. Justice Iacobucci acknowledged that the 
principles he espoused “favour abolishing the rule entirely and making all spouses competent 
witnesses in all circumstances”.292 However, he suggested that “a far-reaching change of this kind is 
best left to the legislature”.293  
There is not necessarily a conflict between the public interest in promoting marital harmony 
and the individual’s right to choose whether or not to testify. As Iacobucci J.’s comments suggest, 
changes in divorce laws reflect the abandonment of the notion that society ought to impose a 
different view of the worth of a particular marital relationship on a participant to that relationship. A 
witness spouse is in the best position to measure the value of the relationship and the degree to 
which its integrity may be threatened by testifying. As Lamer C.J. and Iacobucci J. commented in R. 
v. Hawkins, an approach that vests the spouse of an accused with the choice to testify against his or 
her partner is more consistent with the protection of the marital harmony as well as the autonomy 
and dignity of the individual.294 
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The more difficult question is whether a witness spouse should also be a compellable 
witness for the prosecution in all cases. There are two main advantages of such a rule. First, courts 
would have the benefit of relevant spousal testimony and therefore the pre-eminent goal of a 
criminal trial - ascertaining the truth - would be advanced. Second, a witness spouse will be less 
exposed to potential intimidation or violence by an accused (or associates of an accused) since he 
or she would have no choice but to testify.295 The disadvantage of making a spouse compellable for 
the prosecution is that the witness will be forced to testify even in circumstances where he or she 
believes that the integrity of his or her relationship with the accused will suffer. The difficulty of 
balancing these competing concerns is reflected in the current patchwork of exceptions to the rule of 
spousal non-compellability developed under the common law and augmented by sections 4(2) and 
4(4) of the Canada Evidence Act. 
There is no doubt that the current balance achieved by the common law and the Act between 
truth-seeking and marital harmony is unprincipled. The case for reform is strong. Two options strike 
us as worthy of consideration.  
The first is to make spouses compellable in all cases on the grounds that the contribution of 
the non-compellability rule to marital harmony is outweighed by the importance of admitting 
probative evidence in criminal trials. In other words, the judgment made by sections 4(2) and 4(4) of 
the Act – that the pursuit of truth outweighs the protection of relational harmony - should not be 
limited to the listed offences, but is equally compelling in any criminal trial.  
The second option is to empower judges to decide on a case by case basis whether the 
balancing of the competing policies favours compellability or not. This was the approach advocated 
by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in their Report on Evidence (1975). The Commission 
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recommended the adoption of a general rule that all persons are competent and compellable, 
subject to the following exception for witnesses related to the accused: 
In a criminal proceeding, a person who is related to the accused by family or similar ties is not 
compellable to be a witness for the prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the 
relationship, the probable probative value of the evidence and the seriousness of the offence 
charged, the need for a person’s testimony is outweighed by the possible disruption of the 
relationship or the harshness of compelling the person to testify.296 
 
While this proposal aims to implement a more accurate balance between the relevant competing 
concerns than the crude balance achieved by s.4, it has a number of serious disadvantages. The ad 
hoc balancing involved makes its application in any given case unpredictable and subject to 
appeal.297 In addition, its application requires an intrusive inquiry into the nature of the intimate 
relationship at stake. The invasion of privacy required by such an inquiry is itself a threat to relational 
harmony. We are also persuaded that a compellability rule is likely to reduce the exposure of 
witness spouses to the threat of intimidation or violence. While the difficulty of measuring the 
contribution that the non-compellability rule makes to relational harmony gives us some pause, on 
balance we believe that Parliament would be best advised to remove the limits on spousal 
compellability entirely, rather than extend the rule to broader categories of relationships or offences 
on a case-by-case basis.  
The case for preserving the privileged nature of marital communications is stronger. For one, 
the privilege is limited to private, intimate communications. It does not deprive a court of all of a 
spouse’s relevant testimony. It thus achieves a better balance of competing concerns than that 
achieved by the rules on competence and compellability. Since the rationale for the privilege is the 
protection of privacy and the promotion of candour and trust in intimate adult relationships, there is 
much value in the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s recommendation that the privilege ought to 
attach to the speaker rather than the witness.298  
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In conclusion, the strong arguments in favour of abolishing the special rules on spousal 
competence and compellability ought to lead to the repeal of those rules. The marital 
communications privilege in section 4(3) of the Act is more narrowly drawn to protect important 
relational interests without unduly compromising the search for truth. The privilege in section 4(3) 
should be retained and extended to a broader range of adult personal relationships. The question of 
how to define the scope of relationships covered is one we return to in Part II (B), below. 
 
 
IV. Spousal/Relational Definitions 
 
 
In this section, we review the spousal and relational definitions that are being used to 
promote otherwise legitimate state objectives. Spousal definitions were extended beyond married 
couples in a limited and haphazard manner, on a statute by statute basis. Much federal legislation 
was left untouched, some was only partially extended, and much was extended with little to no 
consideration of a comprehensive or consistent policy towards the regulation of adult relationships. 
The landscape of spousal definitions is entirely changed with the introduction of Bill C-23. Conjugal 
relationships will be now more extensively included within federal legislation, although the process of 
inclusion is not complete. As we will highlight, some federal statutes continue to apply to married 
couples only.   
Bill C-23 does not address the broader category of relational definitions in the same way as it 
systematically addresses the legal situation of spouses and partners. As a result, federal legislation 
will remain essentially unchanged by Bill C-23 in its treatment of non-conjugal relationships. A range 
of relational terms and definitions are used in federal legislation, including dependent, related 
persons, near relative, immediate family, and members of a family who are part of a household. 
There is no consistency to the ways in which groups of individuals are defined or included within 
federal legislation. Nor is there any consistency to the ways in which the relational terms are 
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deployed. ‘Dependent’, for example, is subject to a range of different definitions across different 
federal statutes.  
In this section, we map the existing spousal and relational definitions in federal legislation. 
We begin with a review of spousal definitions, and highlight the changes that will be introduced upon 
the enactment of Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act. We then review the 
range of relational definitions deployed in federal legislation.    
 
A. Spousal/Conjugal Definitions 
 
 Prior to Bill C-23, “spouse” in federal legislation referred to married spouses, and in the 
Income Tax Act and pension statutes, spouse also included common law opposite-sex couples. Bill 
C-23 will significantly amend these spousal definitions. It has introduced a new term – “common law 
partner” and “common law partnership”– defined as “a relationship between two persons who are 
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year.” This 
common law partner definition will replace the extended definition of spouse through which common 
law heterosexual couples were previously included within federal pension and tax legislation. 
Spouse will now mean married persons, and common law partner means any two persons living in a 
conjugal relationship for at least one year.  
 Bill C-23 will extend to common law partners a vast number of federal provisions that 
previously applied only to married spouses.299 It will also extend to same-sex couples a number of 
statutory provisions that previously applied to married spouses and common law opposite-sex 
couples.300 The Bill leaves unchanged a handful of federal statutes that apply only to married 
spouses.301 
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B. Relational Definitions  
 
Federal legislation uses a broad range of relational terms to pursue otherwise valid relational 
objectives. Table Four outlines the range of these relational terms, with examples of federal statutes 
that use them.  
 
TABLE FOUR 
 
RELATIONAL TERMS IN FEDERAL STATUTES 
 
Relational term Examples of Federal Statutes  
Assisted Relative Immigration Act 
Associate, Associated persons Canada Business Corporations Act 
Canada Cooperative Act  
Special Import Measures Act 
Insurance Companies Act 
Trust and Loan Companies Act 
Dependant302 Canada Elections Act 
Canada Shipping Act 
Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act  
Immigration Act 
Merchant Seaman Compensation Act  
Visiting Forces Act 
Family Cooperative Credit Associations Act 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act  
Excise Tax Act 
Firearms Act 
Insurance Companies Act 
Trust and Loan Companies Act 
Family class Immigration Act 
Immediate family Canada Labour Code  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Act 
Interested Person Business Development Bank of Canada Act 
Members of family, forming part of household Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act  
Criminal Code  
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Carriage by Air Act 
Near relative Canada Shipping Act 
Person who because of relationship or 
association with a person 
Witness Protection Program Act 
Related person Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Special Import Measures Act  
Customs Act  
Excise Tax Act 
Relative  Corrections and Conditional Release Act  
Criminal Code 
 
Some of the relational terms are deployed consistently across federal legislation. “Associate” 
and “related person” for example are used quite consistently. By contrast, “dependant” and 
“immediate family” have very different definitions in different contexts. To further add to the 
confusion, some of the relational definitions were amended as a result of Bill C-23, but many were 
not. (See Appendix B5 and B6). In the following section, we briefly review the range of the definitions 
of these relational terms found in federal statutes.   
 
Associate and Related Person 
The term “associate” generally includes a person’s spouse or common law partner, a child of 
that person or of the spouse or common law partner, and a relative of the person or the person’s 
spouse or common law partner, if that relative has the same residence.303 Similarly, the term “related 
person” is defined quite consistently through federal legislation, as “persons are related to each 
other if connected by blood relationship, marriage, common law partnership or adoption”. 304 
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Dependant 
 “Dependant” is sometimes defined within federal statutes. However, as Table Five 
illustrates, there is no consistency in these definitions.  
 
TABLE FIVE 
 
DEFINITIONS OF DEPENDANT 
 
Statute Definition 
Canada Elections Act  
 
Dependent means a spouse, common law partner or relative who 
ordinarily resides with the elector.  A relative is someone who is 
related by blood or marriage. (s. 21(3)Schedule 2, part 3) 
Canada Shipping Act 
 
Dependant means the wife, husband, parents and children of a 
deceased person. (s. 645) 
Foreign Missions and International 
Organizations Act  
 
Dependent means “spouses and relatives dependent on them”  
 
Immigration Act  
 
Accompanying dependent means a spouse, or unmarried son or 
daughter under the age of 19. 
 
Merchant Seaman Compensation 
Act  
 
Dependants means members of the family of a seaman who were 
wholly or partly dependent on his earnings when he died or, but for 
incapacity of the seaman due to an accident, would have been so 
dependent. (s. 2(1)) 
Pension Act, ss.48 & 49  
 
Dependant means a surviving spouse or child of a member to whom 
a pension may be paid under this part (s.48(1)). 
Pension Act,  s. 42  Dependant means any person entitled under court order to support. 
(s.42(1)).  
Visiting Forces Act 
 
Dependant means a person who forms part of the member’s 
household and depends on the member for support. (s.2) 
 
A brief review of the definitions in Table Five illustrates that some of these definitions will be 
amended by Bill C-23 (see for example, the Canada Elections Act which now incorporates common 
law partner, and the Visiting Forces Act wherein the definition of dependant was broadened), while 
others were not. (See for example the Canada Shipping Act, which continues to use the language of 
husband and wife, and the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, which did not 
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add common law partners.) Further, there is a broad range of federal statutes that use the term 
“dependant”, but do not define it.305   
 
Immediate Family  
Several statutes use the term “immediate family”. The Canada Labour Code provides for 
bereavement leave for members of immediate family.306 The term is defined in the regulations as 
“(a) the spouse of the employee, including common law spouse, (b) the father and mother of the 
employee and the spouse of the father or mother, including common law spouse, (c) the children of 
the employee (d) the brothers and sisters of the employee (e) the father in  law and mother in law of 
the employee and the spouse of the father in law or mother in law, including common law (f) any 
relative of the employee who resides permanently in the employee’s household or with whom the 
employee permanently resides.”307 The Canada Labour Code will not be amended by Bill C-23.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Act also uses the term “immediate family”.308 
Schedule, Part 4, s.2, Article 18 provides that the “Officials of the Organisation…shall (b) be 
granted, together with their spouses and members of their immediate family residing with and 
dependant on them…” It was not included within Bill C-23.  
 
Family class 
The Immigration Act uses the relational term “family class”, to allow an individual to sponsor a 
broad but specified range of relatives under the family reunification program. “Family Class” is 
currently defined (SOR/93-4) as including:  
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(a) the sponsor’s spouse; 
(b) the sponsor’s dependent son or dependent daughter;309 
(c) the sponsor’s father or mother; 
(d) the sponsor’s grandmother or grandfather; 
(e) the sponsor’s brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or granddaughter, who is an 
orphan and is under 19 years of age and unmarried; 
(f) the sponsor’s fiancee; 
(g) any child under 19 years of age whom the sponsor intends to adopt and who is 
 (i) an orphan  
 (ii) an abandoned child whose parents cannot be identified 
 (iii) a child born outside of marriage who has been placed with a child welfare authority 
for adoption  
(iv) a child whose parents are separated and who has been placed with a child welfare 
authority for adoption  
(v) a child one of whose parents is deceased and who has been placed with a child 
welfare authority for adoption, or 
(h) one relation regardless of age or relationship to sponsor where sponsor does not have a 
spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, uncle, 
aunt, nephew or niece who is a Canadian citizen, permanent resident or whose 
application for landing the sponsor may otherwise sponsor.   
 
The amendments to the family class promised by the Minister of Citizenship will broaden the 
definition of spouse to include common law partners, as well as broaden the definition of dependent 
child by increasing the age from 19 to 22.310 
 
Assisted Relatives 
The Immigration Act also uses the relational term “assisted relatives”. “Assisted relatives” are 
part of the independent class of immigration applications, but who are awarded bonus points by 
virtue of their relational status to a Canadian citizen or permanent resident.311 Assisted relative is 
defined as “a relative other than a member of the family class, who is an immigrant and is an uncle 
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or aunt, a brother or sister, a son or daughter, a nephew or niece or a grandson or granddaughter of 
a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least 19 years of age and who resides in 
Canada”. 312 
 
Near Relative 
The Canada Shipping Act uses the term “near relative”, which is defined in s.191(4). “Near 
relative means one of the following persons, namely, the spouse, father, mother, grandfather, 
grandmother, child, grandchild, brother or sister of the seaman.” It will not be amended by Bill C-23.  
 
Person who because of the relationship or association with a person 
The Witness Protection Program Act uses a very broad relational term. Section 2 provides 
that for the purposes of the witness protection program, a witness includes not only a person who 
has given information or evidence, but also (b) “a person who because of their relationship to or 
association with a person referred to in paragraph (a) may also require protection for the reasons 
referred to in that paragraph”.313 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
 While the expected passage of Bill C-23 will result in greater consistency in spousal and 
common law definitions, the process of inclusion for cohabiting couples remains incomplete. Several 
federal statutes continue to apply only to married couples. Further, as this section has illustrated, the 
inclusion of non-conjugal relationships remains both partial and inconsistent. An array of relational 
terms are deployed in different federal statutes, that include some non-conjugal relationships for 
some purposes, but not others. Nor is there any consistency in the relationships that are included – 
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sometimes the definition is narrow, other times it is wider. Moreover, for the most part, these 
relational definitions are limited to familial relationships, that is, persons related by blood, marriage, 
common law partnership or adoption. They do not include close personal relationships between 
individuals who are not so related.  
 Many otherwise legitimate objectives of state regulation could arguably be furthered by the 
inclusion of these excluded relationships. Basic equality norms require that the process of including 
conjugal relationships be completed. There is no longer any legitimate justification for the exclusion 
of these conjugal couples. Federal objectives would only be furthered by completing the process of 
inclusion. The question of the inclusion of non-conjugal couples is, admittedly, more complex. 
However, as we will also argue further below, a compelling case can be made that many federal 
objectives could be furthered by the inclusion of a broader range of non-conjugal relationships. The 
question is one, however, that we believe must be addressed on an objective by objective/ statute 
by statute basis.   

  
PART TWO 
 
 
FRAMING THE STATE’S ROLE TOWARD ADULT 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 Part Two of this paper considers how adult personal relationships ought to be defined for the 
purposes of legal regulation. We canvas the range of options for including adult personal 
relationships, and assess the advantages and disadvantages of these various legislative means of 
identifying adult personal relationships relevant to particular policy goals. Finally, we will attempt to 
make recommendations appropriate to each of the main state policy objectives identified in Part I as 
legitimate.   
 
 
 
I. Legal options for identifying adult relationships 
 
 
In this section, we review the different legislative models for identifying and defining adult 
relationships. We consider both the models that federal legislation currently uses, such as marriage 
and deemed or ascribed spousal/relational status, as well as alternative models such as domestic 
partnership regimes and new statutory relationship definitions.   
 
 
A. Marriage  
 
In the past, the state has used marriage as a proxy for commitment and for identifying the 
relationships worthy of legal recognition. But, the transformations in the Canadian family in the last 
three decades has seriously undermined the utility of this proxy. Marriage is now both over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive of the kinds of relationships that may deserve legal recognition in light of 
legitimate policy objectives. For example, laws may be over-inclusive in presuming that all married 
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persons form units with an identity of financial interests (e.g. laws dealing with conflicts of interest), 
when in fact some married couples may not pool their resources or even live together. Many other 
laws dealing with the consequences of interdependent personal relationships may be under-
inclusive in their application only to married persons. Many other relationships may possess the 
qualitative attributes relevant to the objectives of the laws (e.g., the definition of “dependants” 
entitled to bring a wrongful death action pursuant to s.645 of the Canada Shipping Act).   
 
1. Current definition 
As discussed above, the federal government has rarely exercised its jurisdiction in relation to 
marriage, and as a result, the essential validity continues to be governed largely by common law, 
and in Quebec, by the Civil Code. At its most general, marriage has been defined at common law as 
the “voluntary union of life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”.314 This 
passage continues to be cited by the courts as an authoritative definition of marriage.315   
In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M. v. H., Parliament 
moved to defend the opposite-sex definition of marriage. On June 8, 1999, the House of Commons, 
by a vote of 216-55, approved a motion brought by the Reform Party stating that “it is necessary…to 
state that marriage is and should remain the union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of 
all others”.316 However, the motion itself has no legal force. The government has been under pressure 
to pass legislation to accomplish the goals of the motion. There is only one step, short of constitutional 
amendment, that Parliament could take to protect the common law definition of marriage from 
constitutional challenge in the courts. Parliament could reproduce the definition in legislation that 
                                                 
314
  Hyde v. Hyde & Woodmansee (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, in which Lord Penzance, stated at 133 “I conceive that 
marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man 
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  See Re North and Matheson (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 280, Layland v. Ontario (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 658 [hereinafter 
Layland].  
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included a notwithstanding clause. Such a step would immunize the definition of marriage from a 
challenge based on sections 2 or 7 to 15 of the Charter for a period of five years. 
When Bill C-23 was introduced in the House of Commons in February 2000, it did not contain a 
definition of marriage. The Minister of Justice emphasized in her statements to the House on second 
reading that the Bill did not change the legal definition of marriage. In the face of arguments that the 
Bill undermines the status of marriage, the government proposed an amendment in committee that 
became section 1.1 of the Bill as passed by the House of Commons on April 11, 2000. Section 1.1 
provides as follows:  
For greater certainty, the amendments made by this Act do not affect the meaning of the word 
"marriage", that is, the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. 
 
 If Bill C-23 is passed without further amendment by the Senate, section 1.1 of the 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act will become the first provision of federal legislation to 
make reference to the common law definition of marriage. Section 1.1 does nothing more than give 
prominence and clear expression to the reform option not chosen: Parliament chose not to touch the 
definition of marriage in Bill C-23. The political purpose of section 1.1 is easy to understand: the 
government felt under pressure to signal its desire to preserve the definition of marriage from legal 
challenges by same-sex couples. On the other hand, section 1.1 has little legal significance. 
Parliament’s unwillingness to change the opposite-sex requirement of marriage had already been 
conveyed in unambiguous terms. Bill C-23, like all other federal statutes, must comply with the Charter. 
So long as Parliament remains averse to employing the notwithstanding clause of the Charter to limit 
judicial review of federal legislation, the definition of marriage will remain vulnerable to a constitutional 
challenge. 
 
2. Over-inclusiveness 
 As a proxy for marking those relationships deserving of legal recognition, marriage is 
potentially over-inclusive. For example, many conflict of interest laws assumed that all married 
couples constitute a single economic unit, with an identity of financial interests. These laws 
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presuppose that married couples pool their resources and share financial information. While many 
married couples do so, some married couples do not pool their resources. Some may not even live 
together. Using marriage as a proxy neglects any consideration of whether the couple actually has 
shared financial interests. Using marriage as a proxy also assumes that married couples live 
together in these economic units.  
 
3.  Under-inclusiveness 
 Marriage, as currently defined, is also under-inclusive of the kinds of relationships deserving 
of legal recognition. Prior to the introduction of Bill C-23, unmarried cohabiting couples – of both the 
same and opposite sex - were excluded from many of the legal rights and responsibilities that were 
extended to married couples. While Bill C-23 will wed common law partners with married spouses in 
almost all federal statutes, there are a number of significant federal statutory provisions that remain 
restricted in their application to married couples. If the government follows through on its stated 
commitments to amend the Immigration Act, the Canada Evidence Act, and the Canada Shipping 
Act, implementation of the principle of equal treatment of common law partners and married 
spouses will be near completion in federal legislation.  
 
(a) Same-sex couples 
The opposite-sex definition of marriage excludes same-sex couples from entering into a 
legally valid marriage. Unlike cohabiting heterosexual couples who might be said to be choosing to 
remain outside of the institution of marriage, the prohibition on same-sex marriage operates to 
preclude same-sex couples from opting into marriage. As a result, same-sex couples do not have 
access to the bundle of benefits and obligations that extend only to married couples. At the 
provincial level, British Columbia,317 Ontario318 and Quebec319 have taken large steps forward in 
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recognizing the equality rights of same-sex couples. Outside the context of public employment 
rights, same-sex couples remain legally unrecognized in the other jurisdictions. Even in the three 
provinces that have moved forward, important benefits and obligations continue to be restricted to 
married couples. This is the case, for example, with the provisions of all provincial family laws 
dealing with the division of property on relationship break down.320  
In this section, we begin with a review of the existing case law involving same-sex couples 
and marriage, as well as developments in other jurisdictions. We then interrogate the 
constitutionality of the opposite-sex definition of marriage, in light of the most recent Supreme Court 
of Canada equality jurisprudence.  
 
(i) Challenges to opposite-sex requirement of valid marriage 
 The opposite-sex requirement of a valid marriage has been unsuccessfully challenged by 
same-sex couples. In the pre-Charter case of Re North and Matheson,321 two gay men sought an 
order requiring the registration of their marriage. The registrar had refused to issue them a marriage 
licence. Philp Co.Ct. J. held that the ceremony in which the two men had participated was not a 
marriage. The judge reviewed the definition of marriage in the case law, citing passages affirming 
the opposite-sex requirement in the English cases of Hyde v. Hyde322 and Corbett v. Corbett.323 He 
further reviewed several dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions, which all described marriage as 
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 An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M. v. H., S.O. 1999, c.6 (Bill 
5). 
319
 An Act to amend various legislative provisions concerning de facto spouses, S.Q. 1999, c.14. 
320
 This state of affairs is not likely to persist. Two provincial court rulings have held that the denial of the right to seek a 
division of family property to unmarred opposite-sex conjugal cohabitants violates the prohibition on marital status 
discrimination in section 15 of the Charter: Walsh v. Bona, 2000 NSCA 53; Watch v. Watch, [1999] S.J. No. 490 
(Q.B.). 
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 (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 280 (Man. Co. Ct.). 
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 Hyde, supra note 314 at 133 (“…marriage as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”). 
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 [1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (“..sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage, because it is and 
always had been recognized as the union of man and woman”). 
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the union of a man and a woman. He concluded that because a valid marriage requires parties of 
the opposite sex, the marriage between the two men was legally non-existent.  
In Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations),324 a majority of the 
Ontario Divisional Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the opposite-sex definition of 
marriage. Two gay men made an application for judicial review of the refusal of the city clerk’s office 
to issue them a marriage licence. The applicants argued that the common law requirement of 
opposite sexes violated their equality rights under section 15 of the Charter. Justice Southey, writing 
for the majority, reviewed the common law requirement that a valid marriage can only take place 
between a man and a woman, citing extensively from North and  Matheson. He relied on biological 
difference to reject the argument that the opposite-sex requirement violated the applicants’ equality 
rights: 
One of the principal purposes of the institution of marriage is the founding and maintaining of 
families in which children will be produced and cared for, a procedure which is necessary for 
the continuance of the species…That principal purpose of marriage cannot, as a general rule, 
be achieved in a homosexual union because of the biological limitations of such a union.325   
 
Nor did Justice Southey’s opinion accord much weight to the value of relational autonomy. He 
commented that “the law does not prohibit marriage by homosexuals, provided it takes place 
between persons of the opposite sex”. 326 
 In her dissenting opinion, Greer J. was of the view that the opposite-sex requirement of 
marriage did violate the applicants’ equality rights. She took the view that the state’s interest in 
promoting marriage and family should be related to function not form:  
…it is surely in the interest of the state to foster all family relationships, be they heterosexual 
or same-sex relationships….To say that the state must preserve only traditional heterosexual 
families is discriminatory and contrary to the equal benefits and guarantees they are entitled 
to at law. 327 
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In her view, the common law should evolve to reflect society’s changing needs. Justice Greer 
rejected the argument of the Ontario Attorney General “that there is only one societal concept of 
marriage”: 
One has only to examine how multiple marriages have become almost the norm in our North 
American society, how step-parents have become an integral part of children’s lives in these 
marriages, how divorce has become widely recognized in society, and how ‘common law’ 
relationships have become classified as marriages without the sanction of a marriage 
certificate but with most of the benefits conferred by one. There was even a time in history 
when a woman became the property of her husband. That concept of marriage became no 
longer valid and the institution of marriage had to adjust to such changes. The common law 
and legislated law both change to meet a changing society. 328 
 
(ii) Same-sex Marriage in Other Jurisdictions  
The Netherlands has made a commitment to legally recognize same-sex marriages by 
January 1, 2001. No other jurisdiction has taken this step. Other European countries that have 
moved towards the recognition of same-sex relationships have done so primarily through the 
enactment of domestic partnership regimes. In Norway, for example, politicians considered and 
rejected the recognition of same-sex marriage, preferring the recognition of same-sex relationships 
through domestic partnership regimes. “A homosexual relationship can …never be the same as 
marriage, neither socially nor from a religious point of view. It does not replace or compete with 
heterosexual marriage.”329 The constitutionality of the opposite-sex definition of marriage is a highly 
contested issue in the United States. In Baehr v. Lewin,330 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 
state law denying same-sex couples access to marital status would violate the state constitution’s 
equal protection clause unless the state could demonstrate that the exclusion was necessary to the 
pursuit of a compelling state purpose. On remand, the Circuit Court held that the State of Hawaii 
presented insufficient evidence to prove that same-sex marriages would result in adverse 
consequences to the public interest. The case was appealed again to the Hawaii Supreme Court. In 
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the meantime, Congress initiated “proactive” measures to defend marriage from challenges by 
same-sex couples, and in 1996, passed the Defense of Marriage Act.331 The Hawaii legislature has 
since passed a constitutional amendment restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court subsequently concluded that the coming into force of this amendment meant that 
the opposite-sex definition of marriage no longer violated the state constitution.332  
The Hawaii legislature’s response to same-sex couples’ struggle for legal recognition was 
the passage of a reciprocal beneficiaries law, entitled An Act Relating to Unmarried Couples.333 The 
stated purpose of the legislation is to extend certain rights and benefits to couples who are legally 
prohibited from marrying because they are of the same sex or within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity.334 The legislation repeats the legislature’s finding that “the people of Hawaii choose 
to preserve the tradition of marriage as a unique social institution based upon the committed union 
of one man and one woman.” 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled in Baker v. State that the state law excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage violated the common benefits clause of the Vermont 
constitution.335 It held that:  
…the state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits 
and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the 
form of inclusion within marriage laws themselves or a parallel “domestic partnership” system 
or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the legislature.336 
 
The Court thereby gave the legislature two options: it could amend the definition of marriage to allow 
same-sex couples to marry, or it could introduce a domestic partnership regime which would extend 
to same-sex couples all the same rights and responsibilities as married couples. The Vermont 
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legislature adopted the latter approach. In April 2000, it passed An Act relating to Civil Unions, which 
enables same-sex couples to register their relationships as “civil unions”. Parties to a civil union will 
have the same legal status as married spouses.     
 Same-sex marriage remains, then, a controversial and contested issue in many Western 
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding its controversial nature, however, there is a clear trend towards the 
legal recognition of same-sex unions. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and its 
attendant rights and responsibilities is increasingly seen as discriminatory. However, legislatures 
have not yet chosen to remedy this exclusion by amending the definition of marriage. Instead, they 
have preferred to create a parallel civil status, like domestic partnership, to accord a package of 
rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples. We will discuss domestic partnerships in more detail 
below. 
 
(iii)  Recent Supreme Court of Canada equality decisions and the 
constitutionality of the opposite-sex requirement 
 
In Canada, the approach taken by the majority of the Ontario Divisional Court in Layland is 
unlikely to remain the final word on the question of the constitutionality of the opposite-sex 
requirement of marriage. The issue has yet to be considered by an appellate court. Moreover, since 
Layland was decided in 1993, Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence has fundamentally 
transformed the constitutional landscape. Challenges to the opposite-sex requirement of marriage 
are on their way to the courts in a number of provinces,337 and no doubt the issue will eventually find 
its way to the Supreme Court. As we discuss in more detail below, in the aftermath of Egan,338 
Law339 and M. v. H.,340 there is a strong argument that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
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definition of marriage would be found to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of 
section 15. More difficult to predict is whether the Court would find the violation to be a reasonable 
limit under section 1. The decision in M. v. H. in particular lends further credence to the argument, 
advanced by Greer J. in dissent in Layland,  that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the common 
law definition of marriage violates the human dignity of gay men and lesbians. In the absence of any 
other means of relationship recognition, the opposite-sex definition of marriage means that, unlike 
heterosexual couples, same-sex couples are denied any legally effective means of choosing to have 
their relationships recognized as spousal by their communities and the government. At the same time, 
however, the Court in M. v. H. was emphatic that the constitutional validity of the definition of marriage 
is a distinct issue from the discriminatory treatment of unmarried conjugal cohabitants. This statement 
(not to mention the intense political and religious passions engaged by the same-sex marriage debate) 
makes any attempt at predicting the constitutional future in this area a perilous exercise.  
 
Does the exclusion of same-sex couples violate section 15 of the Charter? 
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the Supreme Court of Canada 
summarized the approach the courts should take to claims that the government has violated the 
equality rights in section 15(1) of the Charter. Justice Iacobucci, speaking for a unanimous Court, 
affirmed that section 15(1) is to be interpreted in a purposive and contextual manner:    
It may be said that the purpose of section 15 is to prevent the violation of essential human 
dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social 
prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as 
human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of 
concern, respect and consideration.341 
 
After reviewing the Supreme Court equality jurisprudence, Iacobucci J. summarized the three basic 
elements of the Court’s approach: 
First, does the law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis 
of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already 
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively different treatment 
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? 
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Second, was the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated 
or analogous grounds? And third, does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a 
burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise 
has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or 
worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally 
deserving of concern, respect and consideration? 342 
 
In considering a constitutional challenge to the opposite-sex requirement of marriage, the first 
step is to ask whether the legal definition of marriage draws a formal distinction on the basis of a 
personal characteristic. The opposite-sex definition of marriage explicitly excludes same-sex 
couples, and therefore draws a formal distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex 
couples. The opposite-sex definition of spouse further fails to take into account the disadvantaged 
position of same-sex couples within Canadian society resulting in substantively different treatment 
between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples on the basis of personal characteristics. The 
current position of same-sex couples imposes disadvantages on them not imposed on opposite-sex 
couples.  
 The second step is to ask whether same-sex couples are subject to differential treatment on 
the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that 
sexual orientation is a ground of discrimination prohibited by section 15 of the Charter.343  In Egan, 
the majority of the Court held that sexual orientation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either 
unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs”, and is analogous to other 
personal characteristics enumerated in section 15(1).344 There is little question then that the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry would satisfy this step of the test.  
 The third, and more complicated, step is to ask whether the differential treatment of same-
sex couples is discriminatory in a substantive or purposive sense. In Law, Justice Iacobucci stated 
that in this third step, the relevant inquiry is whether the differential treatment 
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…impose[s] a burden upon or withhold[s] a benefit from the claimant in a manner that reflects 
the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which 
otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less 
capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian 
society, equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.345 
 
Justice Iacobucci reviewed four contextual factors which need to be evaluated to determine whether 
the impugned government action violates the claimant’s dignity and is thus discriminatory in the 
substantive sense. We will consider each in turn.  
 
1. Any pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability experienced by 
the individual or group 
 
Same-sex couples have experienced a long history of disadvantage, stereotyping and 
prejudice. The Supreme Court in Egan recognized the “historical, social, political and economic 
disadvantage suffered by homosexuals”.346 The exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution 
of marriage has contributed to the stereotype or prejudice that same-sex relationships of caring and 
commitment are unworthy of public recognition and support.   
 
2. The correspondence or lack of it, between the ground on which a claim is based and 
the actual need, capacity or circumstances of the claimant or others.  
 
This consideration has been the focus of disagreements between Canadian courts and 
judges when dealing with claims of discrimination by same-sex couples. One view, that had 
significant judicial support until 1995, is that differential treatment of same-sex couples corresponds 
to the actual differences in their procreative capacities.347 The contrary view is that there are no 
relevant differences in the needs, capacities or circumstances of same-sex couples that justify their 
exclusion from laws regulating adult personal relationships. As Cory J. argued in M. v. H., same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples are no different in their ability to form intimate, conjugal relationships 
characterized by economic interdependence. To exclude them from legislative definitions of spouse, 
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he concluded, ignores the facts: the capacity to form intimate relationships characterized by 
economic interdependence has nothing to do with sexual orientation.348  
Since 1995, Canadian courts have favoured the functional equivalence approach over the 
procreative difference approach. The turning point was the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in 
Egan, in which a 5-4 majority firmly rejected the minority’s reliance on procreative difference to justify 
a gay couple’s exclusion from the spousal allowance provisions of the Old Age Security Act. Writing 
for the majority on the equality issue, Cory J. emphasized that same-sex couples “form lasting, 
caring, mutually supportive relationships with economic interdependence”.349 Their exclusion from 
the Act was therefore not related to any actual differences in their capacities that were relevant to 
the objectives of the statutory provision at issue. More recently, in M. v. H., Gonthier J. was the lone 
voice in dissent clinging to an argument founded on “biological and social realities”.350 
The shaky factual and normative foundations of the procreative difference argument have 
fuelled the shift in the perspective of the courts that has occurred in the past decade. Not all 
opposite-sex couples have the potential and desire to procreate; many persons in same-sex 
relationships do. In any case, the state’s interest in marriage is not limited to fostering procreation 
and child-rearing. We have argued that the primary value underlying state regulation of adult 
personal relationships is the creation of a legal framework in which relationships of caring and 
commitment are recognized and supported. The courts have now accepted that the sex or sexual 
orientation of the partners to a relationship has nothing to do with their capacity for care and 
commitment. As a result, Canadian law now leans strongly in favour of the conclusion that the 
same-sex marriage bar violates the human dignity of lesbians and gay men. 
 
3. Whether the impugned legislation has an ameliorative purpose or effect on a 
historically disadvantaged group, and the relative advantage of the excluded group.  
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Justice Iacobucci emphasized that this factor would only defeat a section 15(1) claim if the 
excluded group is more advantaged than the included group. “Underinclusive legislation that 
excludes from its scope the members of an historically disadvantaged group will rarely escape the 
charge of discrimination.”351 
The opposite-sex definition of marriage cannot be said to have an ameliorative purpose or 
effect for a historically disadvantaged group. Rather, the definition exacerbates the disadvantage of 
gay men and lesbians by excluding them from the community affirmation and legal recognition that 
accompanies the right to marry.  
  
4. The nature of the interest affected by the impugned legislation, or more specifically, 
whether the distinction restricts access to a fundamental social institution or affects a 
basic aspect of full membership in Canadian society, or constitutes a complete non-
recognition of a particular group.  
 
Marriage is an important legal social institution, and there is little doubt that the right to marry 
is an important aspect of full membership in Canadian society. Until very recently, it has been used 
as the marker for allocating a wide range of rights and responsibilities. While the passage of Bill C-
23 will reduce the significance of marriage as a proxy in federal legislation, several legal 
entitlements and obligations will continue to be allocated on the basis of marriage. Moreover, 
marriage is a ceremony through which couples can publicly state their commitment, and seek the 
recognition and support of family, friends and society. Marriage, even if it is no longer as significant 
in the allocation of rights and responsibilities, continues to be fundamentally important in terms of 
the symbolism of legal recognition. To deny same-sex couples the right to marry is to deny gays and 
lesbians the right to this legal recognition and to participate in this institution.   
 This brief consideration of a section 15 analysis suggest that the current definition of 
marriage is very likely to be considered to be a violation of the equality rights of same-sex couples. 
There is little question that a challenge to the definition of marriage would satisfy the first two steps 
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of the section 15 analysis – a formal distinction based on an analogous ground. While the third step 
would be somewhat more contested, it is likely that the definition of marriage will be found to violate 
the dignity of same-sex couples, and therefore to be discriminatory in a purposive sense.   
  
Is the section 15 violation a reasonable limit within section 1 of the Charter?  
 Assuming that the opposite-sex definition of spouse constitutes discrimination contrary to 
section 15(1) equality rights, the more difficult question is whether the government could 
demonstrate that the opposite-sex definition of marriage is a reasonable limit on equality rights 
within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.  
The first step of the section 1 analysis requires that the Court determine whether the 
objective of the legislation is pressing and substantial.352 In Vriend, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that where a law violates the Charter owing to under-inclusion, the first stage of the section 1 
analysis must address the object of the legislation as a whole, the impugned provisions of the Act, 
and the omission itself.353  The second step of the section 1 analysis is the proportionality 
requirement, which in turn involves three steps: (1) there must be a rational connection between the 
objectives of the legislation, and the means chosen by the government to implement the objective; 
(2) the government must demonstrate that the impairment is no more than is reasonably necessary 
to achieve its goals; and (3) the benefits that accrue from the legislation must be proportional to its 
deleterious effects as measured by the values underlying the Charter. According to this third step, 
there “must be proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which are 
responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objectives, and there must be a 
proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects of the measures.”354 
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While the outcome of a section 1 analysis is difficult to predict, there are several stages of 
the test in which the government may have difficulty meeting its burden of demonstration. There is a 
serious question as to whether there are pressing and substantial objectives underlying the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage. There is some question as to 
whether the definition of marriage is rationally connected to those objectives. And there is some 
question as to whether the existing regime can satisfy the requirement of minimal impairment. These 
questions are explored in further detail below.  
 
Objectives of marriage? 
The first step of the section 1 test requires an analysis of the objectives of marriage, and the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. What, then, is the objective of marriage? As we 
discussed above, marriage has served many objectives over time. Citizenship, property, religion, 
and supporting a sexual division of labour have all been important objectives in the legal regulation 
of marriage. At its most general, the objective of marriage – at least since the advent of the Church - 
was the promotion of the integrity of a very particular adult relationship. It was the only socially, 
religiously and legally sanctioned relationship, and it was the basis for the distribution of a range of 
rights and responsibilities. Today, marriage is still said to be about reproduction, promoting a stable 
environment for the nurturing of children, as well as promoting social stability more generally.355 The 
Vermont Civil Unions Act similarly states that “the state has a strong interest in promoting stable and 
lasting families. The state’s interest in civil marriage is to encourage close and caring families, and 
to protect all family members from the economic and social consequences of abandonment and 
divorce, focusing on those who have been especially at risk: women, children and the elderly”.356 
While these may be important objectives, there is a question (discussed in further detail 
below) whether these objectives are rationally connected to an opposite-sex definition of marriage. 
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As common law spouses and same-sex partners are extended more and more legal rights and 
responsibilities, and as these relationships assume many of the same functions of marriage, 
particularly in relation to the bearing and raising of children, the question is what’s left of marriage? 
What, if anything, is distinctive about marriage, if it is no longer the exclusive basis for the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities, and no longer the exclusive institution within which children 
are born and raised?  
 Marriage remains an important mechanism through which people announce their 
commitment to a personal relationship. It is a ceremony through which they publicly state their 
commitment, and seek the recognition and support of family, friends and society. It is the public 
recognition of the commitment that remains of importance, rather than the legal entitlements that 
attach. David Chambers describes it as “the single most significant communal ceremony of 
belonging. It marks not just a joining of two people, but a joining of families and an occasion for tribal 
celebration and solidarity.”357 The importance of marriage is then largely symbolic. It is a symbol of 
commitment, and a symbol of the public recognition of the personal relationship. For some, this 
symbol of commitment remains deeply imbued with religious meaning. For others, the commitment 
is more secular. And as a symbol of commitment, it does remain an important, but not exclusive, 
proxy for the assumption of mutual responsibilities. Entering into marriage is a statement of the 
intention to assume mutual responsibility for financial and emotional well being. And as such, it 
remains entirely appropriate for marriage to be one of the legal proxies for the imposition of a range 
of rights and responsibilities.   
 
Objective of the Exclusion  
 The question that must then be addressed is whether there is any legitimate objective being 
furthered by the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage. Arguments 
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defending the current definition of marriage from same-sex challenges are often cast in the 
language of defending tradition, and traditional family values. The objective of the exclusion of 
same-sex couples is said to be the promotion of traditional families. The question is whether 
protecting marriage is a legitimate objective in its own right? It is certainly a powerful political 
argument. Indeed it is frequently asserted as self-evident. For example, in introducing Bill C-23, the 
Minister of Justice stated that the bill ensures the principle of equality,  
…while preserving the existing legal definition and societal consensus that marriage is the 
union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others….This definition of marriage, 
which has been consistently applied in Canada and which was reaffirmed last year through a 
resolution of the House, dates back to 1866. It has served us well and will not change. We 
recognize that marriage is a fundamental value and important to Canadians. 358 
 
The promotion of “traditional values” is closely related to the religious basis of marriage. In 
the West, since the advent of the Christian Church, marriage has been intricately tied to religious 
belief and practice. For some, marriage remains a sacrament; for others it continues to be practiced 
according to Christian principles, and is considered to be ordained by God. The Vermont Civil 
Unions Act for example recognized the continuing religious importance of the institution of marriage, 
noting “the fundamental constitutional right of each of the multitude of religious faiths in Vermont to 
choose freely and without state interference whom to grant the religious status, sacrament or 
blessing of marriage under the rules, practices or traditions of such faith”.359 
There is, however, some uncertainty as to whether the promotion of “traditional” and religious 
values would withstand constitutional review. Specifically, it is unlikely that the promotion of the 
traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage would qualify as a pressing and substantial objective 
sufficient to justify the denial of the right to marry to same-sex couples. Giving legal support to one 
sexual orientation over another violates section 15 of the Charter, and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence suggests that objectives that run directly counter to Charter values cannot serve as 
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legitimate state objectives at the section 1 stage of analysis. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,360 the 
Supreme Court held that the purpose of Sunday closing laws was to compel observance of the 
Christian Sabbath. The Court held that this purpose violated the guarantee of freedom of 
conscience and religion and therefore could not serve as a justification under section 1. Promoting 
Christianity was not a legitimate objective because it undermined religious freedom and equality. 
Similarly, it may be argued that the promotion of marriage as an opposite-sex institution cannot be a 
legitimate objective precisely because it violates the equality rights of same-sex couples. 
 A second, related objective for the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is often 
said to be the role of marriage in reproduction. For example, echoing the majority opinion in Layland, 
La Forest J., in his dissenting opinion in Egan, was of the view that the objective of marriage is 
reproduction:  
…its ultimate raison d’être ….is firmly anchored in the biological and social realities that 
heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most children are the product 
of these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and nurtured by those who live in 
that relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature heterosexual.361   
 
It is, in his view, this central overriding objective that justifies the exclusion of same-sex couples. 
According to La Forest J., same-sex couples are not “capable of meeting the fundamental social 
objectives” of marriage:  
These couples undoubtedly provide mutual support for one another, and that, no doubt, is of 
some benefit to society. They may, it is true, occasionally adopt or bring up children, but this 
is exceptional and in no way affects the general picture.362   
 
While supporting the bearing and rearing of children is undoubtedly an important state 
objective, it is less clear that this objective can justify the exclusion of same-sex couples. 
Many couples, whether of the same or opposite sex, have children outside of marriage. 
Indeed, given the increasing number of same-sex couples who have and raise children, a 
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compelling argument could be made that the objectives would be better promoted by the 
inclusion of these couples within the definition of marriage. 
 
Rational connection  
The opposite-sex definition of marriage might also be vulnerable under the rational 
connection part of the section 1 analysis. Assuming that there are pressing and substantial 
objectives underlying the current definition of marriage, it may be more difficult to establish a rational 
connection between these objectives, and the means chosen to implement these objectives. The 
existing definition of marriage is both over- and under-inclusive in relation to the various stated 
objectives. For example, marriage is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in relation to the 
objective of having and raising children. Many children are now born outside of marriage to both 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples. And many married couples are choosing not to have children.  
In terms of the objective of public commitment and recognition, marriage is also under-
inclusive. Only opposite-sex couples can access this public statement of commitment and 
recognition. And only opposite-sex couples can choose to assume these mutual responsibilities 
through a public statement of their commitment. There is no similar means whereby same-sex 
couples can announce their commitment, and seek the public support and legal recognition of their 
personal relationships. The existence of a registered domestic partnership regime in which same-
sex couples, amongst others, could register their relationships and seek the immediate legal 
recognition of their personal relationships would go some distance to mitigate the effects of 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage. But, a domestic partnership regime is unlikely to provide 
the same degree of symbolic recognition and affirmation of the personal relationship as marriage. 
 
Minimal Impairment 
When legislation violates constitutional rights, the second step of the proportionality test 
requires that the government demonstrate that the impairment is no more than is reasonably 
necessary to achieve its goals. The exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage 
125 
means that these couples have no way to “opt in” to the rights, responsibilities and status that is 
immediately accorded to opposite-sex couples who marry. At the moment, prior to the passage of 
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, the inability to marry means that same-sex 
couples cannot opt into a range of rights and responsibilities that are available exclusively to married 
couples. By eliminating most but not all of the distinctions between married and unmarried couples, 
Bill C-23 will significantly mitigate this unfairness. Same-sex couples who now live together in a 
conjugal relationship for a period of not less than one year will be able to access many of these 
rights and responsibilities. But, there are still some significant disparities between opposite-sex 
couples who have the choice of marrying and opting in to these rights and responsibilities 
immediately, and same-sex couples who do not have the option of marrying, and are only entitled to 
these rights and responsibilities after one year of cohabitation. Moreover, there are still several rights 
and responsibilities from which same-sex couples will remain excluded. As discussed above, the 
Immigration Act will not be amended by the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, and 
same-sex couples cannot sponsor their partners. Opposite-sex couples, on the other hand, have the 
option of marrying their partners, and are thereby entitled to sponsor their partners for immigration.   
 As suggested in relation to the rational connection requirement, the government’s ability to 
demonstrate minimal impairment would be significantly improved by the introduction of a domestic 
partnership regime, whereby same-sex couples would be able to opt in to the same rights and 
responsibilities as married couples.363 The constitutionality of the exclusion from marriage would 
then rest on the status or symbolic arguments alone.   
 
(iv) Conclusion  
 Our discussion is intended to illustrate the potential vulnerability of the opposite-sex definition 
of marriage to a constitutional challenge. It is important to emphasize that we are not predicting that 
the definition will be struck down by the courts – only that there are strong arguments leading in that 
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direction. There are many other variables – including the political ramifications of a court striking 
down the opposite-sex definition of marriage – that might well lead the courts to pull their punches. 
In the current political environment, such a finding would likely further fuel the charges of judicial 
activism and the attack on the institutional legitimacy of the courts. The courts may well shy away 
from this political minefield, and defer to the will of the legislature. Further, even if the courts did 
strike down the opposite-sex definition of marriage, this would not be the end of the story. One 
scenario that cannot be ruled out is the possibility that the federal government would invoke section 
33 of the Charter to reassert the opposite-sex definition of marriage. The province of Alberta has 
made it clear that it is willing to defend the definition of marriage through the use of the 
notwithstanding clause (despite its dubious constitutional jurisdiction to do so).364 
 Our analysis is intended to illustrate that the opposite-sex definition of marriage is vulnerable 
to constitutional challenge, but not that the definition will inevitably fall. However, our analysis is also 
intended to suggest that a government committed to the values of caring, commitment, equality, 
autonomy and privacy, and to proactively realizing its constitutional obligations, might seriously 
consider amending the opposite-sex definition of marriage. Amending the definition of marriage 
would be consistent – for the reasons discussed extensively above - with the promotion of 
relationships of caring and commitment and with the value of equality. It would also be consistent 
with the value of autonomy, by giving individuals within same-sex relationships the freedom to 
choose their relational status. Finally, removing the opposite-sex requirement from the definition of 
marriage would be consistent with the value of privacy. Marriage has considerable advantages over 
common law status, in so far as there are no intrusive tests to determine entitlement. Rather, the 
parties can publicly declare their commitment and thereby be recognized as spouses for the 
purposes of a range of legal rights and responsibilities. Recognizing same-sex marriage is thus 
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consistent with the normative values that we have suggested ought to guide state regulation of adult 
personal relationships.   
Having said that, the current political environment makes such legislative reform unlikely in 
the foreseeable future. There have been many clear indications that the considerable political 
reluctance to extend the existing definition of marriage has not yet abated. Examples include the 
amendment of Bill C-23 in committee to include an opposite-sex definition of marriage, the Minister’s 
comments on the importance of preserving the existing definition of marriage in her introduction of 
Bill C-23 to the House of Commons, and the broad support garnered by the Reform Party’s motion 
defending marriage in June 1999. 
 On the other hand, it may only be a matter of time. In less than ten years, there has been a 
significant change in social attitudes towards, and legal recognition of, same-sex relationships. The 
shift in Canadian attitudes reflects a more general normative shift in understandings of marriage and 
family within many Western countries in the last decade. While only the Netherlands has moved to 
recognize same-sex marriage, many countries have begun to set up parallel legal regimes that 
approximate marriage. Same-sex couples are increasingly being given the option of entering into 
domestic partnership regimes, which accord most of the same rights and responsibilities as 
marriage. The shift towards the recognition of these relationships is indicative of a broader attitudinal 
change, in which the legitimacy of same-sex relationships is being accepted and affirmed.  
The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act must be seen within this broader context 
of changing societal norms and attitudes. If Bill C-23 is enacted, same-sex couples will have legal 
benefits and obligations in federal legislation identical to those of opposite-sex common law couples. 
For the moment, marriage remains the last bastion of the “traditional family”, and the last stronghold 
of the constituency committed to defending “traditional family values” from same-sex relationships in 
what has otherwise become a losing battle. But, as the fall-out of these reforms settles, and the 
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recognition of same-sex partners is normalized in both legal and social discourse, the move towards 
the recognition of same-sex marriage may seem less loaded in the future.  
 In the interim, a government committed to realizing its constitutional commitments to equality 
and autonomy in intimate relationships, but reluctant to tackle the opposite-sex definition of marriage 
in the immediate future, would be well advised to consider the enactment of a domestic partnership 
regime, discussed in detail in the section that follows. As noted above, the existence of a domestic 
partnership regime may reduce the vulnerability of the opposite-sex definition of spouse to 
constitutional challenge. While it may not provide long-term immunity to the definition of marriage, it 
might well buy a government time.  
 
(b) Unmarried Non-conjugal Cohabitants  
 It is not at all clear that marriage provides a potential solution to the needs of persons living 
together in non-conjugal relationships. In our culture, the social meaning of marriage necessarily 
involves conjugality, although conjugality no longer necessarily involves marriage. This is so even 
though the law does not expressly exclude persons of the opposite sex from entering a celibate 
union. The common law does provide that a marriage is voidable in a nullity action if it has not been 
consummated through an act of sexual intercourse. However a party who has agreed to or 
acquiesced in a marriage with knowledge of the other party’s inability or disinterest in engaging in 
sexual intercourse is barred from bringing a nullity action. Therefore, opposite-sex cohabitants have 
always had the option of marrying, whether or not their relationships have a sexual component. It 
follows that if the definition of marriage were amended to permit same-sex marriage, any two 
unmarried adults outside the prohibited degrees could choose to marry. However, because marriage 
is so deeply associated with sexual relations, it is unlikely that any significant numbers of “non-
conjugal” cohabitants, currently excluded from federal laws, would seek inclusion through this route. 
Domestic partnership regimes, discussed in the section that follows, offer considerably more 
promise for the inclusion of non-conjugal couples than does marriage. 
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B. Domestic Partnership Regimes 
 
 
 Faced with challenges to the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage, 
and their consequent exclusion from a wide range of legal rights and responsibilities, an increasing 
number of jurisdictions have enacted, or are considering enacting, registration schemes that 
establish a civil status parallel to marriage. Such schemes enable partners to formally register their 
relationships, express their commitment publicly, and voluntarily adhere to some or all of the legal 
rights and responsibilities conferred on married persons. In contrast to their uniform resistance to 
even considering the idea of changing the definition of marriage, the possibility of enacting such 
schemes has attracted increasing attention from Canadian legislators and policy-makers across the 
political spectrum.365 The political attraction of domestic partnership regimes lies in their capacity to 
foster the equality and autonomy of same-sex couples and other domestic partners without altering 
the traditional definition of marriage that is so deeply rooted in Western cultural and religious 
traditions.  
 We will begin our analysis of registered partnerships by briefly describing the schemes that 
have been enacted or proposed in Canada and in other countries. We will then explain the 
advantages that a federal partner registration law would add to the current structure of federal 
regulation of adult personal relationships. Our conclusion is that the enactment of a registered 
partnership scheme at the federal level will promote the values of caring and commitment, equality, 
autonomy, privacy and security that ought to guide state policy in relation to adult personal 
relationships. 
 
1. Models in Other Jurisdictions 
 
(a) Registered Partnership in Europe 
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In 1989, Denmark became the first country to adopt a registered partnership regime for 
same-sex couples.366 To be entitled to register as partners, the two persons must be of the same 
sex, although they need not share a sexual relationship, or even live together. The wish to provide 
mutual security is sufficient. At least one of the partners must be a Danish resident and citizen, and 
both must be over 18 years of age. Persons who are already party to a marriage or registered 
partnership are not permitted to register.  
In most respects, the legal effects of registered partnership are the same as those of 
marriage respecting, for example, property rules, separation, divorce, maintenance, social security, 
pensions and inheritance regimes. Terms such as "marriage" and "spouse" occurring in Danish 
legislation are deemed to include registered partners. The conditions in Danish law relating to 
separation or divorce apply to registered partnerships.  
However, the Danish model does not eliminate discrimination between same-sex partners 
and married spouses. In the Act as originally passed, registered partners are not permitted to adopt. 
Nor are they entitled to joint custody of a child or access to assisted conception. Legislation was 
passed in 1999 making “step-parent” adoption by a same-sex partner possible. A registered partner 
can now adopt the other partner’s child.367 The prohibition on adoption by registered partners as a 
couple, however, remains in place. Nor is there a right to apply on relationship break down for an 
order of joint custody, access or child support. Finally, the legal formation of registered partnerships 
cannot be carried out in church and registered couples have no claim to mediation performed by 
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clergy. For these reasons, as several commentators have argued, registered partnerships are, 
relative to marriage, “second class forms of relationships”.368 
A number of other Nordic nations have since followed the Denmark model, including Norway 
(1993),369 Sweden (1994),370 Iceland (1996),371 and the Netherlands (1998).372 With the exception of 
the Dutch scheme, the other Nordic registered partnership laws replicate the essential features of 
the Danish law: assimilation to marital status with some critical exceptions relating to parental status 
and the religious significance of marriage.373 The Icelandic law differs from the Danish law in that it 
allows registered partners to have joint custody of the biological children of one partner. The law in 
the Netherlands differs from the Danish law in that it is open to opposite-sex and same-sex partners, 
and all couples may apply to adopt a child. Belgium (1998), France (1999) and the Spanish province 
of Catalonia (1998) have also enacted registration schemes open to two persons of the opposite or 
same sex, although the rights and obligations they impose are more limited than the Danish 
model.374 In the Czech Republic a bill on registered partnership failed by several votes in 1998; 
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plans are underway for an amended proposal.375 In Hungary, a Constitutional Court decision in 1995 
ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from laws recognizing unmarried cohabitants was 
unconstitutional. The cohabitation laws were amended to include same-sex couples in 1996.376 The 
implementation of registered partnership schemes is currently under consideration in a number of 
other European countries, including Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Finland and the Czech Republic.377  
  
(b) Hawaii (1997) 
Hawaii became the first state in the U.S. to adopt a partner registration scheme with the 
passage of a “reciprocal beneficiaries” law in 1997.378 The passage of the Act was part of a series of 
events in Hawaii precipitated by the 1993 ruling of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin.379 
The Court ruled that the state’s opposite-sex definition of marriage constituted sex discrimination 
contrary to the equal protection clause of the Hawaii State Constitution. Following the ruling, the 
legislature established a Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law that recommended in 1995 
that the marriage statute be amended “to allow two people to marry, regardless of their gender.” 380 
The Commission also recommended that the legislature adopt “a universal comprehensive domestic 
partnership act that confers all the possible benefits and obligations of marriage for two people, 
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regardless of gender.”381 The legislature rejected the first option, proposing instead a constitutional 
amendment to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. The electorate ratified the marriage 
amendment by a two-thirds majority in November 1998.382 The legislature chose instead to 
implement a limited registration scheme for “reciprocal beneficiaries”, one that falls far short of the 
Commission’s recommendation that registrants obtain all the benefits and obligations of marriage. 
As noted above, the stated purpose of the reciprocal beneficiaries law is to extend certain 
rights and benefits to couples who are legally prohibited from marrying because they are of the 
same sex or within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.383 The legislation repeats the 
legislature’s finding that “the people of Hawaii choose to preserve the tradition of marriage as a 
unique social institution based upon the committed union of one man and one woman.”384 However, 
the legislature acknowledged that “there are many individuals who have significant personal, 
emotional, and economic relationships with another individual yet are prohibited by such legal 
restrictions from marrying.”385 It cited as examples “two individuals who are related to each other, 
such as a widowed mother and her unmarried son, or two individuals who are of the same 
gender".386 Registration as a reciprocal beneficiary is available to two persons who are legally 
prohibited from marrying, are at least eighteen years old, and are not married nor party to another 
reciprocal beneficiary relationship.387 By filing a declaration, reciprocal beneficiaries become subject 
to a range of rights and obligations specified in Hawaii law, including inheritance rights and survivor 
benefits, health-related rights such as hospital visitation, family and funeral leave, private and public 
employee prepaid health insurance coverage, motor vehicle insurance coverage, jointly held 
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property rights, legal standing for wrongful death and crime victims rights, and other benefits related 
to the use of state facilities and state properties. The state auditor reported that 435 reciprocal 
beneficiary relationships were registered in the first year of the law’s operation.388 
The Hawaii “reciprocal beneficiaries” legislation rests on several normative assumptions 
inconsistent with Canadian understandings of relational equality. One is the view that rights and 
obligations should not be extended to unmarried opposite-sex couples unless they are legally barred 
from marrying. Another is the explicit creation of second-class status for same-sex couples and 
other “reciprocal beneficiaries”. The legislation provides that “unless otherwise expressly provided by 
law, reciprocal beneficiaries shall not have the same rights and obligations under the law that are 
conferred through marriage.”389 By maintaining a privileged legal status for marriage, the Hawaii 
legislature has chosen a discriminatory approach that stands in stark contrast to the principle of 
equal status adopted by the Vermont legislature three years later. 
 
(c) Vermont (2000) 
As in Hawaii, the Vermont “civil unions” bill was precipitated by a court ruling declaring the 
opposite-sex definition of marriage to be contrary to the State Constitution. On December 20, 1999, 
the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled in Baker v. State that  
…the state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits 
and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the 
form of inclusion within marriage laws themselves or a parallel “domestic partnership” system 
or some equivalent statutory alternative rests with the legislature.390 
 
The legislature has chosen to pursue the latter option, that is, the creation of an “equivalent statutory 
alternative”. In April 2000, the House of Representatives and the Senate approved a bill that will 
enact a new civil union status with legal consequences that run parallel to those of marriage. The 
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legislative findings reported with the bill set out the reasons for choosing the creation of a new status 
rather than amending the definition of marriage: 
Changes in the way significant legal relationships are established under the constitution 
should be approached carefully, combining respect for the community and cultural institutions 
most affected with a commitment to the constitutional rights involved. Approaching the 
granting of benefits and privileges to same-sex couples through a system of civil unions will 
provide due respect for tradition and long-standing social institutions, and will permit 
adjustment as unanticipated consequences or unmet needs arise.391 
 
Like the registered partnership regimes enacted in the Nordic European countries, parties to a 
civil union would have to be of the same sex, at least 18 years of age, not be party to another civil 
union or marriage, and not be related to each other (s.1202-3, s.5163). Civil unions would be 
certified according to the same procedures as civil marriage, and could be dissolved following “the 
same procedures” and “subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in 
the dissolution of marriage in accordance with” the divorce laws of the state.392  
In contrast to the European and Hawaii laws, the Vermont bill reflects a stronger commitment 
to conferring equivalent legal rights and obligations on same-sex partners. The bill provides that 
parties to a civil union would have all the same rights and obligations of married couples pursuant to 
Vermont law (s.1204). The legislature took care to reduce the risk that the creation of a status 
“separate but equal” to marriage might be interpreted by the courts as conferring unequal rights and 
obligations on parties to a civil union. The bill adds an interpretive provision directing the courts to 
confer the same rights and obligations on parties to a civil union as are conferred on parties to a 
marriage. The only exception is  
…when clearly necessary because the gender-based text of a statute, rule or judicial 
precedent would otherwise produce an unjust, unwarranted, or confusing result, and different 
treatment would promote or enhance, and would not diminish, the common benefits and 
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.393  
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The Vermont “civil unions” law is the first registered partnership statute in the world to eliminate all 
differences in the legal rights and obligations of married and same-sex couples. Its emergence from 
the legislative process with the principle of equal status intact thus represents a breakthrough in the 
protection of the equal rights of gay and lesbian couples.  
The Vermont “civil unions” law does share with all other registered partnership legislation a 
preoccupation with preserving the traditional definition of marriage, and thus falls short of a full 
commitment to equality. While other registered partnership schemes are separate and unequal, the 
Vermont law creates a status that is separate yet truly equal. Because marriage has cultural, 
symbolic importance that transcends the legal consequences attached to it, a full commitment to the 
value of equality requires the removal of the opposite-sex requirement from the definition of 
marriage as well. 
 
(d) Canadian Proposals 
Canadian governments have not yet enacted a registration scheme for domestic partners, 
although several are considering doing so, and several reports have recommended their adoption.  
 
(e) Ontario Law Reform Commission (1993) 394 
The OLRC recommended the establishment of a registered domestic partnership scheme 
that would be open to any two individuals regardless of the nature of their relationship395 so long as 
they were 18 years of age and not party to another marriage or domestic partnership.396 Partners 
would be subject to the same rights and responsibilities as married couples pursuant to the Family 
Law Act (these include rights and obligations in relation to property division, spousal support, 
cohabitation contracts, and the family members’ tort claim). The Commission defended its 
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recommendation by reference to the values of equality, autonomy and privacy,397 and noted that the 
creation of a new civil status preserves the “particular cultural and religious significance of 
marriage”.398 Registered partnerships could be revoked unilaterally with notice to the other 
partner.399 
(f) British Columbia Law Institute (1998) 
In its Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status, the BCLI recommended that the 
provincial government enact a Domestic Partner Act.400 The proposed Act would enable any two 
persons over the age of majority (nineteen) to agree to have rights and obligations equivalent to 
those of married spouses by making a formal declaration. The Report recommends that domestic 
partners be added to definitions of spouse and related terms in all British Columbia legislation. 
Partnership status would be open to conjugal and non-conjugal couples, whether or not they are 
living together. The Report noted that “[j]ust as with marriage, it would be theoretically possible, 
although highly unlikely, that people making a domestic partner declaration would not live together.” 
401
 Partners must not be party to another domestic partnership or marriage (unless, in the latter 
case, they have been separated for more than one year and the separation is intended to be 
permanent). The partnership could be terminated by a separation agreement or by living separate 
and apart for more than one year with the intention that the separation be permanent.402 
Like the Ontario Law Reform Commission, the BCLI defended its recommendations by 
reference to principles of autonomy, privacy and non-discrimination.403 To protect the principle of 
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privacy, partners would have the option of not registering their partnership declaration, in which case 
it would still have legal significance as between them during their lives, but limited significance as 
against third parties.404 
 
2. The Current Federal Legislative Context 
 
The definition of common law partners included in nearly the full range of federal statutes 
after Bill C-23 requires cohabitation in a conjugal relationship for one year. It could be argued that 
this short period of cohabitation has made it unnecessary to consider enacting a domestic 
partnership scheme at the federal level, since cohabiting conjugal couples will be included in all 
federal statutes after a relatively short period of cohabitation. In the jurisdictions described above  
that have adopted or are considering adopting registered partnership schemes, same-sex couples 
do not have the extensive package of rights and obligations that exist in federal legislation after Bill 
C-23.  
It is true that the need for a domestic partnership scheme at the federal level is less pressing 
after the enactment of Bill C-23. Nevertheless, when one compares the operation and scope of the 
common law partner definitions with the potential scope and operation of a domestic partnership 
scheme, it is clear that the latter continues to offer a number of advantages. 
First, a domestic partnership law would promote the equality and autonomy of non-conjugal 
cohabitants by permitting them to choose to subscribe to the package of spousal and partnership 
benefits from which they are currently excluded. The only other means of effectively accommodating 
the interests of non-conjugal cohabitants is by ascribing legal consequences to their relationships by 
enacting legislative definitions that would capture a broader range of economically and emotionally 
interdependent adult relationships, an option we discuss in greater detail below. Given the diversity 
of non-conjugal relationships, and our lack of knowledge regarding their needs and expectations, it 
is likely that governments will continue to exercise caution before ascribing legal consequences to 
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them. Precisely because registration as domestic partners would be based on a mutual, voluntary 
decision to assume legal consequences, it avoids many of the difficulties and uncertainties of 
ascribed legal status.  
 Second, the possibility of registering as domestic partners would be a welcome option even 
for those unmarried couples living together in conjugal relationships. Once they have lived together 
for one year, these couples are now automatically included in the definition of common law partners 
in nearly the full range of federal statutes that apply to married couples. Nevertheless, a registration 
option would enhance these couples’ autonomy and privacy, permit them to express their 
commitment publicly, and would promote the protection of their reasonable expectations. 
One of the disadvantages of common law partner status is that it is imposed involuntarily, 
without any formal declaration of commitment apart from the fact of living together. The ability to 
formalize a relationship through a public declaration of commitment should not be underestimated. It 
gives the partners and their relationship a degree of public visibility, acceptance and accountability 
that is simply lacking with common law partnership status. There are innumerable ongoing events in 
one’s community – from small, day to day acts of recognition to the celebration of anniversaries – 
that continually reaffirm community acceptance and support of formalized unions. Registration 
schemes are thus preferable to ascribed relational status in promoting caring commitments in 
domestic relationships. 
Moreover, the definition of common law partnerships is not self-executing. It involves 
interpretation by legal decision-makers regarding the duration of cohabitation and the presence or 
absence of a conjugal relationship. These aspects of the definition of common law partners will give 
rise to potential uncertainties and intrusive inquiries into partners’ lives as part of the administration 
of federal legislative schemes, just as definitions of common law spouses have in the provincial 
context.405 
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Registered partnership status, in contrast, comes into effect immediately and voluntarily at a 
time consciously chosen by the partners themselves. There is no uncertainty about their legal status 
and no need for invasions of privacy to determine whether or not partners fall within relational 
definitions employed in statutes. These attributes of registered partnerships promote the value of 
equality because they confer on partners all of the same advantages that marriage provides to 
opposite-sex couples. They also promote autonomy and security to a greater degree than common 
law partnership status does. A registered partnership scheme enables partners to choose to take on 
a more secure set of legal rights and obligations that correspond to the aspirations and reasonable 
expectations of registering partners.406 
For these reasons, the federal government should enact a registered domestic partnership 
scheme that would be open to any two people who are at least 18 and who are not married or party 
to another registered partnership. Registered domestic partners should be added to all federal 
statutes alongside married spouses and common law partners. The registration of a domestic 
partnership will signal the partners’ commitment to each other and immediately subject them to 
rights and obligations under federal law. There should be no difference in the legal status of married 
couples and registered domestic partners. The equality principle embodied in the Vermont Bill 
should be preferred over the discriminatory elements of the European laws and the Hawaiian 
reciprocal beneficiaries law. The prohibitions on marital status and sexual orientation discrimination 
in s.15 of the Charter would render any differences in treatment unconstitutional since there could 
not be said to be any relevant differences in the qualitative nature of partnership relationships and 
marital relationships. 
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Because of the limits on federal jurisdiction, the implementation of a registered partner status 
for the purposes of federal laws could have no direct or immediate impact on provincial laws. 
Registered partners would remain unrecognized (except as common law spouses if they meet the 
cohabitation and conjugal requirements) in provincial laws dealing with the rights and responsibilities 
of family members until those laws are also amended to accommodate the new civil status. The lack 
of correspondence between federal and provincial relational definitions would be an unfortunate and 
inconvenient situation. The best situation would be for federal and provincial governments to move 
forward in a coordinated fashion. However, in the absence of federal/provincial agreement, the 
advantages of federal leadership on this issue outweigh the disadvantages of a lack of 
correspondence between federal and provincial relational definitions. The same problems exist now 
for persons recognized as common law partners in federal legislation. For example, same-sex 
couples, included in the definition of common law partners in federal statutes, are not recognized in 
the legislation of seven provinces. But just as this difficulty did not prevent the government from 
moving ahead with Bill C-23, neither should the challenges of divided jurisdiction inhibit the federal 
government from establishing a registered partnership scheme. 
There is no compelling reason to limit registered partnerships to same-sex couples, conjugal 
couples, or even to cohabiting couples. The value of autonomy suggests that the choice of relational 
status should only be limited for good reasons. The experience in the Netherlands indicates that a 
significant number of opposite-sex couples have chosen to register as partners rather than marry,407 
and that 62% of registered same-sex couples would prefer to marry if that option were open to 
them.408 It should not surprise us that the meanings that particular couples attach to the institutions 
of marriage and domestic partnership are personal and variable. Marriage has deep historical and 
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religious roots; domestic partnership is a product of the secular aspirations of contemporary liberal 
democracies. Ideally, individuals seeking to formalize their primary adult personal relationships 
should be free to choose the relational status that carries the combination of meanings and legal 
consequences that provides the best fit with their own beliefs, attitudes and aspirations. Moreover, 
the principle of equality leans against the creation of a new legal status defined by reference to a 
prohibited ground of discrimination. 
The enactment of a federal domestic partnership law would do much to advance the values of 
caring and commitment, equality, autonomy, privacy and security that ought to guide state regulation 
of adult personal relationships. Registering couples would be able to publicly declare their 
commitment, formalize their relationships, and freely assume the package of legal rights and 
obligations that are currently extended to husbands, wives and common law partners. However, a 
domestic partner registration scheme does not provide a complete answer to the needs of persons 
living together in relationships of care and commitment. For a variety of reasons, just as many 
cohabiting opposite-sex couples are not married, a number of persons living together in 
relationships of caring and commitment will not register as domestic partners. Even if privacy 
protections are built into the new law along the lines of the BCLI recommendations, some couples 
will be reluctant to choose a greater degree of public disclosure of their relationships than required 
by the definition of common law partners. Further, as McCarthy and Radbord have argued, “a 
comprehensive registered domestic partnership regime, without default protections in the event of a 
failure to register, offers no recourse to vulnerable spouses who did not have sufficient knowledge or 
power in a relationship to protect their interests by registration.”409 In other words, registered 
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partnership schemes are “under-inclusive” in not meeting the needs of all persons living in 
relationships of caring and commitment. Therefore, to fully promote the values of equality and 
security in the regulation of adult domestic relationships characterized by caring and commitment, 
the state must consider ascribing or imposing legal status on persons living with others outside 
marriage or a registered partnership. At the same time, careful consideration must be given to not 
interfere unduly with the privacy or autonomy of unmarried and unregistered couples. With the 
passage of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, the federal government will add 
common law partners to the vast majority of federal statutes. Thus, a “default scheme” will already 
be in place for unmarried or unregistered conjugal couples. In the next section, we will consider the 
adequacy of the current definition of common law partner and related terms in federal statutes, and 
advance the argument that the government should consider including non-conjugal domestic 
relationships involving care and commitment in federal legislation to a greater extent.  
 
 
C. Deemed or Ascribed Spousal/Relational Status 
 
 
1. Ascribed Spousal/Partner Status  
 
(a) Current Definitions 
 
 At the moment, prior to the expected passage of the Modernization of Benefits and 
Obligations Act, federal pension and tax laws include deemed or ascribed spousal status provisions. 
These definitions generally have residency, duration and conjugality requirements. For example, the 
Old Age Security Act defines spouse as including “a person of the opposite sex who is living with 
that person, having lived with that person for at least one year, if the two persons have publicly 
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represented themselves as husband and wife”.410 Similarly, the Pension Benefits Standards Act 
defines spouse as including “a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting with the member/former 
member in a conjugal relationship…having so cohabited with the member/former member for at 
least one year”.411 The duration of residence required in federal definitions of common law 
cohabitants has steadily decreased over time, and has now settled on a uniform requirement of a 
year in duration.412 The definition of spouse is also restricted to opposite-sex couples.  
Bill C-23 will replace these definitions of ascribed spousal status with one uniform definition. 
According to the approach in the Bill, a person cohabiting with another in a conjugal relationship for 
at least a year will be referred to as a “common law partner”. Most significantly, the new definition 
eliminates the opposite-sex restriction, thereby extending ascribed “partnership” status to same-sex 
couples. The definition retains the co-residency requirement and the uniform duration for this 
residency of one year. The definition also retains the conjugality requirement, although it does not 
define the meaning of “conjugal”. Therefore, the definition of conjugality continues to be governed by 
the case law. Apart from the removal of the opposite-sex requirement, the definition of common law 
partner is identical to the definition of common law spouse previously employed in federal pension 
and tax laws. 
Several approaches to the interpretation of cohabitation and conjugality are found in the 
case law. One approach emphasizes the economic relationship between the parties, and examines 
whether there is a relationship of economic dependency.413 A second, and more prevalent approach 
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considers whether the relationship is functionally equivalent to marriage. In Re Feehan and Attwells, 
an Ontario County Court held that “cohabit” means “living together in a marriage like relationship 
outside marriage”,414 an approach that was subsequently affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Sanderson v. Russell.415  This approach has required the courts to identify the basic dimensions and 
functions of a marital relationship, and then determine whether the relationship in question 
sufficiently approximates a marital relationship. In this approach, the economic relationship between 
the parties is seen as one among a number of factors to be considered, including shelter, sexual 
and personal relationships, domestic services, social activities, and children.416  
 Both of these approaches to cohabitation and conjugality have been the subject of criticism. 
As we have argued elsewhere, the economic dependency approach is based on the stereotype of 
marriage as a relationship of inequality and dependency. 417 This approach to cohabitation, which 
defines the spousal relationship in terms of the economic dependency of women, seems to be at 
odds with the partnership model of spousal relationships that increasingly informs family law. While 
the economic relationship is an important dimension of the relationship, the emphasis should be 
placed on interdependency and equality, rather than dependency.418 It is, however, possible to shift 
the conceptualization of this model slightly, from an economic dependency model to an economic 
interdependency model. In many respects, the emphasis on economic dependency simply reflected 
the discourse of spousal support at the time. Moreover, the Court in Stoikiewicz did speak of mutual 
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obligations (i.e. whether the individuals in question “have each assumed an obligation to support 
and provide for the other in the same manner that married spouses are obliged to do”).419 The model 
could without difficulty be updated to reflect post-Moge understandings of spousal support and 
family obligations more generally, with its emphasis on economic interdependency. Within such a 
reconceptualized economic interdependency model, the main factor for determining the existence of 
a spousal relationship would be economic – did they live in a relationship of economic 
interdependency or economic partnership? The limitation of this approach is, however, that it still 
risks placing too much emphasis on the economic relationship to the exclusion of other factors that 
contribute to a spousal relationship. 
The functional approach – which does take into account a broader range of factors that 
contribute to a spousal relationship - has also been criticized, primarily for the extent to which it 
measures all relationships against a norm of an idealized marital relationship.420 This approach runs 
the risk of assuming that there is a single model of marriage. As we have argued, “the idealized 
functional approach sets up a monolithic and mythical image of the marital relationship, against 
which all relationships are evaluated”.421 Further, reliance on a functional approach may also lead 
courts “to engage in inquiries into the intimate details of relationships, intruding on personal privacy”. 
422
 At the same time, it is not at all clear that it is possible to avoid a functional definition of spouse, if 
spousal status is ever to be ascribed by statute. There needs to be some basis on which to 
distinguish between those relationships to be included within the legislation, and those that are not. 
It is, after all, the functional similarities of the relationships that has led to the steady expansion of 
rights and responsibilities to cohabiting couples. A functional approach might identify the different 
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dimensions and functions of family life, without insisting that all relationships fit perfectly within this 
norm.  
In M. v. H., the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed, with little consideration, the functional 
approach to conjugality. In particular, Cory J. described the approach in the 1980 Ontario District 
Court case of Molodowich v. Penttinen as setting out “the generally accepted characteristics of a 
conjugal relationship.423 They include shared shelter, sexual and personal behavior, services, social 
activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple”.424 The 
Supreme Court seemed to be taking into account the criticisms of this functional approach to the 
family, in noting that these dimensions of family life will be present in varying degrees, and that it will 
not be necessary for a couple to satisfy all of these dimensions for their relationship to be conjugal. 
“In order to come within the definition, neither opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are 
required to fit precisely the traditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is 
‘conjugal’”.425 The Supreme Court noted that an opposite-sex couple might be considered “to be in a 
conjugal relationship although they do not have children nor sexual relations”.426  
[T]he weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in determining 
whether an opposite-sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and almost 
infinitely. The same must hold true of same-sex couples.427 
 
The Court held that the approach to determining whether a relationship is conjugal must be 
“flexible”, since the “relationships of all couples will vary widely.”428  
 
(b) Critique of Current Definitions 
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 There are then a number of criticisms that may continue to be directed to the current 
definitions for ascribed spousal status. First and foremost is the lack of clarity in the prevailing 
definition of cohabitation and conjugality. Following M. v. H., the test for conjugality involves a 
consideration of the various factors in Molodowich, which according to the Court, “may vary widely 
and almost infinitely”.429 The Supreme Court has given very little guidance on the question of what, if 
anything, makes a spousal relationship unique. How many of the factors must a couple meet before 
they are considered spouses? Are any factors more important than others? The Court gives little 
guidance, other than to emphasize flexibility and diversity. Indeed, it has said that a conjugal  
relationship may exist, even in the absence of a sexual relationship, which is often assumed in 
ordinary parlance to be a central if not defining feature of a “conjugal relationship”.  
There is good reason not to give primacy to the existence of a sexual relationship in 
determining entitlement to a range of rights and responsibilities. Making sexual behaviour part of the 
definition inevitably entails serious invasions of privacy. Moreover, the presence or absence of a 
sexual relationship is in itself not relevant to any legitimate state objectives. Sex is a poor indicator of 
a couple’s entitlement to the range of federal rights and responsibilities. It is both over- and under-
inclusive. Many couples who have a sexual relationship do not have a close economic relationship. 
And conversely, many couples who do not have a sexual relationship may have an economically 
and emotionally interdependent relationship. However, once the existence of a sexual relationship is 
no longer a factor that distinguishes between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, the exclusion 
of many non-conjugal couples becomes more and more difficult to sustain.  
In the aftermath of M. v. H., there is little clarity to the meaning of conjugality. The Court’s 
approach, while an improvement over a functional approach that holds fast to the idealized norm of 
marriage, sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility and diversity. The approach to conjugality 
now appears to be an “I know it when I see it” approach. And in extending conjugality to 
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relationships that do not involve a sexual relationship, the definition of spouse begins to undermine 
the very distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. While the definition of spouse 
does not specifically contemplate the inclusion of relationships between adult siblings, or adult 
children and their parents, it becomes harder and harder to justify the exclusion of these 
relationships. These relationships may be characterized by joint residence, emotional intimacy, and 
economic interdependency.  One may provide domestic services for the other. One may be entirely 
economically dependent on the other. While they would not hold themselves out as spouses, their 
relationships may be characterized by many of the dimensions of family life that give rise to legal 
rights and responsibilities.  
A related concern is that the definition of conjugality is not self-executing. As mentioned 
above, it requires interpretation by legal decision-makers. Administration of the definition may 
require a detailed and intrusive investigation into the lives of the individuals involved. The functional 
definition of conjugality after M. v. H. still requires that a decision-maker consider the most intimate 
details of people’s lives, including their sexual and emotional relationships. Such an inquiry 
constitutes a significant invasion of privacy. One might argue that individuals seeking government 
benefits must be prepared to compromise their privacy. However, the same invasive procedures are 
used to impose government obligations. In other words, it is not simply a question of choosing to 
subject one’s self and one’s relationship to scrutiny in exchange for potential benefits. Often, it is not 
a matter of individual choice at all.  
 
(c) Towards a new Definition for Ascribed Status 
 The current definition of ascribed spousal status lacks clarity, is still under-inclusive of the 
range of relationships that might warrant protection, and is potentially unduly intrusive of individual 
privacy. One option would be to attempt to introduce a new definition of cohabitation or conjugality. 
While the test would have to retain a functional component, it may be possible to better capture the 
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particular dimensions of personal relationships that give rise to the need for legal recognition, and 
the allocation of legal rights and responsibilities.  In our view, there are two factors that are 
particularly salient: economic interdependence and emotional intimacy. As we have argued 
elsewhere:   
It is the combination of emotional intimacy and economic partnership that creates the unique 
vulnerability of spouses to harsh consequences arising on the break down of a lasting 
relationship. Emotional intimacy is founded on the kinds of trust that tend to prevent people 
from taking seriously the possibility of economic deprivation if the relationship falters. And a 
high degree of economic interdependence potentially creates a high degree of economic 
vulnerability.430  
 
In our study on the spousal definitions in Ontario family law, we previously recommended that the 
definition of cohabitation for the purposes of ascribed spousal status be amended. We 
recommended that “spouse” include “either of two persons who have lived together in a relationship 
of primary importance in each other’s lives.” We further recommended that “live together” be defined 
as “living together in an economic partnership whether within or outside of marriage”.431   The 
Ontario Law Reform Commission was of the view that this definition was problematic. “First, the 
meaning of the term ‘economic partnership’ is unclear. Individuals may have difficulty demonstrating 
to a court that such a partnership existed. Second, even when modified by the phrase ‘in a 
relationship…of primary importance in each other’s lives” the proposed definition potentially applies 
to many relationships that are not currently within the purview of the Family Law Act. It could 
conceivably apply, for example, to business partnerships, as well as to relationships between 
parents and their children, or between friends.”432  
We continue to believe that the general approach of focusing on emotional intimacy and 
economic interdependency has much to commend it.  First, we do not believe that proving the 
existence of a economic partnership, or a relationship of economic interdependence is any more 
difficult to establish than the interrogation of an economic relationship in the current approach to 
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conjugality. The test in Molodowich involves an examination of the financial relationship between the 
parties regarding the necessities of life, the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership 
of property, and any special financial arrangements agreed to between the parties. It also involves 
an examination of any domestic services provided by one of the parties. These are in any case the 
kind of factors that go towards the existence of a relationship of economic partnership or economic 
interdependency.  
 However, there is merit to the OLRC’s concern that the definition will apply beyond traditional 
“conjugal” couples. We do not agree that the definition would apply to business partnerships. 
However, a focus on emotional intimacy and economic interdependency could well include a broad 
range of adult relationships within its purview. It could include the relationship between two elderly 
sisters who have lived together for 20 years, or the relationship between a parent and adult child 
who have lived together for many years. Adult siblings or parent/child relationships certainly seem to 
fall outside of the scope of a definition of ‘spouse’. However, the potentially broad scope of the 
definition may go more to the fact that the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships is increasingly difficult to sustain. The purpose of expanded definitions of spouses was 
to recognize relationships that are functionally equivalent to marriage – and thereby characterized by 
the same degree of emotional and economic interdependence. While the existence of a sexual 
relationship was one of the factors that continued to characterize the uniqueness of conjugal 
relationships in the functional approach under Molodowich, the Supreme Court has now made it 
clear that the test for conjugality no longer requires a sexual relationship. As we have argued, in the 
aftermath of M. v. H., the very distinction between conjugality and non-conjugality has in fact begun 
to come undone within the test itself.  
 A question, then, that needs to be addressed is whether it is possible and/or desirable to 
provide a revised definition of spouse and/or cohabitation that would maintain the distinction 
between conjugal and non-conjugal couples. If so, then the question of the legal recognition of non-
conjugal relationships would proceed as a separate issue. If not, then it would be necessary to 
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develop a broader term for the ascription of relationship status that applied to conjugal and non-
conjugal couples alike. After considering this issue, we will then return to the more specific question 
of the appropriate definitions to apply to these relationships.  
 
Models in Other Jurisdictions 
At least two other jurisdictions have seriously considered this question of ascribed relational 
status, and the distinctions between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. We briefly review 
these two models.  
 
New South Wales 
In New South Wales, the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 
introduced a detailed definition of de facto relationships, as well as a definition of close personal 
relationships and domestic relationships.433 The Act amends the definitions contained in the De 
Facto Relationships Act 1984. It further extends the rights and responsibilities in a range of statutes 
to de facto relationships , and in some circumstances, to close personal relationships. Section 5 of 
the Act defines domestic relationships as “a de facto relationship or a close personal relationship 
(other than marriage or a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by 
family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic services and 
personal care.” 434 Section 4(1) of the Act defines a de facto relationship as “a relationship between 
two adult persons (a) who live together as a couple, and who are not married to one another or 
related by family.” Section 4(2) states that:  
…in determining whether two persons are in a de facto relationship, all the circumstances of 
the relationship are to be taken into account, including such of the following matters as may 
be relevant in a particular case:  
 
(a) the duration of the relationship 
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(b) the nature and extent of common residence 
(c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists 
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for 
financial support, between the parties 
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of property 
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life 
(g) the care and support of children 
(h) the performance of household duties 
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationships.  
 
Section 4(3) specifically provides that “no finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in 
subsection 2(a)-(i), or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary for the 
existence of a de facto relationship, and a court determining whether such a relationship exists is 
entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem 
appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.”  
The Act thus maintains a distinction between de facto relationships and close personal 
relationships, although both are included within the broader idea of domestic relationships. A de 
facto relationship can be seen as the equivalent of an ascribed spousal definition – it applies to 
unmarried couples who are living together in a common law or conjugal relationship, although it 
carefully avoids this language. The Act provides a functional definition of de facto relationships – 
setting out the kinds of factors that the courts should take into account in determining the existence 
of such relationships. At the same time, the Act is attentive to the problems of an idealized 
approach, insisting that a relationship need not meet all of these factors, nor indeed any specific 
factor, in order to be regarded as a de facto relationship. The definition of de facto relationship bears 
some resemblance to the Canadian definition of ‘conjugal’ relationships in the aftermath of M. v. H. 
– a flexible and functional approach that considers residence, sexual, economic, parenting, 
domestic, and social relationships. But, the New South Wales legislation has the advantage of 
avoiding the baggage of the language of “conjugality”, and its seemingly inescapable association 
with sexual relationships.  
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A close personal relationship, on the other hand, applies to individuals who live together in 
‘non-conjugal’ relationships (again, carefully avoiding this language). It is not the marriage-like 
nature of the relationship that is significant, but rather, whether the relationship involves “domestic 
support and personal care”.  The definition is functional, in so far as it is concerned with particular 
features of the relationship, but it potentially includes a much broader group of individuals, such as 
parent/adult child, adult siblings, as well as two unrelated adults who live together. Individuals in a 
“close personal relationship” are considered to be living in a domestic relationship, and have a range 
of rights and responsibilities, although a much more limited set of rights and responsibilities than 
those imposed on de facto relationships.  
 
British Columbia Law Institute (1998)  
In its Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status, the BCLI recommended that the 
provincial government enact a Family Status Recognition Act, which would define family 
relationships.435 The Report considered the extent to which the law does and should recognize non-
traditional spousal relationships and non-traditional family relationships. In terms of spousal 
relationships, the Report recommended that three kinds of relationships involving spouses or 
partners be recognized: married spouses, domestic partners 436 and “people in marriage like 
relationships”.437 The BCLI recommended that the three different spousal relationships consist of the 
same rights and obligations while the relationship is subsisting. However, it recommended some 
distinctions in rights and responsibilities between these different relationships when the relationship 
ends, that is, on separation or death. 438  
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The Report specifically recommended that the term “marriage-like relationship” include 
same-sex couples439; that it not require sexual intimacy; 440 and that it not require a duration test441, 
except in specially defined circumstances.442  The draft Act provides a list of relevant factors to take 
into account in determining whether a “marriage like relationship exists between people who are not 
married”, including “the duration of the relationship, the nature of the relationship, the extent to which 
the financial interests of the parties have been merged, the extent to which direct and indirect 
contributions have been made by either party to the other or the mutual well-being of the parties, the 
extent to which the parties are socially and emotionally interdependent, whether the parties hold 
each other out as partners, and whether the parties have together taken responsibility for raising 
children”.443   
 In terms of family relationships, the Report recommended that the law should “recognize 
people (including non-relatives) who live with another in a close relationship that is the equivalent of 
a family relationship.” Family is defined broadly to include “a person’s spouse and household 
member”. A “household member” means “a relative or non-relative of a second person who lives 
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with the second person in a close association that is the equivalent of a family relationship”.444 
According to the BCLI, “the policy is to recognize the family status of people, including non-relatives, 
who live together as family (as opposed to roommates, boarders, or live-in employees, such as a 
housekeeper or other kinds of domestic staff).”445 The Report stated that it will be up to the courts to 
determine whether or not the relationship is sufficiently close to qualify as a family relationship. 
“Clearly, simply sharing a residence is not in itself sufficient to create a relationship that is equivalent 
of family. In most cases, something more in terms of how the parties regard each other, and conduct 
their domestic and financial affairs, would be required.”446 The BCLI thus recommends the inclusion 
of a much broader range of relationships within the concept of “family”. The phrase “close 
relationship that is the equivalent of a family relationship” is intended to capture relationships that 
are neither spousal, nor blood-relatives. It is an open-ended definition, with considerable judicial 
discretion.  
The Continuing Viability of the Conjugal/Non-conjugal Distinction? 
 The New South Wales legislation and the British Columbia Law Institute study suggest that it 
is both possible and desirable to maintain a distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships, although both abandon the language of conjugality. The New South Wales legislation 
distinguishes between de facto relationships and close personal relationships. The BCLI Report 
distinguishes between a spousal (marriage like) and family relationship (close relationship that is 
equivalent to family). Both are effectively maintaining a distinction between spousal relationships 
and other familial relationships, while still recommending that a range of legal rights and 
responsibilities be extended to non-traditional relationships. However, neither use the language of 
conjugality/non-conjugality. And both attempt to move away from the implicit association of spousal 
status with a sexual relationship. Under both the New South Wales legislation and the BCLI 
                                                 
444
 Ibid., section 1.  
445
 Ibid., notes to section 1.  
446
 BCLI Report, supra note 400.  
157 
recommendations, a sexual relationship would not be required to establish a de facto or marriage-
like relationship.  
 The advantage of an approach that maintains a distinction between conjugal and non-
conjugal is that it would cause the least disruption within the existing federal legal landscape. If Bill 
C-23 is enacted, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act will extend legal rights and 
responsibilities on the basis of conjugality. It will define common law partner based on the idea of 
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship. Maintaining a distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal 
couples would allow the expansion of the legal framework to include non-conjugal couples, where 
appropriate, without requiring substantial reform to the recognition of conjugal couples.  
There are, however, a number of disadvantages with this approach to which we have already 
alluded.  There is the increasingly conceptual difficulty of sustaining the validity of the distinction. As 
we have argued above, in the aftermath of M. v. H., it is clear that the legal distinction is not simply 
the existence of a sexual relationship, and the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal has 
become more elusive. The fact that our law retains this distinction begs the larger, and perhaps 
increasingly unanswerable question: What is the difference between conjugal and non-conjugal 
couples, and what significance if any should attach to this difference?  Despite the legal tests, is the 
difference still about the existence of a sexual relationship or perhaps the possibility of an otherwise 
legitimate sexual relationship? For example, even if a couple does not currently have a sexual 
relationship, is it about having had one in the past? Is it about the possibility (or expectation) that 
they could have a legitimate sexual relationship (thereby excluding a range of familial relationships 
from the scope of “spouse”)? 447  
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Is it also a question of commitment? Married spouses and domestic partners can be seen to 
have publicly and voluntarily assumed a mutual commitment to one another  that may be absent in 
other kinds of relationships. However, the very nature of an ascribed spousal status is that it 
imposes spousal status, and its concomitant rights and responsibilities in the absence of such a 
publicly and voluntarily assumed commitment. Is it a question of expectation, or reasonable 
expectations? Persons in “relationships tantamount to spousal”448 have increasingly come to have a 
set of expectations about what the relationship involves – particularly, expectations about economic 
interdependency; expectations about economically intertwined lives that extend indefinitely into the 
future. These are at the same time expectations that are partially, but not fully reflected in the law. 
As we have suggested above, popular opinion seems to be that the law already includes these 
common law relationships on the same basis as marriage.449 These expectations – partially created 
and reinforced by the law itself – may not extend to the same extent to other types of adult 
relationships. Individuals in non-conjugal relationships may not have the same expectation that their 
lives will remain economically intertwined indefinitely into the future. Or they may not have the same 
expectation about the legal implications of their relationships.  
However, such expectations may more appropriately be a question of fact – some of those 
who live in these non-conjugal relationships may well expect that their lives will remain economically 
intertwined indefinitely into the future. Moreover, the fact that they do not expect the law to protect 
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them may say more about the inadequacy of the law than it does about the actual distinctions 
between conjugal and non-conjugal couples. And this argument may overstate the extent of the 
legal exclusion of these non-conjugal couples. It is simply not the case that conjugal relationships 
are included, and non-conjugal excluded. As we reviewed above, federal law already ascribes 
relationship status in a broad range of non-conjugal relationships (i.e. through the language of 
dependants, related persons, etc).  
The theme that runs throughout our discussion is that the distinction between conjugal and 
non-conjugal couples is dissolving. It is increasingly difficult to find a sustainable basis for this 
distinction – beyond a basic “I know it when I see it” approach that seems to inform much of the 
debate. Our discussion would suggest that we are of the view that the distinction should be 
abandoned, and that the law ought to move towards a more expansive definition of ascribed 
relationship status that would include both conjugal and non-conjugal couples. We could return to 
our earlier recommendation of replacing the term “cohabiting in a conjugal relationship” with a more 
specific definition, such as “living together in a relationship of economic interdependency and 
emotional intimacy” – or, in a close personal relationship of economic interdependency.  
However, there remains the political reality that Bill C-23 will extend legal recognition on the 
basis of conjugality. The debates around the Bill suggest that conjugality is for some a meaningful 
social and legal category, and that any further extension of rights and obligations to other adult 
relationships should leave this category intact. In introducing the Bill for second reading in the House 
of Commons, Minister of Justice Anne McLellan specifically stated her commitment to this 
distinction. “[T]here is a qualitative difference between the relationships addressed in Bill C-23 and 
the types of relationships that may exist among relatives, siblings or friends living under the same 
roof and sharing household expenses”.450 The Minister then noted that adult Canadians who 
currently live in these dependency relationships may welcome the extension of benefits, but perhaps 
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not the accompanying legal obligations, and raised a series of important questions about how these 
relationships of dependency ought to be recognized. While these are indeed important questions, 
the significance of the quotation here lies in the blanket assertion of the “qualitative difference” 
between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. 451  
There also remains the political reality that Bill C-23 does not include a definition of 
conjugality, and it seems unlikely that political interest in embracing the challenge will arise in the 
future. It would appear that the government prefers to leave this perplexing issue to the courts.  It is 
likely that, at least for the foreseeable future, it will remain for the courts to develop and apply a 
reasonable definition to conjugality.  
 
2. Ascribing Non-conjugal Relationship Status  
As we discussed above, federal law already ascribes relational status in non-conjugal 
contexts, through a range of relational definitions. The terms “dependant” and “related person” are 
used broadly in federal statutes to include both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  
“Dependant” for example might include married spouses, common law partners, parents and 
children, as well as other “relatives” living in the same household. “Related persons” often includes 
persons related to marriage, blood or adoption. “Immediate family” and “near relative” are also used 
to describe and include a number of non-conjugal relationships. The problem therefore is not one of 
the total exclusion of non-conjugal relationships, but rather, the partiality and inconsistency of their 
inclusion. Some relationships are included for some purposes and not others. And these 
relationships are defined in different ways for different purposes. A strong case can be made for the 
need to rationalize the state’s approach to these relationships. The lack of consistency and 
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uniformity makes it difficult for individuals to know when their relationships are included, and when 
they are not.  
Further, non-conjugal relationships tend to be included only if they involve individuals who 
are related to one another. “Dependant”, “related person” and most of the other relational terms 
deployed in federal statutes only include individuals who are related in some way (for example, by 
blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption). Very few federal statutes include a relational 
term that could apply to individuals who live together but who are not related.452 If two unrelated 
individuals live together in a close, but non-conjugal relationship, pool their economic resources and 
become economically interdependent, there is a strong case to be made that they ought to be 
included for the purposes of at least some federal laws.453 While it is unlikely that a single term can 
be deployed to replace the range of existing relational terms, it may be possible to develop a less 
confusing and haphazard approach to ascribing relational status.  
As noted above, the New South Wales legislation uses the broad term of “domestic 
relationships” to include both conjugal and non-conjugal couples, and the term “close personal 
relationship” to ascribe relational status, and in turn, a number of rights and responsibilities, to non-
conjugal couples. Section 5 of the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 
describes a domestic relationship as including “a close personal relationship (other than marriage or 
a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are living 
together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic services and personal care.”454  
The BCLI Report similarly recommended that the state “recognize people (including non-
relatives) who live with another in a close relationship that is the equivalent of a family 
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relationship”.455 As noted above, it did not recommend a detailed definition, but rather, would leave it 
to the courts to determined whether the relationship was sufficiently close to qualify as a family 
relationship. In the Institute’s view, a shared residence would not suffice; rather “something more in 
terms of how the parties regard each other, and conduct their domestic and financial affairs, would 
be required.” 456 
A similar definition was suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia for the 
purposes of the division of property legislation. The Commission borrowed from the definition 
included in the Australian Capital Territory Domestic Relationships Act 1994, which refers to a “a 
personal relationship (other than a legal marriage) between two adults in which one provides 
personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the benefit of the other”.457  
(a) A new relational term 
We are of the view that federal law should consider a new relational category that captures a 
broad range of non-conjugal relationships, including non-familial relationships (that is, individuals 
who are not related by blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption) . There are a number 
of terms that could be used, such as a “domestic relationship”, a “household relationship”, or a 
“close personal relationship”. There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these terms.  
A household relationship signals that the individuals must be living together, but in no way 
suggests that they must be conjugal or familial. However, the term may be overly broad, since it may 
leave the impression that it applies to any group of individuals who live together in a shared 
household, regardless of the nature of the relationships between them. It could accurately describe 
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relationships such as roommates or boarders, who do constitute a single household, but whose lives 
may not be at all intertwined or interdependent.  
A close relationship, or close personal relationship, approximates the language adopted in 
the New South Wales legislation, and the language suggested in the BCLI Report. It does not in and 
of itself signal that individuals must be living together, although this could be part of the definition. 
The term “close” is vague. While the definition could attempt to give more precise content to the 
term, it might remain a vague and confusing concept.  
A ‘domestic relationship’ closely approximates the term ‘domestic partner’, which we have 
recommended in relation to domestic partnership regimes. This may have both advantages and 
disadvantages. Since we recommend that both conjugal and non-conjugal couples may register 
their relationships as domestic partners, the term “domestic relationship” may appropriately and 
consistently signal that the term is not restricted to conjugality. However, the similarity of “domestic 
partner” and “domestic relationship” may lead to some confusion. “A person in a domestic 
relationship” would not have the same meaning as a “domestic partner”, since the former would be 
an ascribed status and the latter, a voluntarily assumed status.  
 While each term has its relative advantages and disadvantages, we are inclined to suggest 
the adoption of the term “domestic relationship.”  We deploy this term in the discussion that follows. 
 
(b) A new relational definition  
 The next question would then be the definition of this new relational category. The term could 
be defined as ‘living together in a close relationship’ (New South Wales), or ‘a close relationship that 
is equivalent to a family relationship’(BCLI).  Both of these open-ended definitions leave much to the 
courts, to define the nature of “close relationships” or the nature of a relationship “equivalent to a 
family relationship”. In our view, it would be preferable, if possible, to provide somewhat more 
guidance to the courts as to the kinds of factors that might be relevant in deciding whether the 
relationship is sufficiently “close” or sufficiently “equivalent to a family relationship”’.  
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It might be helpful to revisit the proposals in our earlier work for redefining conjugality.458 The 
crux of the definition was the combination of emotional intimacy and economic interdependency. 
The criticism of this definition was that it was potentially over-inclusive; that it would include 
relationships that were not conjugal, such as adult siblings or other unrelated individuals who shared 
a household.459  As such, it may be that these elements of the definition are quite appropriate to 
describe the non-conjugal relationships to be included within the term “domestic relationship”. It is 
the combination of joint residence, emotional intimacy and economic interdependency that gives rise 
to the unique nature of the relationship, such that these relationships ought to be included in at least 
some legal rights and responsibilities. A fourth element that may also be relevant is a commitment to 
continue to live together in this interdependent relationship.  While this commitment is an important 
reason that we recognize adult relationships, it is difficult to measure. It is inherently subjective, and 
particularly when relationships break down, the parties may have very different versions of the 
degree of their long term commitment to one another. This element of commitment could be 
captured by a duration requirement – that is – that the individuals have lived together for a specified 
period of time before they are included within the definition. However, even a duration requirement is 
an imperfect measure of commitment, in so far as it uses past history to measure potential 
commitment into the future.  
 While the precise drafting needs further consideration, we are of the view that the definition 
should include joint residence, emotional intimacy and economic interdependency.  It could be 
phrased in a number of ways, such as “living together in a close emotional and economic 
relationship”, “living together in an emotionally and economically interdependent relationship” or 
“living together in a close relationship, characterized by economic interdependency”. But, the crux of 
the definition would be three fold: a shared residential relationship, a close emotional relationship, 
and an economically intertwined relationship. These three factors capture the basic value that 
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should underlie the legal recognition of adult relationships: the promotion and protection of 
relationships of care and commitment.  
 
3. Conclusion  
 Ascribing relationship status is an exercise fraught with difficulty. First, there is the threshold 
question of when it is appropriate to ascribe a relational status. This is particularly challenging in the 
spousal context, where individuals have not chosen to voluntarily assume the status through 
marriage. When should the state ascribe spousal status to individuals who have not voluntarily 
assumed spousal status? If domestic partnership regimes are enacted that allow non-conjugal 
couples to register their relationships as well, this threshold question will similarly apply to ascribing 
relational status. When should the state ascribe relational status to individuals who have not 
voluntarily assumed relational status? The values of autonomy and privacy must be balanced 
against the values of equality and security.  
Secondly, a basic distinction in federal law between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships 
is increasingly difficult to sustain. Developing and applying a clear and predictable definition of 
conjugality has long been, and remains, elusive. Given the difficulty if not impossibility of making any 
broad conclusions about the differences both between and among conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships, it is imperative that the question of the legal rights and responsibilities of adult 
relationships be addressed much more specifically. In what policy contexts should what kinds of 
relationships be recognized? If the question can not be answered generally, it must be answered 
specifically - on an objective by objective, statute by statute, basis. To the extent that specific 
legislative objectives are considered to appropriately apply to these non-conjugal relationships, 
many of the difficulties of the conjugal/non conjugal distinction may be avoided altogether. If a 
particular objective – such as recognising the potential existence of shared economic interests in 
family relationships giving rise to potential conflicts of interest – is considered to appropriately apply 
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to both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, then it will not be necessary to engage in the 
increasingly difficult exercise of distinguishing between these relationships.  However, if a particular 
objective is considered appropriate for conjugal, but not for non-conjugal relationships, then a 
workable definition of conjugality will continue to be required. Again, these are questions that can 
only be addressed specifically – a task to which we turn in the section that follows.  
 
 
 
II. Evaluating Legal Options in the Context of Specific 
Legislative Objectives 
  
 
In this section, we return to specific statutes and specific legislative objectives, for the 
purpose of recommending appropriate relational criteria. In our view, no one of the three models, or 
no single combination of the three models – marriage, registered domestic partnerships or ascribed 
status – is appropriate for realizing all of the objectives of federal legislation. The solution lies in 
finding the particular combination of the legal options that can best accomplish the legislative 
objectives listed in Part I while respecting the values of autonomy, privacy, equality and security. We 
return to the legislative provisions singled out for detailed examination in Part I above, and attempt 
to formulate recommendations appropriate for each.  
 
A. Regulating the Formation and Dissolution of Adult Personal 
Relationships   
 
Bill C-23 will not affect the law of marriage or divorce. The Bill defines marriage as the union 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others, which confirms the common law rule 
regarding the opposite-sex requirement of the capacity to marry.  Marriage continues to be governed 
by these and other common law rules regarding the capacity to marry. Divorce in turn continues to 
be governed by the Divorce Act, which by definition only applies to couples who have been married, 
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and who have applied to terminate their marital status. As a result, the government objectives of 
regulating the formation and dissolution of adult personal relationships continue under federal law to 
apply only to married couples. Unmarried conjugal couples, whether of the same or opposite sex, 
are not included within the ambit of these provisions. Nor are non-conjugal relationships.  
An argument could be made that these conjugal and non-conjugal relationships might be 
assisted by rules or procedures that more clearly demarcate the beginning (or end) of their 
relationships. Federal jurisdiction in this field will however be limited to demarcating relational status 
for the purposes of determining entitlement to rights and obligations within federal areas of 
jurisdiction. The scope of federal jurisdiction is analogous to the federal government’s ability to pass 
laws putting in place definitions of common law spouses or partners, and should not be confused 
with the scope of federal jurisdiction over marriage and divorce.  
Under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, Parliament has the power to make laws 
in relation to “marriage and divorce”. The courts have held that this jurisdiction includes the power to 
legislate with respect to matters corollary to divorce, such as spousal support, child support and 
child custody. In our view, it is unlikely that the courts would hold that Parliament has jurisdiction to 
make laws in relation to these matters for unmarried conjugal cohabitants or non-conjugal 
cohabitants. In accordance with the “living tree” principle of constitutional interpretation, it could be 
argued that federal jurisdiction in relation to marriage and divorce needs to evolve to reflect the 
demographic and normative transformations in the ways in which individuals form and leave 
conjugal relationships, which has transformed significantly since the division of powers was 
established in the Constitution. Federal jurisdiction in relation to marriage and divorce could perhaps 
be argued as broadly including jurisdiction in relation to conjugal relationships.  
However, this argument – admittedly precarious in its own right – could not be extended to 
include non-conjugal relationships. It would be incredulous to argue that the federal jurisdiction over 
marriage and divorce extended to the regulation of all adult personal relationships. Moreover, any 
effort to extend federal jurisdiction over marriage and divorce to include unmarried cohabitants 
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would amount to a serious incursion on provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights in 
the province.  
Even if the federal government cannot regulate entry and exit from non-conjugal 
relationships pursuant to its jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, its other heads of power enable it 
to regulate entry and exit from a civil status for the purposes of determining the scope of rights and 
obligations within validly enacted federal legislation. Consider, for example, the constitutional basis 
of Bill C-23. The Bill is not valid as an exercise of the federal power in relation to marriage and 
divorce. Rather, it is valid as an exercise of the federal government’s jurisdiction in relation to 
pensions, criminal law, banking, bankruptcy and so on. Just as the federal government must 
necessarily have jurisdiction to ascribe relational status to spouses and partners for the purposes of 
federal statutes, so too must it have the jurisdiction to add new relational categories to federal 
statutes. Therefore, the federal government could enact a registered domestic partnership regime 
for the purposes of including partners within federal laws that are in pith and substance in relation to 
matters within federal jurisdiction.  
Individuals could register their domestic partnerships and thereby be entitled to the range of 
rights and responsibilities within federal law. Within such a scheme, it would be important to have 
clearly demarcated rules for the entry into and exit from these relationships. A registered domestic 
partnership scheme would have to set out who could enter into domestic relationships (for example, 
any two individuals who have reached the age of 18 years), and the procedural and evidentiary 
requirements (for example, signed and witnessed registration forms).  Similarly, the scheme would 
have to set out the rules and procedures for exiting a domestic relationship (for example, unilateral 
termination by appropriate notice to the other party, effective date of the termination).460 
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Finally, the federal government does have jurisdiction to change the definition of marriage to 
include same-sex couples, who could be included with the definition of marriage, and who could 
then be included in the Divorce Act. If the definition of marriage was amended to include same-sex 
couples, then the definition of spouse in the Divorce Act would require amendment. Spouse is 
currently defined as “either a man or woman who are married to each other”. This definition would 
have to be changed to “either of two persons who are married to each other”. 461 
As discussed extensively above, there is a strong equality argument in favour of the inclusion 
of same-sex couples within the definition of marriage.462 Same-sex couples have an equal claim to 
the importance of being able to publicly announce their commitment, voluntarily assume mutual 
responsibilities, and seek legal recognition of their personal relationships. As we discussed above, 
amending the definition of marriage would also be consistent with the value of recognizing 
relationships of care and commitment in a manner that respects autonomy, privacy, equality and 
security. A government committed to promoting these normative values in the legal regulation of 
adult relationships ought to recognize same-sex marriage. However, as we also discussed above, 
the political will to do so has not yet materialized. The inclusion of a definition of marriage in Bill C-23 
is a regressive step that demonstrates that Parliament is not yet prepared to respond to the shifting 
public opinion polls that demonstrate that the majority of Canadians now support the recognition of 
same-sex marriage.  
 
 
B.  Responding to the Consequences of Emotional and Economic 
Interdependence in Adult Personal Relationships  
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1. Supporting the integrity and stability of Interdependent Relationships  
 
(a)  Immigration  
 The Immigration Act will not be amended by Bill C-23. As a result, same-sex and opposite-
sex cohabiting couples are still excluded from the definition of spouse within the sponsorship 
provisions. Because of the prohibition on same-sex marriage, and the lack of any domestic 
partnership regime whereby same-sex couples can opt in, they are completely excluded from any of 
the sponsorship provisions. This blanket exclusion cannot be justified. These couples have the 
same needs for family reuniification as other conjugal couples, and the same entitlement to have the 
integrity of their relationships recognized. Common law opposite-sex couples are also excluded from 
the definition of accompanying dependants, family class or assisted relatives – although at least 
some of these couples might be able to marry in order to qualify for sponsorship.  
However, the Minister of Citizenship has recently introduced Bill C-31, the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act,463 and has promised supporting regulations in the coming months that will 
expand the “family class”. This will include “modernizing the definition of family class to ensure 
consistency in accordance with government legislation under consideration – family class will 
include spouses, common-law and same-sex partners.”464  
No additional information is available at this time as to how the regulations will be drafted. 
However, the commitment seems to follow from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee to 
the Immigration Legislative Review, entitled Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future 
Immigration.465 In their view, “the defining principle in using the term ‘spouse’ must be emotional 
dependency as demonstrated through cohabitation”.466 Accordingly, the Report recommended that 
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the definition of spouse for the purposes of immigration and citizenship be redefined to include not 
only married partners, but also “a partner in an intimate relationship, including cohabitation of at 
least one year in duration, with the burden of proof resting on the applicant.”467 Given the approach 
taken in Bill C-23, it is likely that the inclusion of these cohabiting couples will take the form of 
adding “common law partner” to the regulatory scheme. 
 
Non-conjugal relationships 
Many non-conjugal relationships are recognized, under the provisions for family class 
sponsorship as well as assisted relative immigration. Only non-conjugal couples who are not 
relatives within the meaning of the family class or assisted relatives are excluded. There is no 
provision whereby an individual may be able to sponsor their closest friend, with whom they may 
have lived in a long term relationship of economic and emotional interdependency. Rather, only 
relationships of blood, marriage and adoption are recognized under the Act.  
In the Not Just Numbers report, the Advisory Committee recommended a number of 
amendments to the relational terms used in the Immigration Act that would include these excluded 
non-conjugal relationships. The Report was critical of the ways in which the Immigration Act sets out 
to define in considerable detail the degrees of relationship that can serve as the basis for 
sponsorship within the Family Class. “We prefer that family reunification be achieved on a functional 
rather than a purely categorical basis.”468 After quoting from Justice L’Heureux Dubé’s minority 
opinion in Mossop regarding the increasing diversity of Canadian families, the Report concluded that 
“individuals best understand where their emotional priorities lie, and consequently what constitutes 
their family”. 469 
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The Report recommended that the Family Class “be divided into three broad groupings, 
reflecting the varying degrees of emotional intimacy and dependency found in family relationships”. 
The first tier would include “those in the most intimate family core: spouses and dependent children”. 
The second tier would include fiancé(e)s, parents and when a sponsor’s parents are deceased, 
grandparents. The third tier would be a significantly broader category than currently found in the 
family class:  
Many individuals form strong emotional bonds with persons who are not their intimate 
partners or spouses, nor their biological parents, nor even blood relatives. More to the point, 
some people will be willing to demonstrate the importance of these other bonds by making a 
long-term financial commitment to assist the arrival, establishment and integration of these 
individuals into the Canadian community and economy. We believe that permitting such 
sponsorship can only contribute to our goal of strengthening the role of the family in its many 
forms as a primary unit of self-sufficiency and security.470 
 
The Report stated this “third tier” family class “will permit sponsors to decide who is most important 
to them, and who is part of what they consider family in the broadest sense. It could even include a 
best friend.”471 It recommended that third tier sponsors “be required to demonstrate that the 
individual they are sponsoring is known and emotionally important to them.”472 The crucial aspect of 
this third tier is that the sponsor be prepared to assume “a long term enforceable sponsorship 
commitment”.473  
We believe that there is considerable merit to these recommendations. Non-conjugal 
relationships that currently fall outside of the family class may be characterized by the same strong 
emotional intimacy that justifies sponsorship within the family class. Individuals in relationships of 
caring and commitment, including registered partners and domestic relationships should also be 
entitled to recognition and protection.  Individuals should be able to decide who is most important to 
them, to define their own sense of family, and to then undertake the very serious financial 
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commitment that accompanies sponsorship. It is an approach that balances the values of autonomy 
and equality, while promoting the value of caring and committed relationships.   
 
(b) Privileged Relational Communications 
We argued above that the special evidentiary rules regarding spousal competence and 
compellability should be abrogated so that all witnesses are placed on the same footing without 
regard to any relationship they have with an accused person. The reason for this recommendation is 
that the objectives of promoting the search for truth, respecting autonomy and fostering the physical 
and emotional security of witness spouses, outweigh the uncertain contribution the current rules 
make to the promotion of marital harmony or integrity. However, we recommended that the marital 
communication privilege be retained and extended, because it is more firmly grounded in the 
protection of privacy and the promotion of candour essential to the integrity of adult personal 
relationships.  
At present, the privilege set out in s.4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act applies only to marital 
communications. One implication of Bill C-23 is that federal public policy has rejected a hierarchy of 
values between marriage and common law partnerships. There can be no assurance that any 
particular marriage or partnership will in fact embody the ideals of companionship, commitment, 
intimacy and mutual support that the state is seeking to support. However, marriage and common 
law partnerships have equivalent potential to do so and attempting to draw qualitative distinctions 
within categories of relationships, while sound in principle, in practice would involve significant 
invasions of privacy. Therefore, the privilege should attach to all private communications between 
spouses and between common law partners. Similarly, the relationships of registered domestic 
partners are likely to be the relationships of primary emotional significance in the partners’ lives. This 
is also true of domestic relationships, i.e., persons who are living together in non-conjugal 
relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence for at least one year. The 
state has a strong interest in protecting the privacy and promoting candour and intimacy in each of 
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these categories. For these reasons, we recommend that the privilege in s.4(3) be retained and 
extended beyond marital communications to include private communications between common law 
partners, registered domestic partners, and persons who have lived together in a relationship of 
economic and emotional interdependence for at least one year. 
A case could be made for an even broader definition of the persons entitled to claim the 
privilege. Instead of imposing a “living together” requirement, the definition could be extended to any 
two persons who have a relationship of emotional interdependence that is of primary importance in 
each other’s lives. Such a definition would recognize that some people’s most emotionally 
supportive and intimate relationships are with persons with whom they do not share a household. 
They can rightly assert that their communications with their confidante should be no less privileged 
than communications between spouses, partners or persons living together in non-conjugal 
relationships. However, such an approach has the significant disadvantage of giving rise to 
uncertainties in its administration that are much larger than if the definition is limited to persons living 
together. In the context of criminal trials, uncertainties about whether or not evidence is admissible 
should be avoided if at all possible. 
 
2. Recognizing the Potential Existence of Shared Economic Interests in 
Interdependent Relationships  
 
 In general we believe that the state should define relationships that give rise to potential 
conflicts of interest broadly, so long as basic entitlements are not at stake, and so long as relational 
presumptions can be rebutted through the presentation of evidence. It is inappropriate to put in 
place inflexible rules that presume, for example, that spouses or partners never deal with each other 
at arm’s length because there will in fact be a great diversity of relationships within any particular 
legal category. 
An example of a statutory context where it is desirable to cast the relational net broadly is 
s.632(b) of the Criminal Code, the provision that enables judges to exclude a person from a jury if he 
or she has a “relationship” with one of the participants in the trial. In contrast to many other statutory 
175 
provisions seeking to identify shared interests in personal relationships, this provision of the Code is 
notable in not specifying the kinds of relationships that should excuse jurors. By leaving out a 
definition, Parliament has wisely left the matter to the discretion of trial judges and made it possible 
to respond to any kind of personal relationship, including friendships. Such a broad sweep is 
appropriate in this context for two reasons. First, the exclusion of related jurors has no negative 
consequences. The right to a jury trial does not include the right to have any particular person serve 
on the jury. Similarly, the right to serve on a jury does not require service on any particular jury. 
Second, where both fairness and the appearance of fairness are at stake, it is desirable to cast the 
relational net as broadly as possible. 
 Consider also provisions of laws, like the Bank Act, that place restrictions on the ability of 
persons related to directors or officers of financial institutions to enter into financial transactions with 
those institutions. These laws are designed to prevent the possibility that transactions between 
related parties will give rise to preferential treatment or the appearance of preferential treatment. 
There is a strong argument for casting the relational net broadly in this context as well. The objective 
of these statutes apply to anyone in a close personal relationship – spouses, relatives, common law 
partners, registered domestic partners and domestic relatives. Fundamental interests are not 
normally at stake, since the related party has the option of approaching another institution. The 
negative consequences of a presumption against fair dealing between related parties can be 
avoided if the presumption is rebuttable, that is, if the related parties are free to present evidence 
that their interests are not intertwined or that the proposed deal is in fact fair. 
 
3. Tailoring Financial Benefits and Penalties to Recognize the 
Consequences of Relationships of Economic Dependence or 
Interdependence 
 
(a) Guaranteed Income Supplement of Old Age Security Act 
 
 According to the current provisions of the Old Age Security Act, as described above in Part I, 
whether a pensioner is entitled to a guaranteed income supplement (GIS) is determined by a 
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formula that uses relational criteria. If a pensioner does not have a spouse or common law partner 
who is also a pensioner, then the GIS is calculated at the higher “single rate”, whether or not the 
pensioner is living with another person in a conjugal or non-conjugal relationship. The amount of the 
pensioner’s entitlement will be reduced by a formula that takes into account his or her income, or, if 
the pensioner has a spouse or common law partner, the combined income of the pensioner and his 
or her spouse/partner. If two pensioners are living together, then the amount of the GIS depends on 
whether the relationship is conjugal or non-conjugal. If the relationship is conjugal (i.e., the 
pensioners are spouses or common law partners), then the two pensioners each receive the lower 
“conjugal rate”, reduced by a formula that takes into account their combined income. If their 
relationship is non-conjugal, the two pensioners both receive the higher “single rate”, reduced by a 
formula that takes into account the claimant’s income alone (the income of non-conjugal cohabitants 
need not be declared). 
 Two assumptions explain the use of relational criteria in the scheme. The first is the 
assumption of economies of scale among cohabiting pensioners. The second is the assumption that 
the combined income of cohabiting persons is available to meet their needs. The troubling effect of 
these assumptions is to reduce or eliminate the GIS entitlements of old age pensioners if they are 
living with another pensioner in a relationship of caring and commitment. 
The economies of scale assumption that underlies the lower conjugal rate can be supported 
by empirical evidence: housing and food costs for two persons living together are less than those 
incurred by two single persons living in separate households. The difficulty with the lower conjugal 
rate is that it may operate in practice to discourage the formation of valuable domestic relationships. 
The problem here is one that must be faced in the design of any income or means tested 
programme of social assistance: the principle of adjusting benefits according to actual needs 
clashes with the value of supporting the formation and maintenance of relationships of caring and 
commitment. One approach to this dilemma, adopted by the Ontario Social Assistance Review 
Committee in 1988, is to provide the same benefits to a couple as two individuals. This approach 
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can be defended on the grounds that “a major disincentive to family life” is removed “without 
seriously violating the principle of need.”474 The GIS provisions of the Old Age Security Act, on the 
other hand, appear to give precedence to the principle of need over the value of promoting 
relationships of caring and commitment. 
In our view, rather than give either principle precedence over the other, the best approach 
would be to design the GIS provisions so that they balance the principles of need and relationship 
support. The principle of need does dictate that persons sharing accommodations with others 
receive benefits at a lower rate than persons living alone. However, the principle of relationship 
support suggests that the gap between the single and cohabitant rates should be set at a level that 
eliminates the risk that pensioners will be financially disadvantaged if they choose to live together in 
a relationship of caring and commitment. The gap between the single and cohabitant rates should 
be set at an amount significantly smaller, therefore, than the best estimate of the difference in per 
capita household costs based on the available empirical evidence.  
Because we are not familiar with the empirical evidence, we are not equipped to judge 
whether the current rates are set at levels that eliminate, or at least minimize, the risk of negative 
consequences for the principle of relationship support. Currently, the conjugal rate is set at 65% of 
the single rate. The question is whether we can be confident that low income seniors reduce their 
living expenses by more than 35% when they share accommodation. If not, the current rate structure 
gives inadequate weight to the value of supporting relationships of caring and commitment. The 
35% gap should be re-evaluated to determine whether it gives too much precedence to the principle 
of need over the principle of relationship support.  
Another difficulty with the current scheme is that it applies the lower conjugal rate only in the 
case of two pensioners living together in a conjugal relationship. The economies of scale 
assumption applies equally to any persons who are sharing a household. At the moment, however, 
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pensioners who are non-conjugal cohabitants and pensioners who are cohabiting in conjugal 
relationships with non-pensioners may claim the higher single rate. In our view, if the difference in 
the rates is grounded on valid empirical evidence regarding economies of scale, and if the rate is set 
at a level that achieves a balance between the principles of need and relationship formation, then 
the lower rate for cohabitants should apply whenever a pensioner is living with another person in a 
relationship of caring and commitment, including registered partners and domestic relations. 
The second area of concern with the GIS is the use of the combined income of cohabiting 
spouses and partners to determine their entitlement. These provisions are based on the 
presumption that the combined income of cohabiting spouses and partners is available to meet the 
individual needs of a particular cohabitant. The reliance placed on this assumption is problematic for 
two reasons. First, the pooling of resources may not occur in all marital and non-marital conjugal 
relationships. Second, resources may be pooled by non-conjugal cohabitants living together in 
relationships of caring and commitment.  
In our view, the presumption that combined income is available to meet the needs of persons 
in cohabiting relationships should not be retained in its current form. With appropriate modifications, 
however, we believe that it should be extended to cohabiting registered partners and domestic 
relationships. The problem with the current scheme, in our view, is that the presumption regarding 
pooled income cannot be rebutted except in the case of spousal separation. Section 15(4) of the Act 
provides that the Minister may treat a pensioner with a spouse as entitled to the “single rate” if the 
Minister is satisfied that the pensioner is separated from his or her spouse. Separation, however, is 
not the only circumstance that can prevent a pensioner from having access to the income of a 
cohabitant. Section 15(4) should be amended to enable the Minister to treat a pensioner as entitled 
to the “single rate” whenever the Minister is satisfied that the income of the person’s spouse, 
common law partner, registered partner or domestic relation is not available to meet the applicant’s 
needs. 
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Enabling pensioners to present evidence displacing the presumption of access to pooled 
income would prevent the presumption from operating in circumstances where its factual 
assumptions do not exist. Creating a rebuttable presumption has other advantages as well. We 
have already mentioned our concern about the perverse incentives generated by a scheme that 
accords single persons a higher OAS/GIS entitlement that they would receive if they were living with 
others in relationships of caring and commitment. As a general principle, we do not believe it is 
sound policy to deny benefits designed to meet basic individual needs simply because of the 
existence of an adult personal relationship per se. Such a scheme creates an unacceptable risk that 
the formation and maintenance of relationships of caring and commitment will be discouraged. This 
concern will be greatly alleviated if the OAS/GIS entitlement will be reduced only if the pensioner 
actually is receiving financial support out of the income of a cohabiting spouse, common law partner, 
registered partner or domestic relation. While this will ordinarily be the case, it will not always be so. 
Thus, the irrebuttable presumption that conjugal cohabitants have access to each other’s combined 
income in the current scheme should be replaced by a rebuttable presumption that all cohabitants, 
conjugal or non-conjugal, have access to each other’s combined income. 
 
(b) Survivors’ Benefits in Pension Legislation 
 As described in Part I above, the multitude of federal employment and veterans pension 
laws, the Canada Pension Plan, and the Pension Benefits Standards Act all make survivors’ 
benefits available to spouses and common law partners on the death of contributors, veterans or 
employees. Survivors’ benefits can be claimed regardless of gender. Nor is it necessary to establish 
need or dependency. Indeed, a common law partner is entitled to survivor’s benefits if at least one 
year of cohabitation preceded the death of the contributor. While the original rationale of survivor’s 
benefits was the presumed economic dependency of widows, the current schemes plainly serve 
compensatory as well as dependency objectives. Survivors’ pensions seek to compensate 
dependent spouses/partners for the sudden loss of income on which they have depended to meet 
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their financial needs. And, survivors’ pensions seek to compensate all spouses/partners, including 
those who are economically independent for facilitating the employment earnings of deceased 
contributors. 
 The most obvious difficulty with the current rules of entitlement in federal legislation is that 
survivors’ benefits are limited to persons who are spouses or common law partners of the 
contributor at the time of death. The dependency and compensatory objectives of survivors’ benefits 
are also relevant where a person was living with a contributor in a non-conjugal domestic 
relationship at the time of death.  
The possibility of allowing individuals in domestic relationships to receive survivors’ benefits 
should be seriously considered. The nature of their relationships may give rise to dependency or 
interdependency that is comparable to that arising between spouses or common law partners. As 
we have emphasized throughout this report, conjugal relationships are not unique in possessing the 
functional attributes relevant to state policy objectives. Federal pension laws fail to reflect the fact 
that conjugal relationships do not uniquely give rise to the kinds of dependency or interdependency 
to which survivor’s benefits seek to respond. 
At the same time, if Parliament were to add a definition of domestic relationship to the list of 
survivors entitled to CPP, veterans’ or employment pension survivor’s benefits, a number of 
difficulties would arise. There would frequently be a number of qualifying domestic relationships 
living with the contributor at the time of death.  Of course, at the moment there can be multiple 
claimants if the deceased leaves both a common law partner and a separated spouse. However, to 
add domestic relationships to the mix would give rise to daunting administrative complexities in 
dividing the survivor’s benefit between multiple domestic claimants. Moreover, the degree to which 
individuals in domestic relationships were dependent upon or facilitated the earnings of a contributor 
will vary much more dramatically than is the case with the class of spouses or common law partners 
as a whole. A presumption of entitlement is not justifiable, in our view, in the face of the wide 
variation in circumstances within the class of domestic relationships as a whole.  
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The best way of responding to the legitimate claims of non-conjugal cohabitants in this 
context, in our view, is to put in place a registered domestic partnership scheme and then add 
registered partners to the definitions of survivors in federal pension legislation. There is a strong 
case for permitting registered domestic partners to claim CPP, veterans’ and employment pension 
survivors’ benefits on the same terms as married spouses. Like husbands and wives, registered 
domestic partners have expressed their commitment to each other publicly, and have voluntarily 
subscribed to the full package of rights and obligations accorded to spouses and partners. It is a fair 
assumption that registered domestic partners, like husbands and wives, will have lived together in 
relationships of dependence or interdependence. The inclusion of registered domestic partners 
provides a means of responding to the legitimate claims of non-conjugal cohabitants without 
imposing undue costs and complexity on the administration of survivors’ benefits. By registering as 
domestic partners, persons in either conjugal or non-conjugal relationships would, in essence, be 
able to designate the person they consider the appropriate recipient of their survivors’ benefits. In 
this way, a registered partnership scheme avoids the problems of over-inclusion that would result if 
all domestic relatives could claim survivors’ benefits at the same time as it responds to the problems 
of under-inclusion in current legislation. 
 What of the situation of a contributor who dies without a spouse, common law partner, or 
registered partner? According to the existing scheme of legislation, no survivor’s benefits are 
payable in this situation even though the contribution rate to the CPP or employment pensions is not 
reduced to take account of single employees’ relational status. If survivor’s benefits are a form of 
entitlement earned in employment, arguably the principle of equal pay for work of equal value 
requires that an equivalent survivor’s benefit be available to all contributors regardless of their 
relational status. The pay equity concern could be addressed by amending federal pension statutes 
to give employees without spouses or partners the option of designating the beneficiaries of their 
 182 
 
survivor’s benefits,475 by enriching the death benefit that would be awarded to the estate of single 
employees, or by reducing the contribution rate of single employees. 
 In our view, framing the pay equity argument in this manner misses the mark. Survivors’ 
benefits, like disability and health benefits provided as part of employment contracts, are a form of 
group insurance rather than an equal employment entitlement like wages. The social insurance 
aspect of survivors’ benefits is more apparent in the Canada Pension Plan because it is a social 
programme that depends upon a great deal of cross-subsidization. Contributors to the CPP do not 
receive benefits that correspond to their contributions. For example, those who do not live to 
retirement age subsidize those that do. Contributors do have a legitimate claim to being treated fairly 
if the events that trigger the needs targeted by the statute occur. Employees’ and employers’ 
contributions to the Canada Pension Plan insure employees against their own income needs if they 
reach retirement age or become disabled. Similarly, employers’ and employees’ contributions to 
survivors’ pensions are a form of collective insurance. Benefits are payable on death only if a certain 
kind of loss has materialized. The aim is to ensure that employees’ spouses/partners (or their future 
spouses/partners) are compensated for the sudden loss of income on which they depended or to 
which they indirectly contributed through relational support.476 
The social insurance aspects of employment pension benefits may not be as readily 
apparent as they are in a national programme like the CPP. Nevertheless, collective risk-spreading 
and cross-subsidization, albeit on a smaller scale, are features of survivors’ benefits in employment 
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 See the proposals along these lines in Gwen Brodsky, Submission of the National Association of Women and the Law 
to the Standing Committee on National Health and Welfare on Survivor Benefits Under the Canada Pension Plan 
(Ottawa: NAWL, 1987) at 15; E. Gilchrist, “Superannuation, Discrimination and Same Sex Couples”, (1999) 8 
Australasian Gay & Lesbian L.J. 57 at 65-7. See also J. Freeman, “Defining Family in Mossop v. DSS: The Challenge 
of Anti-Essentialism and Interactive Discrimination for Human Rights Litigation”, (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 41 at 64-5 
(arguing that the definition of family for the purposes of entitlement to bereavement leave should depend on employee 
designation). 
476
 Relying on the social insurance goals of the CPP, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected two constitutional 
challenges to the provisions of the legislation. In Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, the Court held that the Plan did 
not discriminate on the basis of age by denying survivors’ benefits to young widows. In Granovsky v. Canada, 2000 
SCC 28, the Court held that the Plan does not discriminate on the basis of disability by not relaxing the eligibility 
requirements for partially disabled persons to the same degree as it does for the totally disabled. In both cases, the 
Court held that the Plan does not discriminate by targeting benefits to persons most in need. 
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pension plans as well. From a social insurance perspective, the single employee has no more 
complaint about his or her estate or chosen beneficiaries being denied survivors’ benefits than the 
able-bodied employee has about being denied disability benefits. The denial is premised on the 
absence of the relevant need. 
 It could be argued that the denial to single employees of an entitlement equivalent to 
survivors’ benefits runs counter to the value of autonomy. Relational status, unlike age or disability, 
may be the result of a conscious choice. Indeed, it is a product of individuals’ exercise of the 
fundamental freedom of intimate association. The state should not seek to influence individuals’ 
exercise of this freedom by attaching financial incentives to any particular relational status. On this 
argument, the current treatment of survivors’ benefits in federal pension legislation is objectionable 
because it asks single employees to subsidize the relational choices of spouses and partners.  
 We are not persuaded by the autonomy argument. We agree that the state violates the value 
of autonomy if it attaches financial rewards or penalties to a particular relationship status per se, 
without regard to its consequences. But the objective of survivors’ benefits is not to reward couples 
or to induce people into forming relationships of caring and commitment. Rather, the objectives are 
to respond to the distinct needs and legitimate claims that arise in relationships. The dependency 
and compensatory objectives do not fit the situation of single employees. 
 In our view, the situation of single contributors pursuant to the CPP and federal employment 
pension laws - including the limitation of survivors’ benefits to spouses, common law partners and 
(in our proposal) registered partners - is justified by the value of supporting relationships of caring 
and commitment. Supporting such relationships does not mean according coupled individuals 
preferential treatment compared to single individuals. Rather, it means recognizing and responding 
to the distinct consequences that accompany committed, caring relationships. Single contributors 
are treated differently not because their work is considered less valuable or their choice of living 
arrangements less worthy of concern and respect. They are treated differently because the 
dependence and compensatory objectives of survivors’ benefits are not normally relevant to the 
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circumstances of single employees to anything like the same degree that they are for employees 
with spouses or partners.  
Of course, in some cases there may be a person in a single contributor’s life who is 
dependent upon or has supported the contributor’s employment earnings. Indeed, there may be a 
number of such persons whose claim to survivors’ benefits could be justified according to the 
dependence and compensatory objectives. This valid concern, however, will not be so serious if the 
option of registering as domestic partners is available. By putting in place a registered partnership 
status, and adding registered partners to the definition of survivors in pension statutes, Parliament 
would make the functional equivalent of a designated beneficiary option available.  
 In summary, we believe that the dependency and compensatory objectives of survivors’ 
benefits will be best accomplished if the Canada Pension Plan, federal veteran employment pension 
plans, and the Pension Benefits Standards Act are amended to extend survivor’s benefits to 
registered domestic partners on the same terms as married spouses. The situation would then be as 
follows. If at the time of death the deceased was cohabiting with a common law partner, the 
common law partner will be entitled to survivors’ benefits. If the deceased also left a separated 
spouse or separated registered partner, they will be able to claim a share of the survivor’s benefits in 
proportion to the number of years they lived with the deceased.477 If there was no common law 
partner at the time of death, then the spouse or registered partner will be the sole survivor entitled to 
the benefits. 
  
4. Recognizing the Economic Costs and Value of Caregiving 
Relationships 
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 Former common law partners currently cannot claim survivors’ benefits, presumably on the assumption that proving 
the existence of a past common law relationship after the contributor’s death poses difficulties, and, in any case, a 
division of pension entitlements is now available to common law partners pursuant to the Pension Benefits Division 
Act. Former spouses currently cannot claim survivors’ benefits, presumably on the assumption that an equitable 
division of property, including pension entitlements, took place upon divorce. If this is right, former registered partners 
should be excluded from the definition of survivor only if they have access to a similar right to a division of pension 
entitlements upon break down of the partnership. 
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 We noted in our discussion in Part I above that no federal statute currently provides direct 
income support to persons who have provided unwaged domestic labour and caregiving services to 
members of their household. The performance of these socially valuable roles often entails 
substantial financial sacrifices. The government in the future ought to give serious consideration to 
the enactment of a homemaker’s or caregiver’s pension to accomplish this objective. Spousal or 
partnership status are crude means of identifying persons deserving of this kind of state support. 
The better approach in principle would be to design a scheme that can measure the actual quantity 
of unwaged domestic labour and caregiving provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Compensation for the loss of, or harm to, emotional and 
economically interdependent relationships 
 
(a) Wrongful Death Action in the Canada Shipping Act 
We argued above that the definition of “dependants” entitled to bring a wrongful death action 
arising from maritime torts is in need of reform. First of all, the word “dependant” is inapt in this 
context and should be replaced. It may have been an accurate description of many claimants in the 
nineteenth century, since many widows and children would not have had an independent source of 
income. Even then, claimants in fatal accident actions have never had to demonstrate dependence 
and the helplessness it suggests. Whether or not they have other means of financial or emotional 
sustenance, they are entitled to recover their relational losses. Therefore, we suggest that revised 
legislation adopt the terms “claimants” and “relational claims”, or some equivalent neutral 
terminology.  
The purpose of the relational claim – to compensate for the lost expectation of future 
economic or emotional support – suggests that the legislation should define the range of potential 
claimants broadly. This is especially so since inclusion in the list of claimants does not entitle one to 
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anything other than the right to attempt to prove such a loss through the introduction of evidence in a 
court proceeding. The danger of trivial relational claims being filed is reduced by other factors, such 
as the costs of litigation and the claimant’s burden of proof. If no loss can be established, then none 
will be awarded. Therefore we recommend that the list of claimants in s.645 of the Canada Shipping 
Act be expanded to include siblings, common law partners, registered domestic partners, and 
persons in a relationship of emotional interdependence with the deceased or injured person that 
was of primary importance to each other’s lives. The breadth of the latter portion of this suggested 
definition reflects the view that a “living together” requirement would unnecessarily restrict the 
objectives of the relational claim. The loss suffered on the death or injury of “best friends” may be as 
devastating as the loss of a spouse or partner. The phrase “of primary importance in each other’s 
lives” is intended to prevent claims being brought by multiple “best friends”. We are also suggesting 
that economic interdependence should not be a necessary attribute of the non-conjugal 
relationships embraced by this provision. This is because one objective is to compensate for the 
loss of future emotional support, whether or not it is accompanied by a loss of future financial 
support.  
 
6. Preventing violence or abuse in Adult Personal Relationships 
 
Section 215 of the Criminal Code 
 The offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life set out in s.215 of the Criminal Code 
aims to protect the most vulnerable persons in society from neglect that threatens their lives or 
health. In our view, there is little doubt that the offence pursues a legitimate state objective.478 
However, it is equally clear that the scope of the offence needs to be revised to bring it into line with 
modern relational realities and expectations. The law has remained substantially unaltered since its 
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 See the comments of LaForme J. in Middleton, supra note 243 at paras 54 and 56 (“it does not stretch the imagination 
to know that in most relationships one or more persons within it will be vulnerable and require the protection of 
s.215(4)(a)… it is well documented as an area of pressing and substantial concern in Canada which has been 
recognized by our courts time and time again.” 
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enactment in 1892.479 As LaForme J. commented in a decision finding that the provision violated the 
equality rights in s.15 of the Charter, “this law, as opposed to its purpose, is antiquated and is in 
serious need of consideration by Parliament if it is to address present needs and concerns.”480 
The Charter violation considered by LaForme J. was the exclusion of common law spouses 
from the offence. Parliament will have rectified this omission with the passage of Bill C-23. 
Nevertheless, problems in the definition of the offence remain. In our view, s.215 needs to be 
redrafted to capture spousal and partnership relationships in a narrower range of circumstances, 
and to capture a broader range of dependency relationships.  
The duty to provide necessaries will read as follows if the Modernization of Benefits and 
Obligations Act comes into force: 
215. (1) Every one is under a legal duty (a) as a parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a 
family, to provide necessaries of life for a child under the age of sixteen years; (b) to provide 
necessaries of life to his spouse or common law partner; and (c) to provide necessaries of 
life to a person under his charge if that person (i) is unable, by reason of detention, age, 
illness, mental disorder or other cause, to withdraw himself from that charge, and (ii) is 
unable to provide himself with necessaries of life. 
 
Section 215(2) provides that it is an offence to fail to provide necessaries of life to a child, spouse or 
common law partner who “is in destitute or necessitous circumstances” or whose life or health is 
endangered by the breach of duty. It is also an offence to fail to provide necessaries to a wholly 
dependent person under one’s charge if the failure endangers the life or health of that person. 
 In our view, the current provision is poorly tailored to the purpose of protecting wholly 
dependent persons from serious forms of relational neglect in two ways. First, it is premised on an 
outdated assumption of spousal dependency or helplessness. It is inconsistent with modern 
assumptions to require spouses to assume responsibility for each other’s care regardless of the 
existence of cohabitation. Section 215 reflects the older legal paradigm in which “husbands were 
under a duty to support their wives and provide for their necessaries during and (in the case of 
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 Middleton, supra note 243 at para. 54. 
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separation) after a marriage. The logic of support was simple. Marriage gave the husband power 
and property and made the wife correspondingly dependent. The dependence gave rise to a support 
obligation on the part of the husband toward the wife.”481 Now, it is not marital status itself, but the 
nature of the relationship and the expectations that may reasonably flow from it that give rise to an 
obligation of spousal support.482 If this is true in family law, it should be all the more so in the context 
of legal obligations enforced through criminal prohibitions where deprivations of physical liberty are 
at stake. 
 It follows, in our view, that the duty to provide necessaries should extend to spouses, 
common law partners and registered partners who are cohabiting, but should not be imposed on 
them if they are no longer living together. Otherwise the law will hearken back to the discredited view 
that relational status per se should give rise to legal obligations of support. On the other hand, if 
persons are living together after having expressed their commitment to each other through marriage 
or registered partnership, or have been living together in a conjugal relationship for at least a year, 
then it is indeed a fundamental moral failure to endanger the lives of their spouses or partners by not 
taking reasonable steps to provide them with food, clothing, shelter or medical care. 
 At the same time, s.215 captures too narrow a range of dependency relationships. The duty 
is currently limited to persons who have a wholly dependent person “under their charge”. This 
wording will capture custodians or institutional caregivers, such as prison officials or nurses, but it is 
an inapt expression for capturing the range of relationships than can give rise to extreme forms of 
vulnerability.483 The Law Reform Commission of Canada proposed in 1986 that the duty should 
                                                 
481
 Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 at para. 23 per McLachlin J. (as she then was). 
482
 Ibid. at para.44. The Bracklow decision supports the now well-established notion that spousal support obligations 
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 See, Stuart, supra note 479 at 90 (“Section 215 is arbitrary and creates anomalies.”). 
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apply to “other family members living in the same household” or “anyone under [a person’s] care”, as 
follows: 
Everyone has a duty to take reasonable steps, where failure to do so endangers life, to:  
(i) provide necessaries to  
(A) his spouse; 
(B) his children under eighteen years of age; 
(C) other family members living in the same household, or 
(D) anyone under his care 
if such person is unable to provide himself with necessaries of life.484 
 
We believe that, with appropriate refinements, this is a sound proposal for a revised s.215.485 
Arguably the offence should apply to serious endangerment of health as well as life, as is the case 
with the current offence. The closing language, which qualifies all of the relational duties created by 
the proposed section, makes clear that the purpose of the offence is to protect wholly dependent 
persons from serious neglect by the persons on whom they are dependent. It thus abandons the 
assumption of dependency accompanying any particular relational status that was the basis for the 
original duty imposed on husbands. 
We would suggest that the words “his spouse” in the Commission’s 1986 proposal be 
changed to “his or her spouse, common law partner or registered partner living in the same 
household.” This brings the relational definitions into line with Bill C-23’s approach and our 
suggestion that a registered domestic partnership scheme be enacted for the purposes of federal 
statutes. It is necessary to add a “living together” requirement to the duty owed by spouses and 
partners to each other, since it is inconsistent with contemporary expectations to impose such a duty 
upon the separation of spouses or partners.  
Rather than use the phrase “family members living in the same household”, we would 
suggest that the duty extend to “domestic relations living in the same household”. In this way, the 
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duty will extend not only to relatives by blood, marriage, partnership or adoption. It will also extend to 
other cohabitants in an economically and emotionally dependent relationship. And, finally, the 
phrase “under his [or her] care” is appropriate because the duty ought to extend to institutional 
custodians or caregivers and to persons who find themselves temporarily in circumstances where 
another person’s life or health is in their hands.486 
 
7. Restructuring Financial Arrangements on the Break down of 
Relationships of Caring and Commitment  
 
(a) Family support obligations 
Bill C-23 does not affect the law of divorce. As a result, only formerly married couples will be 
included within the corollary relief provisions of the Divorce Act. Couples who cohabit outside of 
marriage, and non-conjugal couples who might also need assistance in the restructuring of their 
financial relationships on relationship break down, are not covered by the federal Divorce Act. These 
relationships may also be characterized by economic interdependency, and may also confer 
economic advantages and disadvantages to the parties. When these relationships break down, an 
argument can be made that an individual who has conferred economic advantages on the other 
party should also be entitled to compensation for the disadvantages that he or she has incurred. 
While opposite-sex conjugal couples may access provincial support regimes, same-sex couples 
only have access in some provinces, and non-conjugal relationships are not generally included 
within provincial support regimes.487  
However, as discussed in the previous section, the federal government possesses limited 
constitutional jurisdiction to legislate in this area. When the federal government has passed 
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  As in, for example, the famous case of People v. Beardsley, (1907) 113 N.W. 1128, where the Supreme Court of 
Michigan acquitted a man charged with manslaughter for failing to secure medical attention for the woman with whom 
he was having an extra-marital relationship. The Court concluded that “no such legal duty as exists in law and is due 
from a husband towards his wife” was owed by Beardsley to his lover even when she was unconscious and in his 
care after ingesting a large quantity of morphine. 
487
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example section 32 of the Ontario Family Law Act.  
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legislation that deals with the rights and responsibilities of common law partners, it has done so as 
an incidental aspect of its jurisdiction in relation to some other federal constitutional matter, such as 
immigration, pensions, and taxation. The federal government has no independent power to legislate 
in relation to spousal and child support obligations, custody of and access to children, and the 
division of property. Rather, federal legislation in relation to these matters is valid only as an 
incidental aspect of federal jurisdiction in relation to the formation and termination of marital 
relationships.488 As we suggested above, it might be possible to argue that the federal jurisdiction in 
relation to marriage and divorce needs to evolve to reflect the demographic and normative 
transformations in the ways that individuals live in conjugal relationships. If the federal government’s 
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce was interpreted as including jurisdiction in relation to conjugal 
couples, then this jurisdiction could include corollary relief issues – spousal and child support, child 
custody and access.  Notwithstanding the “living tree” principle of constitutional interpretation, it is 
not likely that the courts would interpret the words “marriage” and “divorce” so broadly as to be 
capable of supporting laws that deal with matters such as support obligations. Further, the federal 
government could have no jurisdiction to deal with the support obligations of non-conjugal 
relationships.  These are matters that clearly fall outside federal jurisdiction in relation to marriage 
and divorce and within exclusive provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights in the 
province.  
As discussed in the previous section, the federal government does have jurisdiction to 
change the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, who could then be included in the 
corollary provisions of the Divorce Act, in relation to spousal support, child support, and child 
custody and access.  
 
(b) Enforcement of Family Support Obligations 
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  Section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Parliament jurisdiction to pass laws in relation to “marriage and 
divorce”. 
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 The federal statutes with provisions for the enforcement of family support obligations are 
drafted broadly to include persons with support obligations. The Garnishment, Attachment and 
Pension Diversion Act489 provides for garnishment and attachment of federal salaries, as well as the 
diversion of pension benefits from federal sources to satisfy financial support orders, including any 
support order made under the Divorce Act, or any provincial law relating to family support 
obligations. The superannuation statutes similarly allow for pensions, annuities or amounts 
otherwise payable under the statutes to be diverted to satisfy financial support orders in accordance 
with the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act.490 The Family Orders and 
Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act491 provides for the release of information that may assist in 
locating persons in default of their support orders, as well as for the garnishment and attachment of 
federal moneys to satisfy these orders, and the denial of federal licenses.  The statutes are as broad 
as the support obligations themselves – they include family support obligations under either federal 
or provincial law.492 As such, the breadth of these enforcement provisions are directly related to the 
breadth of these support obligations. To the extent that provincial law includes common law 
opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples and/or other dependant relationships within their 
provisions for support, then these family support obligations will be included with the enforcement 
provisions of these federal statutes.  Any question of extending the coverage to other adult 
relationships not currently included, such as ‘a domestic relationship’ or ‘a close personal 
relationship between persons who are not relatives’ is more appropriately a question for the law of 
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support obligations (provincial and federal) as discussed in the section above. If the law of support 
obligations was extended beyond its current scope (married spouses, common law opposite-sex 
partners, and in some provinces, same-sex partners, and adult children in relation to their parents) 
to include other familial or non-familial relationships, the federal enforcement provisions could and 
should apply. 493 
 
(c) Division of Pensions on Relationship Break Down 
The Canada Pension Plan Act, Pension Benefits Division Act and the Pension Benefits 
Standards Act provide for a division of pension earnings between spouses and common law 
partners when the relationship breaks down. Bill C-23, by including common law partners within 
these provisions, recognizes that these relationships constitute economic partnerships, thereby 
entitling the parties to share in the wealth generated during the relationship on relationship break 
.down.  
However, non-conjugal relationships are not covered by these statutes for the purposes of 
division of pension entitlements. There is no recognition that non-conjugal relationships may be 
characterized by economic interdependency, and no provision for the sharing in the wealth 
generated during these relationships if and when these relationships break down. The question to 
be addressed in evaluating this exclusion is whether these relationships ought to be recognized as 
economic partnerships, or whether there is a legitimate reason for their exclusion. 
While little consideration has been given to this exclusion in public policy debates, its 
defence would lie in the argument that non-conjugal relationships are qualitatively different from 
conjugal relationships. More specifically, the argument would focus on the differences in 
commitment, and the reasonable expectations of the parties. Non-conjugal relationships might be 
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a small amendment if the scope of support obligations was extended to non-familial relationships (unless ‘family’ was 
retained as a non-technical term, as suggested for example in the British Columbia Law Institute’s proposed Family 
Status Recognition Act). 
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said to not give rise to the same expectation of long-term commitment and mutual support. On the 
break down of these relationships, then, there would be no expectation of continued financial 
support, nor of sharing in the wealth generated during the relationship.  The argument could also 
rely on the exclusion of non-conjugal relationships from virtually all provincial family property 
regimes. 
 In contrast, the argument in favour of inclusion would argue that non-conjugal relationships 
may well involve the pooling of economic resources akin to the economic partnership model of 
marriage, and may well involve the assumption of mutual support obligations. While not all non-
conjugal relationships would be characterized by economic interdependency, the blanket exclusion 
of all these couples with no ability to opt in to the private rights and responsibilities could be argued 
to be too broad. At least some of the non-conjugal relationships do structure their relationships as a 
economic partnership, and would be in a similar position as conjugal couples on the break down of 
their relationships. The inability of the individuals within these relationships of economic 
interdependency to share in any of the wealth generated by the relationship arguably lacks a rational 
connection to the objectives of state legislation.494 
 One approach to inclusion of non-conjugal relationships for the purposes of pension division 
would be by way of a registered domestic partnership regime. Individuals in non-conjugal 
relationships could register their relationships, and thereby be entitled to the division of pension 
earnings within these federal statutes. Inclusion would then only involve those individuals who have 
chosen to designate their relationships as domestic relationships. It would be done on the basis of 
self-designation, and would thereby meet most of the objections to the inclusion. Individuals with a 
long-term commitment and with an expectation of sharing in the wealth generated by the partnership 
would be included.   
                                                 
494
  While most of the issues of division of property fall within provincial jurisdiction, the division of unadjusted federal 
pensions does fall squarely within federal jurisdiction, and federal law could be amended to include these 
relationships.  
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 The more difficult question is whether individuals in non-conjugal relationships who have not 
registered their relationships as a domestic partnership should ever be included for the purposes of 
pension division. If these individuals are not included through an ascribed relational status, there 
would be a serious possibility of under-inclusiveness – some individuals may have a long term 
commitment and an expectation to share in the wealth of the relationship, but do not register their 
relationship, and would thereby be excluded. However, an ascribed relational status creates its own 
risks, including a risk of over-inclusiveness. Ascribing relational status to non-conjugal cohabitants 
who have not designated their relationships as domestic partnerships would risk including a range of 
individuals who never intended to share in the wealth of the relationship.495  It would thereby risk 
undermining the value of relational autonomy.  Further, ascribing such relational status to non-
conjugal couples for the purposes of pension division would go well beyond the kind of division of 
property on relationship break down contemplated within provincial family law schemes, where the 
law remains reluctant to even ascribe spousal status.496  
It might be possible to ascribe relational status in a manner that establishes an appropriate 
threshold for claims to division of pensions on relationship break down. In New South Wales for 
examples, individuals in a domestic relationship may make an application for division of property on 
relationship break down.  But, the entitlement is not automatic – rather, the statute gives the courts 
the discretion to make such orders as seem to the court just and equitable, having regard to the 
contributions of the parties (both financial and non-financial). 497  However, in our view, the risks of 
adding a definition of domestic partner to these provisions allowing for a division of benefits on 
relationship break down outweighs the benefits.  At this stage, the best option for responding to the 
                                                 
495
  The  definition  for  ascribed  relational  status,  emphasizing  joint  residence  with  emotional  and  economic 
interdependency might go some distance to only including those relationships with such reasonable expectations of 
sharing in the wealth of the relationship.  
496
  Notwithstanding the fact that many law commission reports have recommended that these common law relationships 
be included within provincial division of property regimes. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 420, and 
the British Columbia Law Institute. See also Walsh v. Bona supra note 320 holding that the exclusion of these 
common law couples violates the Charter.  
497
 Section 20, De Facto Relationship Act 1984 N.S.W.   
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legitimate claims of non-conjugal cohabitants is to put in place a registered domestic partnership 
scheme, and then add registered partners to the provisions of the Canada Pension Plan Act, the 
Pensions Benefits Division Act and the Pension Benefits Standards Act.   
 
8. Conclusion 
As we have seen, the scope of federal legislation governing adult personal relationships has 
steadily expanded over the past thirty years. In undertaking this expansion, Parliament has been 
driven  largely by its desire to bring legislation into line with the requirements of formal legal equality. 
Law reform has come in three stages.  
 The first stage, characteristic of the early to mid-1970s, was a result of a drive to achieve 
formal sex equality. Gender-specific statutory provisions were expunged from the statute books. 
Rights and responsibilities that formerly could be claimed only by women or only by men were now 
possessed by men and women alike. Of course, behind the surface appearance of gender equality, 
a deeply gendered reality remained. One of the difficulties of accurately describing the contemporary 
roles of federal statutes is that their gender-neutral surface alters and obscures their original 
gendered objectives. The particular importance, for example, of pension survivors’ benefits or the 
old age spousal allowances to elderly women is not a matter of historical interest only.  
 The second and third stages have resulted from Parliament's desire to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation respectively.  The normative and 
legal commitment to formal equality required that functionally equivalent relationships be treated 
equally under the law. The second stage brought persons of the opposite sex within the legal 
category of spouse if they lived together outside of marriage in relationships that were functionally 
equivalent to marriage. This second stage elimination of marital status discrimination proceeded 
haltingly from the 1950s through the 1990s. Common law opposite-sex couples were added to 
federal pension and tax laws. Systematic progress did not occur until this year, with the expected 
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passage of Bill C-23. Soon unmarried opposite-sex couples will have the same rights as married 
couples in the vast majority of federal statutes.  
 In comparison, the third stage elimination of sexual orientation discrimination has advanced 
remarkably quickly. The process that began in 1999 in employment pension statutes will soon be 
largely complete with the passage of Bill C-23.  The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act 
will expand the application of federal relational statutes to include same-sex couples, along with 
unmarried opposite-sex couples, under the new label of common law partners. The second and third 
stages of reform will be complete if the exclusion of unmarried conjugal relationships from a handful 
of important statutes is addressed by Parliament, and if the same-sex marriage bar is removed. We 
argued that the remaining statutory anomalies - including the Immigration Act, the Canada Evidence 
Act and the Canada Shipping Act - need to be eliminated. There is no longer any compelling 
justification for the exclusion of conjugal couples from the full range of federal statutes imposing 
relational benefits and obligations. The inclusion of conjugal couples can be advanced in two ways. 
First, those conjugal couples who are currently excluded from marriage - that is, same-sex couples - 
ought to be given an opportunity to opt in to conjugal status. A government committed to the values 
of equality and autonomy in intimate relationships ought to amend the definition of marriage to 
include same-sex couples. However, given the continuing political resistance to this option, at a 
minimum, the federal government ought to enact a registered domestic partnership scheme that 
allows same-sex couples (among others) to opt into a new civil status entitling them to the full range 
of federal rights and responsibilities extended to spouses. 
 These three stages of law reform designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex, 
marital status and sexual orientation have been the focus of Parliamentary attention to relational 
statutes for several decades. The pattern has been to add a new layer of individuals or relationships 
to the existing legislative schemes. In our view, this process of law reform by accretion has not 
resulted in a serious interrogation of two questions that ought to give rise to fourth and fifth stages of 
law reform in this area. The first is whether the underlying objectives of relational statutes remain 
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legitimate. The second is whether relationships that lack a sexual component - and therefore may 
not qualify as conjugal - ought to qualify for inclusion in a broader range of federal statutes.  
 Our review of federal legislation led us to conclude that there are in essence two legitimate 
relational objectives being pursued by the state: the regulation of the formation and dissolution of 
relationships, and the regulation of the consequences of relationships characterized by emotional 
intimacy and economic interdependence. We discovered that the remarkable diversity of federal 
statutes employing adult relational terms can be allocated to one or the other of these objectives. In 
our view, these are both important state objectives. We have not called their legitimacy into 
question. In most federal contexts, therefore, the issue is not whether relational objectives should be 
abandoned. Rather, it is the scope of these laws - how they should define the relevant relationships 
to which they should apply - that is at issue. Our analysis did identify a number of federal statutes 
that employ relational terms in a manner that is no longer compelling or necessary to the pursuit of 
the two valid relational objectives. The rules regulating spousal competence and compellability in 
criminal trials, the monthly allowance in the Old Age Security Act, and the definitions of insurable 
employment in the Employment Insurance Act are examples of federal laws that do not promote 
legitimate relational objectives. We have suggested that these statutes should be amended to 
remove relational terms altogether. Our analysis also indicates that a number of relational statutes 
need to be updated to abandon outdated assumptions. Some statutes based on assumptions of 
married women’s economic dependency, for example, have never been seriously re-examined. 
They have simply been expanded to include individuals without discrimination on the basis of 
gender, marital status or sexual orientation. The repeal and refinement of outdated relational 
statutes is a fourth stage of law reform that remains to be accomplished (and needs to be 
accomplished on an ongoing basis). 
 Our report also seeks to advance the conversation about the situation of non-conjugal 
cohabitants. This group lacks a coherent identity. Their interests are not advanced by advocacy 
organizations, nor has anti-discrimination law placed their issues on the legislative agenda. It is not 
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clear whether living in a non-conjugal relationship is a ground of discrimination prohibited by human 
rights statutes or the guarantee of legal equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These 
differences in the political and legal resources available to non-conjugal cohabitants may help 
explain their marginalized position in federal statutes. The question of principle that remains, 
however, is whether these relationships have functional attributes worthy of greater recognition in 
federal statutes. Non-conjugal relationships are currently included in a limited number of federal 
statutes, in a manner that appears arbitrary and inconsistent. Moreover, with several notable 
exceptions, the inclusion of non-conjugal relationships is limited to individuals living in a household 
with others connected by recognized familial relationships, that is, by connections of blood, 
marriage, adoption or, after Bill C-23, common law partnership. Bill C-23 does not deal with non-
conjugal relationships generally, and thus, does nothing to remedy the perfunctory nature of the 
treatment of non-conjugal relationships in current federal legislation. 
       In our view, a detailed examination of the objectives underlying many federal statutes yields 
the conclusion that there are compelling reasons to include many persons living in non-conjugal 
relationships of dependence or interdependence in federal laws.  We are of the view that the best 
option for inclusion is through the enactment of a registered domestic partnership scheme, which 
would allow individuals in non-conjugal relationships to opt into the full package of relational rights 
and responsibilities in federal legislation. A domestic partnership regime would advance all of the 
fundamental values animating the regulation of adult relationships of caring and commitment: 
equality, autonomy, security and privacy. Individuals could choose the status of their relationships, 
and have this choice respected in law without undue intrusion into the intimate details of their lives.  
 The more difficult, and contentious issue is whether relational status should be ascribed to 
individuals in non-conjugal relationships who do not opt into a domestic partnership scheme.    
Ascribing relational status to individuals who have not opted in runs the risk of undermining the 
values of autonomy and reasonable expectations, by imposing rights and responsibilities never 
contemplated by the parties.  However, as we have tried to highlight, this is not an entirely novel 
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issue – federal legislation does currently ascribe relational status, and impose some rights and 
responsibilities to individuals in non-conjugal relationships through such concepts as dependant, 
associate and related persons.  But, this is not an issue that can in any way be answered in the 
abstract.  Rather, as we have insisted, the inclusion of these relationships can only be evaluated on 
a statute by statute, provision by provision basis.  There is, in some circumstance, a compelling 
case to be made for inclusion.   
For example, we argued that there is a strong argument for broadening the inclusion of non-
registered, non-conjugal relationships in immigration law. The category of 'family class' already 
includes a broad range of non-conjugal relationships, but does not allow for sponsorship of 
individuals who are not related to each other.  Given the seriousness of the sponsorship obligations 
– including the potential for long term financial support – individuals ought to be given an opportunity 
to decide for themselves who is sufficiently important to them (within the limits of a test for emotional 
interdependency), and to voluntarily undertake responsibility for that person.  In this sense, the 
recognition of a broader range of relationships would be entirely consistent with the value of 
relational autonomy.   
Similarly, we are of the view that domestic relationships of emotional intimacy and economic 
interdependency should be included within the privilege that attaches to private communications in 
the Canada Evidence Act.    As for statutes concerned with the potential existence of shared 
economic interest in interdependent relationships, we concluded that a compelling case can be 
made for including domestic relationships, provided that presumptions against fair dealing between 
the parties are made rebuttable.    In our consideration of statutes tailoring financial benefits and 
penalties to recognize the consequences of relationships of economic dependence or 
interdependence, we argued that there is a strong case to be made for including a broader range of 
domestic relationships in the rules for determining eligibility for the guaranteed income supplement 
of the Old Age Security Act.  We argued that the current system needs to be revised so that the gap 
between single and cohabitant rates is reduced and the presumptions regarding pooled income 
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made rebuttable. These refinements are necessary to ensure that the scheme does not have the 
perverse consequence of discouraging the formation of relationships of caring and commitment. 
With these revisions in place, we argued that the statute can more effectively target need by 
including a broad range of domestic relationships in its eligibility rules.  
In the context of compensation for the loss of future economic or emotional support, there is 
again a strong case to be made for defining the range of potential claimants broadly.   For example, 
we argued that including unregistered, non-conjugal relationships within s. 646 of the Canada 
Shipping Act does no more than entitle an individual with the right to try to prove such a loss through 
the introduction of evidence in a court proceeding. If no loss can be established, then none will be 
awarded.   Finally, in the context of preventing violence or abuse in adult personal relationships, we 
were similarly of the view that it was entirely appropriate to include unregistered, non-conjugal 
relationships within the ambit of section 215 of the Criminal Code dealing with the necessities of life.  
 However, there are other legislative contexts in which we believe that it would be less 
appropriate to ascribe relationship status to individuals in non-registered, non-conjugal relationships. 
Survivors’ benefits and division of pension earnings on relationship break down in pension 
legislation are two examples of legislative contexts in which we believe that it would not be 
appropriate to ascribe relationship status through a definition of domestic relationship.  In these 
contexts, the administrative complexities, the problems of overbreadth, and the risks to relational 
autonomy outweigh the advantages of inclusion.  It is quite possible that this conclusion could 
change over time, as more and more non-conjugal relationships come to be included in the web of 
federal legislation, creating a different and higher set of expectations amongst individuals within 
these relationships.  However, at this stage, the best option would be to create a means by which 
individuals in these relationships could opt to have their relationships recognized (domestic 
partnership registration), allowing these individuals to choose to be included within these statutory 
provisions. 
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 In returning then, to the scenario with which we began – of the two individuals who have lived 
together for 15 years in a close emotional and economic relationship of caring and commitment – 
the question of their inclusion in the web of federal legislation can only be answered conditionally 
and contextually.  If they have chosen to express their commitment to care for each other through 
marriage or registered partnership, then, yes, they should be included in all federal relational 
statutes. If they have lived together in a conjugal relationship for at least a year, after Bill C-23 they 
will be included in the vast majority of federal statutes as common law partners. But what if they 
have not chosen to formalize their non-conjugal relationship through registered partnership or 
marriage? Should their relationship nevertheless be included in rules regulating conflict of interests? 
Yes, provided that the rules allow assumptions of shared economic interests to be rebutted. Should 
they have a legal obligation to provide for one another? It depends. For the purposes of criminal 
sanctions of failing to provide the necessaries of life? Yes, if they still live together and one is wholly 
dependent on the other. On relationship break down? Yes, if they are married. If they are common 
law partners, registered partners, or living in a domestic relationship, the answer is likely well beyond 
the scope of federal jurisdiction. Should the state provide financial relief if their household income is 
suddenly diminished as a result of disability, retirement or death? In many cases the answer is no 
since the group of unregistered non-conjugal cohabitants is too diverse to justify broad 
presumptions of dependence or interdependence. The answer might be  yes if the nature of the 
statutory scheme enables the isolation of situations - through an adjudicative or administrative 
process - where a real relational loss has occurred. 
What is clear is that the answers to these questions can no longer be answered simply by 
whether or not the individuals were married.  Marriage is no longer an appropriate proxy for marking 
those relationships deserving of legal recognition.  Nor can the question be answered simply by 
reference to whether or not they are living in a marriage-like or conjugal relationship. The question of 
the appropriate scope for the legal regulation of adult personal relationships now requires a far more 
complex series of inquiries into the objectives and assumptions of the statutory provisions.  
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Moreover, the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships is becoming less and 
less clear, and can no longer serve as the basis for determining entitlements and obligations across 
the board.  Rather, as we have argued throughout this paper, federal statutory provisions need to be 
examined on a statute by statute, objective by objective basis.   And there is a compelling case to be 
made in many contexts to expand the scope of federal regulation to include non-conjugal couples.  
 Finally, it is important to emphasize that the process of rethinking federal legislation, and 
expanding the scope of federal regulation is precisely that – a process.  And as such, the process is 
likely to be evolutionary.  The inclusion of non-conjugal relationships in some legislative contexts 
and not others will no doubt have to be re-evaluated in the future.  Much like the progressive 
inclusion of conjugal couples within federal legislation, it may well be that in the future, the values of 
equality, autonomy, privacy and security will require a more complete inclusion.  Or perhaps not.  
The legal regulation of non-conjugal relationships remains relatively uncharted territory, and there is 
little reason to believe that the conclusions reached today will withstand, without further amendment, 
the test of time.   
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Appendix A: 
 
Origins and Evolution of Definitions of Common  
Law Spouses in Federal Legislation 
 
 
 
Marital Model: Spouse and related terms referred to wives and, sometimes, husbands. Common 
law couples were not recognized. Before the 1950s, this was the dominant model (departed from 
only in the case of common law spouses of men in the armed forces in the Pension Act of 1919). Its 
dominance was eroded beginning in the 1950s in pension statutes. The definition of spouse as 
husbands and wives has been revived by Bill C-23 just as the exclusivity of marriage as a policy 
device has been rejected. 
 
Model #1 (up to 1970s): Decision-makers had discretion to deem a woman to be a surviving widow 
if she established that she had "been maintained" and "publicly represented by the contributor as the 
spouse of the contributor" for seven years (if either the deceased or the claimant were married to 
someone else) or for an unspecified "number of years" (if neither was married). 
Comment: This gender-specific definition of common law spouses responds to women’s actual (not 
presumed) dependence. It creates a discretionary entitlement in contrast to the rights of wives. The 
onus is on the claimant to establish the relevant facts, which include a lengthy period of 
cohabitation. The definition reflects deep ambivalence about recognizing women in common law 
relationships at all. 
 
Model #2 (1970s): Like model #1, the entitlement of common law cohabitants is discretionary. The 
dependency (“been maintained”)  requirement is dropped, and the number of years of required 
cohabitation is reduced to three if the contributor was married and one if not. 
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Comment: The entitlement is rendered gender neutral. The unstructured discretion of decision-
makers and the onus on the claimant remains. This definition indicates a grudging move towards 
greater recognition of women (and men) living in opposite-sex relationships outside of marriage. 
 
Model #3 (1970s-1990s): The duration of required cohabitation is reduced to one year in all cases. 
Public representation as husband and wife is required and the entitlement is discretionary. 
Comment: Shorter period of cohabitation but discretionary nature of entitlement keeps common law 
spouses in a second-class legal position compared to married spouses. 
 
Model #4 (1980s-1990s): A spouse is defined as a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting 
with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the time of the contributor’s death, having so 
cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year (in some statutes, the 
requirement of public representation as husband and wife is retained in place of the conjugal 
requirement). 
Comment: The discretionary nature of the entitlement in the previous models is repealed. 
Entitlement now follows from recognition just as it does for married spouses. Represents a 
significant step forward in eliminating marital status discrimination. 
 
Model #5 (1999-2000): This model was first adopted in the definition of survivor added to a number 
of pension statutes by the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34. It was 
extended to most federal statutes dealing with the rights of spouses by the Modernization of Benefits 
and Obligations Act, 2000. As in the marital model, spouse is a term restricted to husbands and 
wives. Common law partners are included alongside spouses in federal statutes. "Common law 
partner" is defined as "a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship" at 
the time of the contributor’s death, "having so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period 
of at least one year." 
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Comment: Bill C-23 removes opposite sex common law couples from the definition of spouse in 
pension statutes and the Income Tax Act. It creates a new status of common law partner that has 
the effect of adding same-sex couples to federal statutes and extending the inclusion of opposite-
sex common law couples beyond pension and tax laws. Model #5 represents a significant step 
forward in eliminating discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation in the 
distribution of burdens and benefits. However, its terminology is regressive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
YEAR THAT COMMON LAW SPOUSES INCLUDED 
 IN CURRENT STATUTES PRIOR TO BILL C-23 
 
 
 
Statute Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 
Canada Pension Plan498 1966 1974 1986  2000 
      
Canadian Forces Superannuation Act499 1959 1975 1992  1999 
Defence Services Pension Continuation Act500 1955 1975 1993  1999 
Income Tax Act501    1993 2000 
Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act502 – M.P.s 
                                                                                - P.M. 
   1995 1999 
2000 
Old Age Security Act 503 – spousal allowance 
                                    – guaranteed income supplement 
 1975504  1985 
1998 
2000 
2000 
                                                 
498
  Canada Pension Plan, S.C. 1964-65, c.51, s.56; An Act to amend the Canada Pension Plan, 1974-75-76, c.4, s.30; R.S.C. 1985, c.30 (2nd 
Supp.), s.1; Bill C-23, s.42. 
499
  Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, S.C. 1959, c.21, s.12(4); S.C. 1974-75-76, c.81, s.39(3); S.C. 1992, c. 46, s. 43; Public Sector Pension 
Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34.  
500
  Defence Services Pension Continuation Act, S.C. 1955, c.28, s.15; S.C. 1974-75-76, c.81, s.51; S.C. 1992, c.46, s.86; Public Sector Pension 
Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.207. 
501
  S.C. 1994, c.7, Sch. VIII (1993, c.24), subsec. 140(3); Bill C-23, s.141.  
502
  Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act, S.C. 1992, c. 46, s. 81; S.C. 1995, c.30, s.4 and s.13; Public Sector Pension Investment Board 
Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.224; Bill C-23, s.179. 
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Pension Act505 1919
506
 1975   2000 
Pension Benefits Division Act507    1992 2000 
Pension Benefits Standards Act508    1986 2000 
Public Service Superannuation Act509 1953 1975 1992  1999 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Continuation Act510   1992  1999 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act511 1959 1975 1992  1999 
War Veterans Allowance Act512 1961 1974 1990  2000513 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
503
  Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.O-9; S.C. 1974-75-76, c.58, s.1(2); R.S.C. 1985, c.34 (1st supp.), s.1(1); S.C. 1998, c.21, ss.108-11; Bill C-
23, s.192. 
504
  Unlike other uses of model #2, the 1975 Old Age Security Act definition gave rise to an automatic entitlement. 
505
  Pension Act, S.C.1919, c.43, s.33(3); S.C. 1970-71-72, c.22 (2nd supp.), s.1(2); S.C. 1974-75-76, c.66, s.14; S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c.19, s.14(4); 
S.C. 1990, c.43, s.21; S.C. 1995, c.18, s.64; Bill C-23, s.211. 
506
 The 1919 Pension Act, and 1980 and 2000 amendments to the Act, do not fit the models neatly, since they all require cohabitation for an 
unspecified $reasonable time” and the entitlement remains discretionary throughout. 
507
 Pension Benefits Division Act, S.C. 1992, c. 46; Bill C-23, s.243. 
508
 Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.), s.2(1); Bill C-23, s.254(1). 
509
  Public Service Superannuation Act, S.C. 1952-53, c.47, s.12(4); 1974-75-76, c.81, s.9; S.C. 1992, c.46, s.13; Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.53. 
510
  Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Continuation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-10; S.C. 1992, c.46, s.91; Public Sector Pension Investment Board 
Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.216. 
511
  Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act, S.C. 1959, c.34, s.13(4); 1974-75-76, c.81, s.60; S.C. 1992, c. 46, s. 72; Public Sector 
Pension Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.169(2). 
512
  War Veterans Allowance Act, S.C. 1961, c.39, s.2(3); S.C. 1974, c.8, s.3(7); S.C. 1975, c.66, s.24; S.C. 1990, c.43, s.32(6); Bill C-23, s.317(10). 
513
  The reform of the War Veterans Allowance Act has consistently lagged behind the other federal pension statutes. The entitlement of common law 
spouses has remained discretionary, although this will no longer be the case if Bill C-23 is enacted (dropped by the other statutes when they 
adopted model #4). Remarriage by a common law partner still terminates entitlement (even after Bill C-23), although this is no longer the case in 
the other pension statutes. 

  
Appendix B 
 
Summary of Amendments to Federal Statutes in Bill C-23, 
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act 
 
 
 
1. Statutory provisions that previously applied to married spouses only, that after Bill C-23 will 
apply to married spouses and common law partners 
 
Statute Section Bill C-23 section  
Bank Act s.283(1)(e) associate of the offeror includes spouse s.4 
Bank Act s.486(1) related party includes spouse s.7 
Bank Act s.496(5) and (6)  when loans to spouses of senior officers permitted s.5 
Bank Act s.675(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or 
other dependant 
s.6 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.4(2) “related persons” includes marriage s.9 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.113(3) spouse of bankrupt cannot vote for trustee or inspectors s.13 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.121(4) spousal support a provable claim, not released by discharge s.14 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.137(2) spouse or former spouse cannot claim wages before other 
creditors 
s.15 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.138 family claims (including married spouses) for wages cannot be 
preferred 
s.16 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.178(1) discharge in bankruptcy does not release the bankrupt from 
liability for spousal or child support 
s.18 
Business Development Bank of 
Canada Act 
s.31 “interested person” includes spouse s.26 
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Canada Business Corporations Act s.2(1) defines “associate” as including spouse s.27 
Canadian Cooperatives Act s.2(1) defines “associate” as including spouse s.28 
Canada Corporations Act s.100(1) defines “associate” as including spouse s.29 
Canada Elections Act s.15(1) anti-nepotism clause prohibits hiring of spouse s.31 
Carriage by Air Act sch. 2, s.1 relational tort claim; includes liability to husband or wife s.73 
Citizenship Act s.5(1.1) s.74, s.75 
Cooperative Credit Associations Act s.410(1)(c) related party includes spouse s.86 
Cooperative Credit Associations Act s.466(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or 
other dependant 
s.85 
Corporations Returns Act s.2(1) related group includes marriage s.87 
Criminal Code s.215 duty to provide necessaries to spouse s.93 
Criminal Code s.423(1) intimidation through threats to spouse an offence s.95 
Criminal Code s.718.2 spousal abuse a factor in sentencing s.95 
Criminal Code s.738(1) restitution order may include moving expenses of A “spouse” 
and member of household if harmed or threatened 
s.95 
Criminal Code s.810 may lay an information when fear of harm to spouse s.95 
Customs Act s.45(3)(a) “related persons” includes marriage s.96 
Diplomatic Service (Special) 
Superannuation Act 
s.5(9) death benefit to spouse s.100 
Excise Tax Act s.2(2.2) references definition in Income Tax Act s.140, Sch.2, s.10 
Excise Tax Act s.325 transactions between spouses not arm's length s.112, Sch.1, s.1 
Governor General’s Act s.7, s.8 death benefit to spouse s.127, s.128 
Insurance Companies Act s.307(1)(d) associate of the offeror includes spouse s.154 
Insurance Companies Act s.518(1) related party includes spouse s.158 
Insurance Companies Act s.529 when loans to spouses of senior officers permitted s.155 
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Insurance Companies Act s.706(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or 
other dependant 
s.157 
Judges Act s.40 moving expenses for surviving spouse s.160 
Judges Act s.44, ss.46-9 survivor benefits to spouse ss.162-7 
Lieutenant Governors 
Superannuation Act 
s.2 definition of survivor added s.170 
Lieutenant Governors 
Superannuation Act 
ss.7-9 survivor benefits to spouse ss.171-5 
Members of Parliament Retiring 
Allowances Act 
s.49 survival benefits to spouse of former Prime Minister s.180 
Special Import Measures Act s.2(3) related persons includes married persons s.291 
Trust and Loan Companies Act s.288(1) associate of the offeror includes spouse s.299 
Trust and Loan Companies Act s.474(1) related party includes spouse s.302 
Trust and Loan Companies Act s.484 when loans to spouses of senior officers permitted s.300 
Trust and Loan Companies Act s.534(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or 
other dependant 
s.301 
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2.  Statutory provisions that previously applied to married spouses and common law 
heterosexual couples, that after Bill C-23 will apply to married spouses and common law 
partners 
 
 
Statute Section Bill C-23 section  
Agricultural Marketing Program Act s.3(2) presumption against arm’s length transactions if ’cohabiting’ or 
married 
s.2 adds common 
law partners 
Canada Pension Plan amended to include common law partners throughout s.42-65 
Employment Insurance Act s.5 employment not insurable if not at arm’s length sch.2, s.10 
Income Tax Act amended to restrict spouse to married persons, and to include common 
law partners throughout 
ss.130-146, 
Schedule 2 
Old Age Security Act s.12 calculation of entitlement to guaranteed income supplement s.207 
Old Age Security Act Entitlement to spousal allowance  ss.195-202 
Pension Act Survivor benefit’s to spouse ss.212-240 
Pension Benefits Division Act Amended to include common law partners throughout ss.243-253 
Pension Benefits Standards Act s.2(1) spouse redefined to remove common law couples; definition of 
common law partner added, and implemented throughout the Act 
ss.254-264 
War Veterans Allowance Act 
 
s.2(1) spouse redefined to remove common law couples; definition of 
common law partner added, and implemented throughout the Act 
ss.317-337 
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3.  Statutory provisions that apply to married spouses and common law partners that will not 
be amended by Bill C-23 
 
 
Statute Section 
1. Canadian Forces Superannuation Act see definition of survivor in s.29(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.136 
2. Defence Services Pension Continuation Act see definition of survivor in s.32(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.214 
3. Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances 
Act 
see definition of survivor in s.2(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.224 
4. Public Service Superannuation Act see definition of survivor in s.25(4) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.75 
5. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension 
Continuation Act 
see definition of survivor in s.25.1 enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.222 
6. Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Superannuation Act 
see definition of survivor in s.18(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment 
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.185 
 
 
 
 
 
 226 
 
 
4.  Statutory provisions that apply only to married spouses that will not be amended  
by Bill C-23 
 
 
Statute Section 
Canada Evidence Act s.4 rules regarding competence and compellability of spouses, and marital communications 
privilege 
Canada Shipping Act s.645 dependants entitled to bring wrongful death action for maritime tort includes A ‘wife, 
husband' 
Canada Shipping Act schedule 6, c.1, art. 3 claims by 'dependants' of employees governed by contract 
Criminal Code s.159(2) married persons under the age of 18 are exempt from the anal intercourse offence 
Criminal Code s.307(2) defamatory libel can extend to statements made in debates of House of Commons 
regarding marriage or divorce 
Employment Insurance Act s.133 subject to privilege in s.4(3) of Canada Evidence Act, spouse is competent and 
compellable regarding offence of false statement 
Immigration Act s.2(1) dependant includes spouse; member of family class includes spouse and fiancé(e) 
s.6(1) immigrant who meets all selection standards and dependants entitled to landing 
s.6(2) sponsorship of family class 
Special Retirement Arrangement 
Act 
s.22 
Young Offenders Act s.9(4) notice of arrest and detention of young offender may go to married spouse instead of 
parent 
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5.  Statutory provisions that use other household, family or relational definitions that will be 
amended by Bill C-23 
 
 
Statute Section Bill C-23 section  
Agricultural Marketing Programs Act s.3(2) if cohabiting or related by blood, adoption, marriage, presumed 
to be not at arm’s length unless proven to the contrary 
ss.2-3: 
presumption 
extended to CLPs  
Bank Act s.283(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’ s.4 adds CLPs 
Business Development Bank of Canada 
Act 
s.33 applicant must disclose ’interested person’; Board approval of 
assistance necessary 
s.26 adds CLPs 
Canada Business Corporations Act s.2(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’ s.27 adds CLPs 
Canada Cooperatives Act s.2(1) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’ s.28 adds CLPs 
Canada Corporations Act s.100(1) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’ s.29 adds CLPs 
Insurance Companies Act s.307(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’ s.154 adds CLPs 
Trust and Loan Companies Act s.288(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’ s.299 adds CLPs 
Visiting Forces Act s.2 definition of dependant replaced; now defined as ’a person who 
forms part of a member’s household and depends on the member for 
support’ 
s.316 
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6.  Statutory provisions that use other household, family or relational definitions that will not be 
amended by Bill C-23 
 
 
Statute Section 
Canada Labour Code s.210(1) bereavement leave entitlement on death of employee’s ’immediate family’ member 
Corrections and Conditional Release 
Act 
s.71(1) in order to promote relationships, reasonable contact, including visits with ’family, 
friends and other persons’, should be encouraged 
Criminal Code s.91(5), s.94(5), s.113(1) exemption to firearms offences if used ’to sustain the person’s family’ 
Criminal Code s.121(1) bribery includes offer to ’any member of [an official’s] family’ 
Criminal Code s.186(2) can wiretap solicitor’s residence if ’member of the household’ is suspected of criminal 
activity 
Criminal Code s.264(2) criminal harassment includes threatening ’any member of their family’ 
Criminal Code s.423(1) intimidation aimed at ’relatives’ is an offence 
Criminal Code s.632 judge can excuse juror who has ’relationship’ with accused (not defined) 
Criminal Code s.738(1) restitution order may be made to cover moving expenses if ’any member of the 
household’ harmed or threatened 
Excise Act s.176(1) exemption for brewing beer for family consumption 
Excise Act s.227 exemption for tobacco ’for use of family’ on farm 
Firearms Act s.112(2) exemption to offence if used to sustain the person’s family 
Investment Canada Act s.3 ’voting group’ includes 2 or more persons in a ’personal relationship’ who ’would ordinarily 
be expected to act together’ 
National Defence Act s.117 offence to receive gifts etc. ’by or through any member of his family’ 
Special Import Measures Act s.2 question of fact whether persons not related to each other were at ’arm’s length’; irrebutable 
presumption that related persons are not 
Territorial Lands Act s.20(4) eviction order can require removal of ’all members of that person’s family’ 
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Witness Protection Program Act s.2 ’witness’ means a person who may require protection ’because of their relationship or 
association’ with a witness 
Young Offenders Act s.16.2, s.24.1, s.26.2 sentencing should take into account accessibility to ’family’ 
 
 
 
7. Statutory provisions that previously employed relational terms that will be repealed by (or use of relational 
terms removed by) Bill C-23  
 
 
Statute Section Bill C-23 section 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.91(3) settlements made within one year of bankruptcy void unless made 
before and in consideration of marriage 
s.11 repealed 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.92 covenants or contracts made in consideration of marriage s.12 repealed 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.93 payments of money that are void against the trustee s.12 repealed 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s.177 transactions made in consideration of marriage s.17 repealed 
Bridges Act s.14 liability to any person including the wife or husband s.25 relational terms 
deleted 
Criminal Code s.23(2) married persons cannot be accessories after the fact for providing 
comfort, assisting escape 
s.92 repealed 
Criminal Code s.329(1) theft does not apply to property of cohabiting husband and wife s.94 repealed 
 
 
 
 
